CAN  WE  BE  SURE 
OF  MORTALITY? 

By 

WM.  A.  CHENEY 


Trade 


Mark 


JAN  161911 


IF¥ 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

University  of  California. 


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CAN  WE  BE  SURE  OF  MORTALITY? 


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CAN  WE  BE  SURE  OF 
MORTALITY? 

A    LAWYER'S    BRIEF 

BY 

WM.   A.   CHENEY 

EX-JUDGE  OF  THE  SUPEEIOE  COURT  OF  THE 

STATE  OF  CALIFORNIA  IN  AND  FOR 

LOS  ANGELES  COUNTY 

TRADE 


NEW  YORK 
ROGER  BROTHERS,  Publishers 

1910 


LONDON:   L.   N.   FOWLER  &  CO. 


OF  THE 


OF 


^Lironw 


Copyright,  1910,  by 
WILLIAM  ATWELL  CHENEY 


THE  TBOW  PSES8,  NEW  YORK 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

Preface vii 

I.     Introduction 1 

II.  Some  Things  Which  Science  Does  Not  Know    18 

III.  The  Living  Environment 33 

IV.  Eelationship 66 

V.     The  Witnesses 80 

YI.     Consciousness  and  Pain 98 

VII.     Memory 117 

VIII.     Monism 134 

IX.     The  Will 145 

X.     The  Eternity  of  Individuality 151 

XI.     Conclusion 194 


207173 


PEEFACE 

If  it  be  true  that  "you  are  not  all  included  be- 
tween your  hat  and  your  boots,"  then  possibly  the 
residue  or  individual  is  not  mortal  after  all.  One 
surmises  many  things  about  this  selfsame  indi- 
vidual irrespective  of  biology,  anatomy,  or  phys- 
ics in  general,  and  while  a  surmise  is  not  a 
datum,  it  often  evolves  an  experience  which  re- 
sults in  the  acquisition  of  a  fact.  Good  guessing 
is  second  cousin  to  an  hypothesis,  especially  if 
based  on  a  fair  amount  of  actuality.  Are  we  sure 
then  that  we  are  mortal?  Furthermore,  are  the 
professors  of  exact  science  quite  certain  that  the 
individual  is  annihilated  when  the  body  dies  as 
such  and  goes  back  to  the  elements  whence  it 
came?  The  amount  that  we  know  is  absurdly 
small  compared  with  that  yet  unexplained,  and 
the  Eiddle  of  the  Universe  is  not  so  easy  of  solv- 
ing as  some  of  our  professors  may  suppose.  To 
be  sure,  a  key  is  a  good  thing,  and  we  have  one 
already  that  unlocks  many  doors;  but  on  ahead 
are  more  and  still  more  closed  avenues  not  yet 
explored. 

The  word  science  means  to  know,  this  term  by 
its  very  nature  implying  the  unknown;  and  the 
scientist  is  simply  a  human  being  conscientiously 

vii 


Vm  PBEFACE 

dealing  with  the  negatives  and  positives  of  pos- 
sible knowledge.  He  gropes  about  in  the  dark 
with  his  torch  of  a  fact,  getting  glimmers  here  and 
there  of  new  data  or  a  law,  like  the  pay  streak  in 
ore-bearing  rock — that  which  is  seen  is  but  an  in- 
dication of  that  which  is  hid,  and  only  the  indi- 
vidual who  admits  this  is  worthy  the  term  of  sci- 
entist. Should  we  discover  the  secret  of  secrets, 
the  final  or  first  principle — the  hidden  mainspring 
that  once  understood  would  reveal  the  Universe 
with  all  its  facts — even  then,  man,  being  but  hu- 
man and  a  victim  of  time  and  space,  must  needs 
keep  busy  through  eternity,  adjusting  and  relating 
these  infinite  data  one  to  the  other.  There  is  no 
danger  of  a  slump  in  the  business  of  science  or 
the  scientific  man,  for  that  in  which  he  lives, 
moves,  and  has  his  being  is  so  much  bigger  than 
himself  that  he  can  never  retire  from  business 
while  time  lasts.  The  living  environment  in  which 
each  individual  finds  himself  submerged  forms  a 
sargasso  of  specialization  that  compels  him  to  des- 
perately flounder  until  a  grasp  on  unity  is  at- 
tained. In  physics,  with  its  hypothetical  atom, 
he  is  lost  and  well-nigh  drowned.  Not  until  he 
discovers  a  dominant  unit  guiding  and  directing 
its  subjects  of  lesser  units  does  the  cosmic  bal- 
ance of  things  present  itself.  The  word  relation- 
ship  is  a  misnomer  unless  it  really  expresses  its 
true  meaning.  Things  chaotically  bumping  to- 
gether without  let  or  hindrance,  sympathy  or 
mutual  understanding,  are  not  in  a  true  sense  re- 
lated. A  universe  of  accidents  like  this  would  be 
without  coordination,  without  harmony,  without 


PREFACE  IX 

inherent  unifying  law.  We  know  of  no  sncli  uni- 
verse. Eelationship  is  an  established  fact;  cos- 
mos and  balance  are  everywhere  in  evidence. 
Living  things  environ  and  are  environed,  estab- 
lishing a  true  relativity,  physically,  mentally,  and 
spiritually.  Dominant  units  control  lesser  units 
and  are  in  turn  controlled  by  those  above  them. 
There  is  a  hierarchy,  an  ascending  scale.  All 
things  then  are  good  in  their  initiative  and  final- 
ity. The  Alpha  and  Omega  are  absolute  and  true ; 
only  that  which  goes  between  presents  itself  to 
the  partial  understanding  as  Evil;  the  Ultimates 
are  beyond  cavil. 

Which  is  the  myth,  then,  considering  our  en- 
vironment and  relationships — mortality  or  im- 
mortality! Professor  Haeckel  claims  that  immor- 
tality is  a  fable,  an  old  man's  dream;  but  many 
another  scientific  witness  argues  against  the  myth 
of  mortality,  and  much  of  this  argument  hinges 
on  the  fact  of  consciousness — a  problem  which 
staggers  the  materialistic  monist  and  which  he 
certainly  does  not  solve.  An  assumption  of  one 
infinite  eternal  substance  with  innate  property 
of  movement,  minus  eternal  differentiation,  is  no 
adequate  explanation  of  consciousness.  This 
power  of  mind  being  beyond  solution,  by  science 
either  heterodox  or  orthodox,  is  also  beyond  the 
reach  of  judgment  as  to  its  mortality  or  other- 
wise. Therefore,  any  scientist  who  would  sum- 
marily dispose  of  it  is  hardly  worthy  of  serious 
consideration.  The  miracles  which  we  are  asked 
by  orthodox  Christianity  to  believe  are  simple 
and  childlike  compared  with  the  stupendous  de- 


Xll  PEEFACE 

priest  and  logician — ^yes.  "All  men  are  mortal." 
But  what  is  a  man!  As  before  said,  "you  are  not 
all  included  between  your  hat  and  your  boots." 
Therefore,  in  face  of  the  dominant  assertions  of 
the  ages  past,  the  author  of  this  book  has  the  au- 
dacity to  ask,  Are  you  sure  ? 

A.  E.  C. 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 


Chapter  I 


INTEODUCTION 

The  assurance  with  which  some  writers  dealing 
with  biological  and  kindred  topics  have  asserted 
the  scientifically  demonstrated  mortality  of  the 
individual  is  a  matter  of  profound  astonishment ; 
and  being  a  lawyer  by  profession,  I  undertook 
for  my  own  satisfaction  and  that  of  some  of  my 
friends  the  task  of  writing  a  brief  for  the  other 
side.  It  appeared  clearly  to  me  that  if  any  theory 
or  any  number  of  theories  could  be  presented 
which  were  consistent  with  what  Science  knows, 
and  also  with  the  idea  of  immortality,  then  the 
claimed  demonstration  of  man's  mortality  must 
necessarily  fail.  While  I  was  engaged  in  the 
preparation  of  this  brief,  my  attention  was  called 
to  the  recently  published  opinions  of  leading  sci- 
entists upon  the  question,  causing  me  to  adapt 
my  argument  to  the  position  taken  by  them,  par- 
ticularly to  that  assumed  by  Professor  Haeckel. 
My  reason  ^r  selecting  the  great  Zoologist  for 
the  purpose  V-because  he  presents  the  argument 
for  that  side  of  the  question  with  all  the  force  of 
which  it  is  capable,  and  he  marshals  the  evidence 
to  its  minutest  detail.  H^  therefore  represents 
the  scientific  nonimmortalists. 

I  am  not  desirous  of  assuming  an  attitude  criti- 

1 


Z  INTKODUCTION 

cal  of  his  scientific  attainments  in  a  chosen  and 
special  field  of  thought — far  from  it.  I  have  found 
his  labors  a  source  of  great  satisfaction  when  my 
mind  turned  wearily  from  the  sheep-bound  books 
containing  the  condensed  wisdom  of  jurists;  but 
Professor  Haeckel  has  written  a  book  for  the 
world  at  large,  one  which  is  not  a  text-book,  nor  a 
treatise  on  his  special  science. 

I  have  read  the  work  and  am  one  of  those  for 
whose  benefit  it  may  be  presumed  it  was  written. 
I  am  one  of  the  human  beings  whom  he  would 
turn  adrift  on  the  sea  of  profound  despondency, 
with  the  cables  of  their  vessels  slipped,  and  the 
sails  idly  slapping  the  yards  and  masts. 

I  therefore  have  a  right  to  know  why  he  has 
assumed  judicial  functions  and  pronounced  the 
judgment  of  mortality  upon  man,  what  proofs  he 
possesses,  why  he  has  loaded  down  with  an  extra 
weight  of  woe  my  fellowman  who  already  found 
life  in  this  world  discouraging,  disappointing,  but 
who  nevertheless  kept  a  smiling  face,  because  it 
was  hopefully  turned  toward  either  heaven  or 
some  compensating  change  of  environment  in  the 
eternities. 

The  bearer  of  bad  news  is  never  welcome, 
though  that  should  not  prevent  a  straightforward 
presentation  of  science,  provided  it  6e  science,  on 
the  part  of  those  men  who  seem  to  be  set  apart  for 
that  especial  work,  neither  should  we  be  afraid  to 
face  the  truth,  provided  \i  he  the  truth,  though 
destructive  of  our  ideals. 

Who  and  what  are  scientists?  They  are  men 
who  at  the  sacrifice  of  a  generalized  life  special- 


INTRODUCTION  t> 

ize  the  operations  of  their  minds  in  some  chosen 
field  for  the  purpose  of  gathering  data,  facts; 
these  they  report  to  the  general  world  of  mankind, 
which  constructs  therefrom  its  conclusions.  A 
man  may  be  great  as  a  specialist,  as  Darwin,  Hux- 
ley, Haeckel,  or  he  may  be  great  as  a  generalist, 
as  Herbert  Spencer,  but  he  is  never  great  as  both, 
or  so  rarely  that  it  is  diiBficult  to  recall  the  name  of 
one  to  mind. 

Witnesses,  even  experts,  never  occupy  the 
bench  or  the  jury  box  on  the  trial  of  an  issue  of 
fact ;  they  are  respectfully  requested  to  step  down 
if  they  are  to  bear  witness,  and  leave  the  judicial 
functions  to  be  exercised  by  others.  So  Professor 
Haeckel  is  a  great  witness  to  such  data  as  he  has 
collected  in  his  chosen  field,  but  as  judge  or  jury 
his  conclusions  from  them,  when  applied  to  an- 
other and  entirely  different  field,  are  of  no  more 
value  than  are  the  reader^s  or  mine. 

The  absolute  negative  can  be  proven  never;  and 
if  any  theory  or  theories,  any  hypothesis  or  hy- 
potheses, any  belief  or  beliefs,  can  start  the  pro- 
jection of  their  lines  of  thought  where  the  proof 
ends,  it  is  sufficient. 

The  cool  nonchalance  with  which  German  sci- 
entists of  a  certain  school  announce  as  a  final  con- 
clusion the  falsity  of  the  doctrine  of  the  immortal- 
ity of  man  would  be  amusing  if  it  were  not  for 
the  danger  that  the  mass  of  busy  men  may  accept 
their  assertion  as  truth.  Judging  from  the  en- 
thusiasm with  which  they  embrace  the  opportuni- 
ties to  attack  it,  it  would  seem  almost  as  if  the 
destruction  of  this  hopeful  doctrine  was  the  ob- 


4  INTEODUCTION 

jective  point  to  which  they  were  aiming  all  their 
researches.  There  are  evidences  of  this  to  be 
found  in  the  fact  that  by  his  own  admission,  an 
admission  upon  which  he  prides  himself,  Profes- 
sor Haeckel  holds  the  same  opinion  now  that  he 
did  thirty  years  ago,  before  the  recent  progress 
had  been  made  in  biology.  Are  we  to  conclude 
from  this  that  he  was  a  wonderful  prophet  thirty 
years  ago,  or  rather  that  his  preconceived  notions 
concerning  immortality  have  caused  his  conclu- 
sions from  data  to  be  biased?  The  vehemence 
with  which  the  doctrine  of  immortality  is  as- 
saulted but  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  be- 
lief to  humanity.  Either  it  is  exceedingly  dan- 
gerous to  the  best  interests  of  hmnankind,  or  else 
those  who  assail  it  are.  The  opinions  of  special- 
ists are  of  peculiar  value,  when  expressed  con- 
cerning matters  clearly  within  the  limits  of  their 
fields  of  observation  and  investigation.  Outside 
of  those  realms  their  opinions  are  but  dicta  and 
possess  no  particular  worth,  and  this  for  the  rea- 
son that  the  very  concentration  along  the  especial 
lines  of  their  work  causes  them  to  be  peculiarly 
weak  in  other  directions.  Darwin  said  of  himself 
that  as  he  grew  older  while  the  capacity  for  ob- 
servation in  his  chosen  field  of  labor  increased  in 
power,  he  completely  lost  the  appreciation  of  tune, 
harmony,  and  all  that  gives  to  music  its  soul-in- 
spiring qualities.  All  of  his  marvelous  scientific 
attainment  would  not  therefore  qualify  him  as  a 
judge  of  music. 

A  study  of  the  growth,  development,  complex- 
ity, and  functions  of  the  brain  and  nervous  system 


INTRODUCTION  5 

emphasizes  this  position.  Lines  of  least  resist- 
ance are  established,  facile  connections  made,  and 
others  blocked  and  frequently  inhibited.  It  is  not 
to  be  wondered  at,  then,  that  a  man  who  spends  all 
his  time  over  the  microscope  in  the  study  of  the 
egg  with  its  nucleus,  polar  bodies,  and  centrosome, 
or  whose  energies  are  altogether  given  to  the 
chemical  analysis  of  the  living  machine  and  its 
operations,  should  by  such  concentration  to  a  per- 
ceptible degree  incapacitate  himself  for  generali- 
zation. Just  as  difficult  is  it  for  a  man  who  is 
bound  by  a  creed  to  find  truth  anywhere  outside  of 
his  particular  form  of  religion.  This  is  because 
of  the  establishment  of  preferred  paths,  which 
become  lines  of  least  resistance;  the  mind  oper- 
ates only  along  these  lines,  the  other  channels  are 
clogged,  paralyzed,  atrophied,  or  undeveloped; 
therefore,  anything  poured  into  the  brain  through 
the  senses  seeks  these  lines  and  these  only.  The 
opinion  of  the  microscopist  or  the  occult  chemist 
concerning  the  divinity  of  Christ  has  no  added 
value  from  his  eminence  in  his  special  field  of  la- 
bor, and  the  opinion  of  the  creed-bound  priest  as 
to  the  office  of  the  centrosome  of  the  cell  receives 
no  strength  from  his  clerical  calling. 

The  scientist  may  consistently  demand  that  you, 
in  opposing  him,  furnish  him  with  data  incon- 
sistent with  his  apparent  science,  but  he  may  not 
with  propriety  say  that  science  declares  your 
facts  untrue,  for  either  his  position  is  not  scien- 
tific or  your  declarations  are  not  of  facts. 

The  specialist  is  not  the  emperor  of  the  world 
of  thought,  he  is  merely  king  of  his  limited  mon- 


6  INTRODUCTION 

archy.  His  duty  is  performed  when  he  has  im- 
loaded  the  things  he  has  discovered  and  the  prin- 
ciples evolved.  His  only  value  to  the  mental 
world  is  measured  by  what  he  has  added  to  the 
sum  of  knowledge;  where  his  contributions  fit, 
how  they  adapt,  and  what  ethical  or  religious  con- 
clusions are  to  be  drawn  from  them,  are  questions 
better  answered  by  the  general  constructor  than 
by  the  specialist  himself. 

The  mountains  of  wisdom  are  honeycombed 
with  the  old  holes  once  filled  with  the  surveying 
flag  poles  of  scientists.  They,  the  scientists,  are 
sleepless  surveyors;  they  never  fold  their  hands 
and  cry,  "It  is  finished";  they  assume  positions, 
they  abandon  them,  and  enable  the  world  of 
thought  to  rear  new  structures  upon  the  ruins  of 
the  old.  This  positive  assertion  on  the  part  of 
materialistic  or  monistic  specialists  that  the  world 
must  part  with  its  dream  of  immortality  has  a 
familiar  sound.  We  are  all  accustomed  to  the  im- 
perious verdict  of  some  scientists;  their  "cannot 
be"  confronted  with  the  "may  be"  of  ordinary 
mankind  has  more  than  once  resulted  in  an  aban- 
donment of  position  and  the  acknowledgment  "it 
is."  The  solar  system,  aye,  the  universe,  has  been 
constructed  on  various  plans  and  reconstructed  to 
meet  the  demands  of  increasing  knowledge;  heat 
and  light  have  abandoned  some  of  the  various 
methods  of  proceeding  from  the  Sun  to  Earth 
provided  for  them  by  physicists  from  time  to 
time ;  many  dog-eared  leaves  in  the  Geologic  book 
have  been  torn  out;  combating  biologists  have 
found  more  hidden  wheels  in  the  machinery  of 


INTKODUCTION  7 

the  ovum,  and  constructed  man  with  his  load  of 
inheritances  upon  several  new  theoretical  plans 
based  thereon,  but  there  does  not  walk  upon  the 
earth  one  solitary  scientist  who  is  justified  by  the 
joint  investigations  of  them  all  in  asserting,  as 
has  been  done,  that  the  opening  days  of  the  Twen- 
tieth Century  confront  us  with  demonstrative 
proof  that  the  idea  of  immortality  is  a  dream. 

One  of  the  wisest  and  most  persevering  investi- 
gators, George  Eomanes,  the  man  who  first  sought 
systematically  for  and  found  in  the  medusa  what 
is  probably  the  primitive  nervous  system  of  living 
creatures,  says  in  "Mind,  Motion,  and  Monism": 
"Because  within  the  limits  of  human  experience 
mind  is  only  known  as  associated  with  brain,  it 
clearly  does  not  follow  that  mind  cannot  exist  in 
any  other  mode."  "There  is  no  being  without  know- 
ing. ...  If  there  is  no  motion  without  mind,  no 
being  without  knowledge,  may  we  not  rather  infer, 
with  Bruno,  that  it  is  in  the  medium  of  mind  and  in 
the  medium  of  knowledge  we  live  and  move  and 
have  our  being  ?  .  .  .  Yet  even  here,  if  it  be  true  that 
the  voice  of  science  must  thus  of  necessity  speak 
the  language  of  agnosticism,  at  least  let  us  see  to 
it  that  the  language  is  pure,  let  us  not  tolerate  any 
barbarisms  introduced  from  the  side  of  aggres- 
sive dogma,  so  shall  we  find  that  this  new  gram- 
mar of  thought  does  not  admit  of  any  construction 
radically  opposed  to  more  venerable  ways  of 
thinking — that  if  a  little  knowledge  of  physiology 
and  a  little  knowledge  of  psychology  dispose  men 
to  atheism,  a  deeper  knowledge  of  both,  and  still 
more,  a  deeper  thought  upon  their  relations  to  one 


8  INTEODUCTION 

another  will  lead  men  back  to  some  form  of  re- 
ligion which,  if  it  be  more  vague,  may  also  be  more 
worthy  than  that  of  earlier  days." 

The  claim  of  thoughtful  and  hopeful  humanity 
has  been  that  individuals  may  be  immortal.  He 
would  not  be  a  rash  man  who  should  add  to  his 
hope  the  expectation  that  sometime  the  certainty 
of  immortality  should  be  scientifically  manifest, 
but  he  certainly  goes  to  the  verge  of  rashness  who 
asserts  that  it  is  now  or  ever  will  be  demonstrated 
by  human  science  that  individual  life  is  not  im- 
mortal. We  measure  mortality  by  and  in  a  dying 
environment,  we  witness  the  protean  changes  of 
form  and  expression,  and  the  columns  of  mortal 
figures  which  we  add  but  result  in  mortal  totals. 
The  very  conception  of  immortality,  indeed  any 
conception  of  it,  must  be,  and  is,  always  of  an- 
other and  different  environment. 

All  that  science  has  measured,  weighed,  gauged, 
or  analyzed,  to  this  day  has  been  that  which  ap- 
peals to  our  five  senses,  and  even  that  has  not  as 
yet  found  its  limits.  We  do  not  know  what  energy 
is,  and  the  least  in  size  and  latest  in  discovery  of 
physical  organisms  reveals  it  operating  with  such 
marvelous  precision  and  selectivity  that  the  last 
words  of  science  uttered  with  bated  breath  are: 
"Energy  may  be  conscious!"  Possibly  we  may 
yet  shout  in  the  positiveness  of  conviction,  "En- 
ergy is  conscious,  energy  is  consciousness,  energy 
is  mind!" 

Whether  we  may  not  reasonably  postulate  units 
of  energy  as  a  substitute  for  the  hypothetical  hard 
atoms  and  find  in  ether  and  motion  the  key  to  the 


INTRODUCTION-  9 

kaleidoscopic  phenomena  of  nature,  is  a  question 
which  I  hardly  think  can  be  at  present  answered 
in  the  negative. 

Much  of  the  intellectual  fogginess  surrounding 
the  idea  of  immortality  may  arise  out  of  the  fact 
that  we  are  prone  to  limit  our  conception  of  it  to 
the  immortality  of  man  qua  man,  whereas  the  true 
question  should  be:  Is  the  individual  immortal? 
A  man  is  but  a  form  of  energy  as  presenting  its 
necessary  phenomena  in  the  existing  environment. 
He  is  an  essential  adaptation  to  changing  sur- 
roundings. 

The  transformation  of  energy  is  supplemented 
by  the  reversibility  of  energy.  When  I  speak  into 
the  transmitter  of  the  telephone,  the  energy  forms 
of  my  voice  succeed  one  another  in  the  various 
vibrations  of  the  tympanum  and  unseen  and  un- 
heard traverse  the  long  wire,  the  environing  me- 
dium is  different,  the  energy  forms  are  different 
likewise,  but  upon  reaching  the  enveloping  atmos- 
phere beyond  the  receiver  they  are  again  what 
they  were  before  in  the  same  medium,  contain  the 
qualities  of  my  voice,  and  all  along  the  line  are  in 
changing  forms,  but  retaining  individuality  of 
energy. 

We  are  what  we  are  because  of  where  we  are. 

The  permissive  suggestion  of  Socrates  to  his 
mourning  friends  that  they  might  bury  him  "if 
they  could  catch  him,"  savors  of  a  profound  in- 
sight into  the  real  nature  of  life. 

With  our  microscopes  and  in  our  chemical  labo- 
ratories we  are  analyzing  what  we  are  with  what 
we  are  and  in  the  where  we  are. 


10  INTRODUCTION 

We  are  what  we  are  in  form  and  expression  be- 
cause of  our  relationship  to  the  environment  in 
which  we  form  and  express ;  we  could  not  be  other 
than  we  are  in  that  environment.  If  evolution  has 
not  taught  us  that  lesson,  then  we  are  remarkably 
blind  to  its  leadings. 

Our  forms,  senses,  arms,  legs,  chemical  proc- 
esses, methods  of  analysis,  and  expression  of 
ideas,  all  are  but  so  many  inevitable  results  of  the 
movement  of  the  individual  in  this  environment. 
What  would  it  be  if  operating  in  another  and  dif- 
ferent one?  Who  can  say?  Certainly  the  scien- 
tist, whose  very  science  is  measured  in  terms  of 
the  environment,  cannot  be  permitted  to  assert 
that  he  has  demonstrated  that  it  could  not  exist 
at  all.  As  the  expression  of  a  unit  of  force  in  this 
environment,  man,  undoubtedly  he  may  demon- 
strate the  impossibility  of  its  similar  appearance 
in  a  foreign  environment,  but  that  is  as  far  as 
reason  permits  him  to  go  in  condemning  the  hope 
and  expectancy  of  humanity  that  its  life  has  no 
death,  but  does  have  inherent  power  of  adapta- 
tion to  any  environment  in  which  it  may  find  it- 
self. Until  Biology  is  able  to  give  some  more  lucid 
explanation  for  the  phenomena  of  thought  and 
memory  than  the  hazy  one  of  chemical  action,  or 
phosphorescent  gleams,  it  is  not  in  a  position  to 
declare  an  ultimate  conclusion  that  the  individual 
is  merely  a  machine  and  its  mortality  demon- 
strated. 

If  mind  is  but  the  functioning  of  matter,  if 
thought  but  the  secretion  of  the  brain,  then  mem- 
ory is  utterly  inexplicable,  and  consciousness  is  but 


INTEODUCTIOIT  11 

the  immediate  moment  and  miable  to  declare  it- 
self, for  in  functioning,  a  state  or  condition  be- 
comes another  state  or  condition  and  the  process 
is  already  past.  Indeed,  upon  such  a  foundation 
I  do  not  see  how  we  may  rationally  speak  of  a 
"state."  Nothing  would  be  static,  it  would  be  an 
ever-becoming.  The  process  is  not  like  that  of 
the  kinetoscope,  where  the  pictures  succeed  each 
other  as  independent  forms,  separate,  distinct,  but 
producing  the  appearance  of  movement  only  by 
the  rapidity  of  successive  presentation ;  not  so  at 
all.  The  progressive  change  in  man  is  one  move- 
ment of  a  constantly  evolving  figure  of  one  chang- 
ing form.  As  a  matter  of  common  experience  we 
know  that,  whatever  the  unit  of  force  may  be 
which  is  thus  adapting  itself  to  its  environment, 
we  are  not  only  aware  of  the  moment's  process, 
but  memory  means  that  we  compare  each  wave  of 
the  flux  with  the  wave  which  preceded  it  and,  in- 
deed, even  anticipate  the  wave  which  will  follow; 
otherwise  we  could  only  be  conscious  of  being, 
not  of  having  been,  nor  of  becoming. 

These  may  be  old  problems,  but  they  ever  re- 
main unsolved  to  rebuke  the  effrontery  of  men 
who  think  they  have  surveyed  the  universe  of 
mind  by  measuring  along  the  straight  line  of  spe- 
cialty. 

If  we  be  logical  in  our  analysis  of  the  proposi- 
tion that  biological  science  demonstrates  that  mind 
is  but  the  functioning  of  organized  matter  and 
therefore  there  is  nothing  to  survive,  we  shall  add 
to  the  conclusion,  "therefore  there  was  nothing  to 
commence." 


12  INTEODUCTION 

To  limit  the  evidence  for  or  against  the  im- 
mortality of  the  individual  to  either  physical  or 
psychical  phenomena,  or  to  biology  or  psychology, 
is  to  reach  a  conclusion  based  upon  one  side  of  the 
case  alone. 

I  believe  that  every  thoughtful  man  will  recog- 
nize the  fact  that  it  is  to  the  failure  to  harmonize 
the  data  of  these  parallel  sciences  that  we  must 
look  for  the  reason  for  the  unjustified  conclusions 
reached  by  our  great  physicists  and  biologists. 

A  work  upon  biology  is  a  text-book  or  a  treatise 
upon  a  special  subject ;  so  is  one  upon  psychology, 
but  in  the  attempt  to  reach  a  conclusion  concern- 
ing the  meaning  of  life  or  its  continuity,  one 
surely  betrays  an  unconscious  prejudice  if  he  re- 
fuses to  consider  the  bearing  of  the  data  of  both 
these  sciences  upon  the  matter. 

Professor  Haeckel  frankly  says  that  it  is  impos- 
sible for  any  man  to  be  master  of  all  the  sciences, 
and  that  his  own  command  of  them  is  "uneven  and 
defective,"  though,  of  course,  this  is  compara- 
tively so  only.  So  that  when  we  read  his  latest 
book  we  are  not  studying  the  well-digested  data 
presented  in  a  text-book  or  a  scientific  treatise, 
but  rather  the  opinions  of  a  scientist  who,  adding 
to  the  legitimate  products  of  a  personal  research 
on  his  own  part  the  declarations  and  opinions  of 
others,  which  he  has  exercised  his  own  judgment 
in  selecting,  has  constructed  a  scheme  of  existence 
which  satisfies  himself.  This  should  be  borne  in 
mind  in  reading  his  book,  because  otherwise  we 
may  fall  into  the  grievous  error  of  supposing  our- 
selves compelled  to   accept  his  conclusions  be- 


INTRODUCTION  13 

cause  of  his  great  prominence  in  his  chosen  field 
of  research. 

The  latter  part  of  his  work  consists  of  chapters 
which  deal  with  questions  entirely  outside  of  his 
special  sciences,  as,  for  instance,  those  on  "God 
and  the  World,"  "Knowledge  and  Belief,"  "Sci- 
ence and  Christianity,"  "Our  Monistic  Eeligion," 
"Our  Monistic  Ethics,"  and  the  "Immortality  of 
the  Soul." 

That  Professor  Haeckel,  as  any  other  scholarly, 
influential  man,  has  a  right  to  form  and  express 
his  views  upon  these  subjects,  no  one  for  a  mo- 
ment can  doubt ;  but  that  his  religious,  philosophi- 
cal, and  ethical  opinions  should  be  received  and 
given  the  same  value  as  his  theses  on  zoology  or 
evolution  is  open  to  grave  doubts  for  the  reasons 
which  I  have  suggested. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  undertake  the  foolish 
task  of  criticising  Professor  Haeckel  in  the  line 
of  thought  and  research  where  he  stands  preemi- 
nent, nor  to  review  the  caustic  strictures  placed  by 
him  upon  religion  and  the  ordinarily  accepted 
articles  of  faith.  I  do,  however,  hope  to  be  able 
to  give  some  reasons  for  not  following  him  into 
the  marshes  of  absolute  negation  of  individual  im- 
mortality. I  cannot  hope,  nor  shall  I  attempt,  to 
present  any  explanation  of  the  Universe,  nor  ar- 
rogate to  myself  the  ability  to  understand  it,  but 
merely  to  suggest  that  some  avenues  of  escape 
from  despair  are  yet  scientifically  open  to  the  im- 
agination which  will  even  bear  the  test  of  the  ap- 
plication of  "pure  reason."  The  great  question 
presented  by  Professor  HaeckePs  book  is  whether 


14  INTKODUCTION 

the  individual  can  survive  the  wreck  of  its  physi- 
cal body,  and,  of  course,  that  involves  the  other 
questions.  What  is  an  individual,  and  did  it  have 
a  beginning! 

It  is  true  that  the  immortality  discussed  by 
Haeckel  is  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  but  as  he  de- 
fines the  soul  to  be  a  collective  title  for  the  sum  of 
cerebral  functions,  these  to  be  determined  by  phys- 
ical and  chemical  processes,  it  is  apparent  that  he 
treats  the  whole  man,  physical  and  psychical,  as 
the  individual ;  therefore,  soul  and  individual  are 
for  the  purposes  of  his  chapter  on  immortality 
one  and  the  same  thing.  The  gist  of  his  argument 
is  that  soul  being  but  the  sum  total  of  these  cere- 
bral functions,  when  they  cease  there  ia  nothing 
in  the  nature  of  an  individual  to  survive.  Much 
of  the  discussion  is  directed  to  the  annihilation  of 
the  doctrine  of  immortality  as  presented  by 
Christianity  and  other  dualistic  religions.  It  has 
seemed  to  me  that  a  larger  view  of  what  an  in- 
dividual is,  than  that  which  narrows  him  to  the 
mere  manifestation  in  the  material  body,  is  sci- 
entifically possible ;  and  I  have  endeavored  in  the 
pages  which  follow  to  outline  the  reasons  why  I 
think  so.  Not  that  I  claim  that  the  particular 
theories  which  I  advance  are  exclusive,  but  that 
they  are  subject  to  fewer  serious  scientific  objec- 
tions than  the  negative  conclusions  presented  by 
Professor  Haeckel.  They  are  possibly  true,  even 
in  the  light  of  recent  science,  and  if  possibly  so, 
then  the  argument  for  the  negative  is  invalid ;  and 
if  the  possibility  trends  toward  probability,  then 
the  negation  disappears  entirely. 


INTRODUCTION  15 

Unless  some  such  idea  of  what  an  individual  is 
as  is  presented  in  these  pages  is  a  true  one,  I 
really  do  not  see  that  science  recognizes  any  in- 
dividual at  all.  Professor  HaeckePs  definition  of 
an  individual  is  that  of  a  unity  which  cannot  be 
divided  without  destroying  its  nature,  an  indi- 
visible entity;  and  as  we  know  that  the  germ  cell 
of  animal  life  does  divide  many  times  in  segmen- 
tation before  birth  and  continues  to  do  so  after 
birth  in  generation,  it  really  would  appear  diffi- 
cult to  locate  individuality,  although  he  says  that 
there  (in  the  cell)  the  individual  begins  his  ex- 
istence. Its  production  of  the  other  generative 
cells  sexually  can  no  more  be  "overgrowth"  and 
compatible  with  the  preservation  of  the  individ- 
ual than  is  the  segmentation  of  protists,  which 
Haeckel  says  destroys  the  individual. 

I  cannot  resist  the  feeling  that  there  is  reason 
to  believe  that  there  is  meaning  in  the  individual 
life,  a  meaning  which  holds  such  a  relation  to  the 
Universe  that  its  value  must  not  be  measured  in 
time  and  space,  but  in  the  time  of  times  and  space 
of  spaces — Eternity.  The  existence  of  ether  we 
probably  admit  from  necessity  growing  out  of  evi- 
dent phenomena  demanding  it,  but  when  Pro- 
fessor Haeckel  claims  it  to  be  "thinking  substance" 
which  would  appear  to  possess  the  essence  of 
thought,  but  does  not  think,  that  is  his  opinion, 
demanded  by  his  own  preconceived  notions  and 
which  he  supplies  in  his  scheme  to  meet  the  de- 
mand. 

When  he  postulates  an  eternal,  infinite  ether, 
which  has  a  tendency  to  condense  and  otherwise 


16  INTEODUCTION 

differentiate,  that  is  his  opinion  again,  and  we  are 
left  to  ask.  What  is  a  "tendency!"  Is  it  not  a  will, 
and  if  it  tends  to  differentiation,  is  it  not  a  dif- 
ferentiated will,  and  are  we  not  again  at  a  point 
where  we  may  just  as  scientifically  as  we  postu- 
lated all  this,  also  postulate  individual  forces — 
units  of  force? 

Before  I  surrender  that  which  I  have  always 
considered  my  great  and  overshadowing  motive  in 
life,  namely,  my  individual,  eternal  value  in  the 
Universe,  I  must  have  something  more  than  the 
opinions  of  any  man,  however  great.  When  Pro- 
fessor Haeckel  asserts  that  when  the  cerebral 
functions  cease,  thought  and  consciousness  do 
likewise,  that  again  is  an  opinion,  it  is  a  mere  as- 
sertion concerning  the  very  question  at  issue.  He 
does  not  know  that  they  cease,  and  from  the  very 
premises  upon  which  he  constructs  his  conclu- 
sions, it  is  evident  that  he  cannot  know.  How  can 
he  expect  to  measure  the  thought  and  conscious- 
ness expressed  in  something  which  is  not  cere- 
brum by  cerebral  activity  in  his  own  brain? 

I  will  conclude  this  introduction  by  asking  the 
reader  to  consider,  as  he  reads  the  succeeding 
pages  of  this  book,  that  the  statement  of  Professor 
Haeckel  that  this  "ether,"  this  "spirit"  (force), 
this  "thinking  substance,"  these  "fundamental 
postulates"  are  to  be  viewed  as  eternally  produc- 
ing the  differentiated  aspect  of  the  Universe,  so 
that  we  are  not  to  "hark  back"  to  a  point  where 
the  two  were  equated  in  a  homogeneous  infinite 
sea.  That  being  so,  of  course  it  follows  that  the 
present  characteristic  differentiation  of  the  Uni- 


INTEODUCTION  17 

verse  has  been  eternally  in  existence — now  here, 
now  there,  now  this,  now  that — and  that,  therefore, 
a  grand  organization  sufficient  to  eternally  have 
been  the  manifestation  of  one  great  organized 
mind  has  never  been  wanting,  and  much  that  I 
suggest  in  the  following  pages  is,  therefore,  ra- 
tionally conceivable;  and  being  so,  constitutes  so 
much  of  possibility  to  o:ffset  the  dogmatic  con- 
clusions of  Professor  Haeckel. 


Chapter  II 

SOME    THINGS    WHICH    SCIENCE    DOES 
NOT   KNOW 

A  fair  examination  of  the  "demonstration"  by 
Haeckel  and  others  of  the  mortality  of  man,  when 
examined  critically  by  the  application  to  it  of  the 
rules  of  evidence  as  adopted  and  prevailing  in 
our  courts  of  law,  will  result  in  the  conclusion 
that  it  does  not  meet  the  requirements  of  the  rule 
of  circumstantial  evidence. 

If  the  evidence  is  of  separate  facts,  they  must 
be  so  connected  together  in  an  unbroken  chain  of 
continuity  as  that  only  one  conclusion  can  flow 
therefrom.  There  must  be  no  missing  links  in 
the  chain,  no  unknown  quantities  which  must  be 
supplied  by  hypotheses,  unless  they  are  them- 
selves the  conclusions  sought  for,  and  are  irre- 
sistible deductions.  A  chain  of  evidence,  like  one 
of  iron,  is  no  stronger  than  its  weakest  link. 

I  fancy  it  will  be  admitted  that  when  Science 
undertakes  the  task  of  destroying  the  belief  of 
ages  of  nearly  all  men,  one  which  arises  without 
external  stimulation,  which  springs  up  within  the 
mind  as  a  very  part  of  its  constitution,  namely, 
the  belief  that  the  individual  is  immortal,  the  bur- 
den of  proof  is  on  Science  to  establish  the  fact  of 
mortality. 

18 


SOME   THINGS   WHICH  SCIENCE  DOES  NOT   KNOW      19 

This,  I  think,  will  be  manifest  when  we  remem- 
ber that  the  idea  of  immortality  finds  its  place  in 
the  mind  itself  and  appears  to  be  as  innate  as  any- 
thing else;  hence,  to  destroy  it,  to  demonstrate 
that  it  is  false,  requires  a  prior  demonstration  as 
to  what  mind  is  in  itself.  Science  asserts  that  we 
know  nothing  except  through  the  senses;  there- 
fore, as  the  idea  of  immortality  is  of  a  life  where 
knowledge  exists  without  the  use  of  the  senses  as 
we  know  them,  and  of  an  activity  in  a  medium  now 
immeasurable  by  these  senses,  Science  can  know 
nothing  of  immortality  and  can  demonstrate  noth- 
ing concerning  it  pro  or  con. 

Science  asserts  (Haeckel)  that  the  atoms  prob- 
ably are  endowed  with  will  and  feeling.  I  do  not 
dispute  the  fact,  but  Science  has  never  seen,  felt, 
heard,  smelled,  or  tasted  an  atom,  or  received  any 
knowledge  of  it  through  the  senses  except  by  in- 
ference ;  therefore,  it  knows  nothing  about  the  ex- 
istence of  atoms,  and  hence  cannot  endow  them 
with  qualities  of  will  and  feeling,  on  his  hypothe- 
sis. 

Scientists  are  disagreed  as  to  whether  the  hy- 
pothetical atoms  are  hard  or  soft,  are  matter  or 
force,  are  spirals  or  vortex  rings,  are  eternal  or 
appear  and  disappear;  hence,  the  hypothesis  of 
the  existence  of  atoms  includes  a  guess  (a  rational 
one)  at  what  they  are  if  they  exist.  Therefore, 
Science  cannot  tell  us  anything  about  atoms  that 
is  not  open  to  readjustment  as  to  its  truth. 

Science  relegates  consciousness  to  the  activities 
of  the  cerebral  cells,  but  it  cannot  construct  a  syn- 
thesis of  those  activities  which  will  result  in  a 


20      SOME   THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE  DOES   NOT   KNOW 

synthetic  consciousness  competent  to  explain  what 
we  feel  as  to  the  unity  of  our  consciousness. 

Science  begins  its  analysis  of  man  in  media  res, 
at  the  intricately  organized,  fertilized  ovum  cell, 
smaller  than  the  point  of  a  needle;  therefore,  it 
does  not  know  the  origin  of  his  physical  or  mental 
capacities. 

It  finds  apparent,  inherited  traits,  and  is  forced 
to  crowd  them  into  this  cell. 

It  is  confronted  with  genius,  and  is  compelled 
to  crowd  the  "race  memory"  into  this  cell. 

It  is  aware  that  a  man's  wonderfully  com- 
pounded body  comes  from  it,  and  perforce  of  ne- 
cessity packs  this  cell  with  additional  memories  of 
the  human  form,  organs,  central  system,  etc. 

All  of  this  is  usually  admitted  to  be  a  rational 
theory,  but  Science  does  not  know  and  cannot  tell 
what  memory  is,  that  it  can  be  thus  potential  in  a 
microscopic  speck;  hence,  the  fertilized  ovum  cell 
is  a  convenient  closet  in  which  to  store  any  biolog- 
ical problem. 

Science  asserts  memory  and  consciousness  to 
be  products,  but  starts  with  such  a  cell  (fertilized 
ovum)  already  loaded  with  memories,  which  do 
not  appear  except  as  after  products  of  the  activi- 
ties of  changing  syntheses  growing  out  of  the  mul- 
tiplication of  the  cell  by  division ;  therefore,  there 
is  as  much  reason  for  believing  the  memory  to  be 
something  aliunde  the  physical  cell  and  which  is 
the  activity  behind  the  syntheses  as  to  believe  the 
cell  to  be  itself  a  bundle  of  potential  memories. 

Science  claims  (Haeckel)  that  the  noblest  love 
of  human  hearts  is  precisely  the  same  thing,  on  a 


SOME   THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES   NOT   KNOW      21 

larger  scale,  as  the  chemical  affinities  of  atoms; 
but  Science  cannot  find  in  the  whole  universe  an 
atom  which  by  reason  of  its  affinity  for  another 
will  by  the  deliberate  exercise  of  the  will  with 
which  it  is  endowed  lay  down  its  life  and  go  out 
of  existence  for  another.  Such  an  analysis  of 
love  as  that  given  by  Haeckel  is  reductio  ad  ah- 
surdum. 

Science  (Haeckel)  denies  anything  to  soul, 
mind,  or  spirit  except  as  the  result  of  chemical 
activities  of  the  cerebrum. 

Everywhere  atoms  of  specific  character,  asso- 
ciated in  similar  ways  and  subjected  to  the  same 
stimuli  chemically,  act  uniformly  in  an  identical 
manner.  Science  can  diiferentiate  brain  cells  by 
localities,  but  it  has  not  as  yet  been  able  to  show 
that  the  substance  is  not  identical  in  all  of  them. 
These  cells  are  in  the  different  localities  subjected 
to  different  stimuli,  but  Science  cannot  give  a 
known  reason  why  the  associative  cells  of  the 
cerebrum  are  enabled  anywhere  to  land  a  unity 
of  consciousness.  Science  does  not  know  what 
either  memory  or  consciousness  is  in  itself. 

Science  knows  nothing  about  the  qualities, 
forces,  or  organic  potentialities  of  the  ether  one 
single  step  beyond  the  point  where  it  has  wit- 
nessed its  supposed  phenomena.  If  it  did,  it  would 
not  be  on  the  outlook  for  more  discoveries  every 
year ;  hence,  the  increasing  discoveries  of  the  qual- 
ities of  ether  may  lead  toward,  instead  of  away 
from,  even  an  organized  immortality. 

Ignoring  the  theory  that  individuality  may  be 
at  last  a  form  of  energy  and  its  various  bodies  but 


22      SOME   THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES  NOT   KNOW 

presentations  of  it,  Haeckel  makes  light  of  a  pos- 
sible gaseous  body  to  the  soul  and  says  that  if  it 
were  possessed  of  such  a  body,  "we  could  then 
catch  the  soul  as  it  ^breathed  out'  at  the  moment 
of  death,  condense  it,  and  exhibit  it  in  a  bottle  as 
^immortal  fluid.'  .  .  .  By  a  further  lowering  of 
temperature  and  increase  of  pressure  it  might  be 
possible  to  solidify  it  to  produce  'soul  snow.' " 
He  then  naively  suggests  that  "the  experiment  has 
not  yet  succeeded."  Just  so,  it  has  not,  and  there- 
fore we  may  not  assume  that  it  can  be  done. 
Here  Science  betrays  the  weakness  of  its  one- 
sided method  of  reasoning,  in  that  it  is  guilty  of 
the  folly  of  seeking  for  the  immortal  in  the  vehicle 
instead  of  in  what  it  carries.  Souls  may  have  a 
gaseous  body  for  aught  we  know,  and  yet  such 
embodiment  may  be  temporary. 

It  is  just  possible  that  even  if  such  aeri- 
form beings  credited  with  "being,"  possessed  of 
the  ^^physiological  functions  of  an  organism" 
(Haeckel),  existed,  such  a  process  might  call  forth 
a  comment  from  the  individual  soul  of  which  it 
was  an  "organism,"  similar  to  that  of  Socrates, 
"You  may  bottle  me,  if  you  can  catch  me." 

But  Haeckel  goes  further  and  says  that  an 
"etheric  soul  .  .  .  cannot  possibly  account  for  the 
individual  life  of  the  soul."  Perhaps  not,  but 
might  it  not  be  that  Science  does  not  know 
whether  the  "individual  life  of  the  soul"  can  or 
cannot  account  for  an  etheric  body  of  the  soul? 
I  perceive  the  radiant  energy  of  ether  as  white 
light,  but  if  I  pass  its  pencils  through  the  prism,  I 
cause  the  phenomenon  of  white  light  to  break  up 


SOME    THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES    NOT    KNOW      23 

into  its  varying  wave  lengths  and  its  combination 
becomes  apparent  to  me  as  rays  of  different 
colors,  and  each  will  perform  its  different  func- 
tions and  produce  its  different  phenomena;  so 
with  the  Eoentgen  and  N  rays,  and  otherwise  in 
physics  a  few  rather  startling  results  reveal  them- 
selves as  the  days  go  on.  Science  knows  only  that 
which  it  knows  about  the  ether. 

A  theorist  who  will  postulate  an  ether  "not 
atomistic,  not  made  up  of  separate  particles 
(atoms),  but  continuous,"  but  which  can  in  some 
manner  be  condensed  into  a  structure  (matter) 
which  is  "atomistic,"  made  up  of  infinitesimal, 
distinct  particles  (atoms),  discontinuous,  should 
not  treat  with  dogmatic  contempt  any  theory 
which  supposes  an  ether  in  which  organisms  may 
exist.  Ether  is  yet  a  mystery,  and  its  unknown  ca- 
pabilities and  potentialities  will  not  support  an 
absolute  denial  of  any  rational  theory. 

Some  Scientists  believe  experimentally  in  telep- 
athy, or  communication  of  mind  impulses  at  a 
distance,  but  they  know  nothing  about  its  modus 
operandi;  others  deny  its  existence  without  ex- 
amination or  experiment ;  hence.  Science  is  at  war 
here  with  itself. 

Science  denies  any  value  to  the  transcendental. 

It  is  transcendental  that  the  germ  cell  can  con- 
tain all  that  we  believe  it  does.  Such  "uncon- 
scious memories"  are  transcendental. 

It  is  transcendentalism  to  postulate  eternal,  in- 
finite, thinking  substance;  the  infinite  itself  is 
transcendental. 

It  is  transcendentalism  to  bestow  will  and  feel- 


24      SOME    THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES   NOT   KNOW 

ing  upon  unknown  atoms;  will  itself  is  transcen- 
dental ;  we  only  know  it  by  what  it  does. 

It  is  transcendentalism  to  postulate  movement 
as  an  "innate  property"  of  substance ;  innate  prop- 
erties are  transcendental,  so  is  substance  itself. 

It  is  transcendentalism  to  think  of  a  commence- 
ment, and  we  do  not  escape  it  by  thinking  "eter- 
nity," for  the  thought  of  eternity  is  transcen- 
dental. 

Anything  is  transcendental  which  is  absolutely 
beyond  our  sense  capacity,  even  though  we  find 
reasons  for  povstulating  it.  If  there  lives  a  Sci- 
entist or  lay  thinker  who  can  honestly  say  that 
his  senses  give  him  proof  demonstrative  of  these 
things  which  I  have  mentioned,  he  has  not  as  yet 
had  the  temerity  to  say  so  in  print.  We  believe 
these  things  to  be  so,  because  we  have  no  better 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  witnessed  by  us 
daily. 

Science  makes  use  of  words  as  names  of  recog- 
nized conditions  and  experiences,  such  as  con- 
sciousness, thought,  memory,  dreams,  halluci- 
nations, imaginations,  etc.,  all  of  which  are 
absolutely  essential  for  the  purpose  of  distinguish- 
ing one  condition  of  mind  from  another ;  but  by  giv- 
ing names  to  conditions  we  do  not  at  all  analyze 
or  explain  the  conditions  themselves. 

The  word  "imagination"  is  a  common  word 
enough,  and  so  is  the  condition  for  which  the  word 
stands.  And  we  understand  by  it  that  it  refers  to 
that  experience  of  the  human  mind  in  which  it 
calls  up  to  consciousness  images  or  pictures  in 
the  mind.    When  we  have  followed  the  process 


SOME  THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES   NOT   KNOW      25 

just  as  far  as  our  knowledge  of  the  action  of  the 
cerebral  cells  permits  U3,  we  remain  with  these 
questions  unanswered,  viz. :  What  do  we  mean  by 
"images"  1  What  is  the  medium  in  which  they  ap- 
pear? Is  it  a  substance!  If  so,  what  is  a  sub- 
stance! Why  do  they  possess  the  power  of  mo- 
tion, change,  and  activity  in  themselves?  Con- 
sider, for  instance,  the  dream  state.  Dreams  are 
of  such  common  experience  that  the  atmosphere 
of  mystery  surrounding  them  is  lost  sight  of  in  the 
commonplace  occurrence  of  the  dreams  them- 
selves. 

Here  is  a  dream  as  an  example  in  which  I  have 
found  an  abundance  of  mystery,  which  even  the 
voluminous  treatises  on  psychology  do  not  enable 
me  to  penetrate.  I  dreamed  that  upon  the  elec- 
tion of  certain  officers  to  fill  a  number  of  public 
positions  a  banquet  was  given,  to  which  all  the 
fortunate  individuals  were  invited,  including  my- 
self and  a  friend.  Judge  B .    Upon  assembling 

at  the  table  we  found  that  there  had  been  placed 
before  each  guest  a  soup  tureen  full  of  soup.  Con- 
sidering this  to  be  a  novel  and  rather  ridiculous 
innovation,  I  was  guilty  of  making  a  most  atro- 
cious pun.    Turning  to  my  friend.  Judge  B ,  I 

suggested  that  such  a  supply  of  soup  was  "su- 
perabundant." Now  this,  so  far,  was  not  much 
beyond  ordinary  experiences  in  a  dream — many 
have  made  puns  undoubtedly  when  enjoying  good 

company  in  dreamland — but  Judge  B laid  his 

finger  waggishly  against  his  nose  and  responded, 
"No,  Judge,  this  is  superficial,"  which  consider- 
ing that  the  banquet  was  an  official  affair,  was  not 


26      SOME   THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE  DOES  NOT   KNOW 

bad  for  Judge  B .    Eight  here,  however,  comes 

that  which  I  find  difficulty  in  explaining  to  my  sat- 
isfaction. In  the  first  place,  I  was  conscious,  self- 
conscious,  conscious  of  my  dream  surroundings, 
conscious  of  the  fragrant  soup,  and,  so  far  as  I  am 
concerned,  I  can  perceive  no  distinction  between 
the  character  of  the  consciousness  then  and  now 
in  wakefulness. 

Next,  I  had  the  ordinary  use  of  my  faculty  of 
imagination.  I  evolved  a  pun,  but  I  did  not  antici- 
pate  the  pun  which  was  hurled  back  at  me  by 
Judge  B .  Indeed,  I  was  rather  piqued  in  real- 
izing that  his  was  a  better  pun  than  mine.  The 
point  of  his  witty  saying  revealed  itself  only  after 
the  utterance  of  the  language  by  him,  and  I  en- 
joyed it  and  laughed  heartily. 

I  realize  that  all  this  seems  simple,  it  was  "only 
a  dream,"  it  can  be  analyzed  by  applying  to  it  the 
psychological  methods,  l3ut  I  insist  that  the  back- 
ground of  the  whole  experience  lies  in  terra  in- 
cognita to  Science. 

If  the  "soul,"  the  ego,  is  the  "sum  total"  of  the 
activities  of  the  cerebral  cells,  then,  considering 
that  I  was  conscious  of  my  individuality  and  en- 
gaged in  a  punning  duel  with  another  "sum  total," 
which  was  only  present  in  my  mind,  the  "soul," 
the  ego,  the  individual,  unloaded  some  of  the  units 
which  ordinarily  go  to  make  up  the  individual, 
leaving  the  individual  intact  and  supplying  a  suffi- 
cient number  to  create  another  "sum  total"  as  an 
individual. 

If  it  be  an  easy  matter  to  explain  how  we  per- 
ceive moving,  living,  thinking  forms  in  such  a  con- 


SOME   THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES   NOT   KNOW      27 

dition  of  dreaming,  suppose  we  ask  ourselves 
again,  in  what  substance  do  these  images  appear? 
If  they  are  not  real,  what  is  the  unreal?  If  I 
create  them,  out  of  what,  in  what,  do  I  do  that? 

Science  relegates  all  these  phenomena  to  the 
activities  of  the  cerebral  cells,  but  it  cannot  and 
does  not  pretend  to  go  further  than  to  push  the 
mystery  back. 

Science  declares  subject  and  object  to  be  one, 
but  somehow  the  subjectivity  of  the  individual  ap- 
pears to  succeed  in  keeping  itself  behind  even  the 
objectivities  of  the  imagination  and  recognizing 
an  objectivity  correlated  to  a  subjectivity  which  it 
will  not  consent  to  acknowledge  as  itself. 

If  chemical  analysis  of  the  substance  of  which 
cerebral  cells  are  composed  revealed  the  fact  that 
they  are,  in  different  localities  of  the  cerebrum, 
differently  composed  of  varying  elements,  so  that 
a  center  of  cells  in  one  part  should  be  of  a  differ- 
ent chemical  construction  from  another,  we  might 
find  some  reason  to  declare  individual  conscious- 
ness, mind,  etc.,  to  be  the  sum  total  of  their  activi- 
ties, because  we  should  have  a  basis  for  such  a 
differentiation  as  might  account  for  the  tremen- 
dous variations  in  the  substance  of  our  thoughts 
and  consciousness;  but  the  cells  have  not  been 
shown  to  be  so  differently  composed  of  different 
elements. 

Great  as  has  been  the  advancement  of  cytology, 
we  really  know  little  about  the  substance  proto- 
plasm. As  is  said  by  J.  A.  Thompson  in  "The  Sci- 
ence of  Life" :  "We  have  no  knowledge  of  the  real 
nature  of  living  matter;  we  cannot  define  any  sub- 


OF  THE 


28      SOME   THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE  DOES   NOT  KNOW 

stance  physically  or  chemically  and  say  this  is 
pure  protoplasm.  According  to  one  view,  proto- 
plasm is  a  mixture  of  complex  substances ;  accord- 
ing to  another  view,  it  is  a  single  substance  allied 
to  proteids;  according  to  a  third — perhaps  the 
most  probalDle — view,  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
living  matter.  The  meaning  of  the  last  view, 
which  may  appear  paradoxical,  is  simply  that 
vital  functions  may  depend  upon  the  interactions 
or  interrelations  of  a  number  of  complex  sub- 
stances, none  of  which  by  itself  could  be  called 
alive." 

It  is  for  that  reason  that  Science  cannot  au- 
thoritatively declare  this  wonderful  individuality 
to  be  the  product  of  the  chemical  activities.  It  is 
emphatically  an  open  and  undecided  question. 
No  doubt  the  form  of  motion  of  these  elements 
differs  in  the  various  cells. 

Again,  although  it  be  admitted  that  the  stimuli 
reaching  these  various  cell  centers  are  different, 
and  hence  the  different  forms  of  activity,  we  do 
not  escape  the  dilemma.  As  I  suggested  before,  it 
leaves  no  room  for  the  apex  of  an  ultimate  synthe- 
sis, the  individual,  for  we  must  at  least  reach  a 
cell  substance  where  there  certainly  could  be  no 
"sum  total"  of  movements  which  could  recognize 
detail. 

Science  does  not  know  but  that  the  following 
is  the  real  truth,  neither  do  I,  neither  is  it  to  be 
demonstrated  that  it  is  not. 

Suppose  it  to  be  true  that  there  is  a  substance 
in  which  individual  centers  of  consciousness  func- 
tion as  forms  of  motion  of  it  ( surely,  while  we  are 


SOME   THINGS    WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES    NOT   KNOW      29 

accepting  ideas  as  forms  of  chemical  activity,  this 
is  not  a  violent  assumption).  Suppose  this  sub- 
stance to  be  capable  of  a  great  variety  of  forms 
(and  here  again,  in  view  of  the  recent  discoveries 
in  the  realm  of  ether,  this  is  not  a  foolish  suppo- 
sition) ;  and  suppose  again  that  in  order  that  such 
an  individual  center  of  consciousness,  never  itself 
departing  from  its  eternal  habitat,  might  be  con- 
scious of  objects  in  a  more  dense  medium,  ponder- 
able matter,  it  should  be  essential  that  the  sensa- 
tions produced  by  such  objects  should  be  refined, 
should  be  accented,  should  be  sifted  through  sub- 
stance, which  approaches  by  gradations  up  to  the 
imponderable  substance  in  which  it  functions.  It 
would  follow  that  only  by  such  means  could  such 
an  individual  be  conscious  of  such  objects  and  it 
would  likewise  follow  that  any  disturbance  at  any 
point  in  the  process  of  accentuation  would  result 
in  a  distortion  of  the  object  in  consciousness  and 
any  destruction  of  the  means  of  such  a  process 
would  cut  off  all  consciousness  of  the  objects  as 
such  as  surely  as  the  removal  of  the  prism  from 
the  field  of  light  puts  an  end  to  the  spectrum. 

Such  a  destruction  of  the  means  would  not  nec- 
essarily result  in  the  death  of  the  individual,  but 
would  merely  remove  the  opportunity  for  further 
consciousness  of  such  objects  as  such. 

The  natural  inquiry  to  succeed  these  supposi- 
tions is  whether  we  possibly  have  any  such  nexus, 
any  such  mediator  between  ponderable  matter 
and  such  an  individual  center  as  I  have  postu- 
lated. 

I  think  we  have,  in  the  body,  in  the  organs  of  it, 


30      SOME   THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES   NOT   KNOW 

in  the  central  system  and  culminating  in  the  cere- 
brum. 

Certainly  a  science  which  can  find  sufficient  in- 
stability and  delicate  irritability  in  the  cerebral 
cells  to  establish  a  field  for  a  "sum-total"  soul 
should  admit  that  their  substance  is  about  as  close 
an  approach  to  one  end  of  such  a  bridge  as  can 
well  be  imagined,  and  really  the  external  termini 
of  organs  of  sensation  reach  the  other  extremity. 

Such  a  theory  is  at  least  consistent  with  all  the 
theses  of  evolution.  It  accounts  for  consciousness 
and  unconsciousness  of  objects;  it  provides  an 
arena  for  the  display  of  dreams;  parallels  in  its 
process  what  we  know  of  the  march  of  evolution 
to  and  from  established  stations  of  automatism ;  it 
suggests  a  meaning  to  pain;  it  has  a  meaning  in 
itself;  leaves  the  individual  possessed  of  a  soul; 
and  is  even  monistic,  if  properly  comprehended. 

Now,  Science  does  not  know  this  not  to  be  the 
truth,  and,  therefore,  it  may  be  approximately 
true,  notwithstanding  the  pseudo-demonstrations 
of  scientific  men  that  man  is  necessarily  mortal. 
All  I  claim  for  it  as  a  theory  is  its  possibility. 

What  Science  knows  is  of  great  value,  because 
its  knowledge  makes  the  ladder  upon  which  we 
climb  for  wider  views,  but  what  it  does  not  know 
is  valuable,  because  it  is  worthy  of  our  search  for 
it;  our  instinct  protests  against  an  abandonment 
of  it  as  a  probable,  or  even  possible,  truth,  merely 
because  it  is  not  demonstrated  and  known. 

Assuming  such  a  theory  as  I  have  suggested  to 
be  a  rational  one,  it  would  then  follow  that  the 
"sum  total"  of  the  chemical  activities  of  the  cere- 


SOME   THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES   NOT    KNOW      31 

bral  cells  would  be  not  the  soul  but  the  activity  of 
the  soul  at  that  point  in  its  line  of  continuity  from 
objects  in  ponderable  matter  to  their  perception 
by  its  activity  in  imponderable  matter.  Auto- 
matic centers  would  then  be  in  the  nature  of  relay 
stations.  In  this  connection  it  may  be  said  that 
the  unit  cells  of  which  the  human  body  is  com- 
posed are  themselves  open  to  an  application  of 
the  scheme  outlined,  for  what  are  they  but  masses 
of  protoplasm  in  which  is  situated  a  less-equi- 
librated substance  (the  nucleus),  which,  for  aught 
Science  knows,  performs  a  function  akin  to  the 
cerebrum  of  the  whole  man. 

Science  does  not  know,  and  cannot  therefore  af- 
firm, that  mind  and  matter  are  not  opposite  poles 
of  the  same  thing,  nor  that  mind  may  not  be  as 
complex  at  its  pole  as  is  ponderable  matter  at  the 
opposite  pole.  The  processes  of  evolution  lend  as 
much  color  to  that  proposition  as  to  any  other,  for 
it  may  well  be  that  for  the  appearance  of  complex 
mind  in  ponderable  matter  as  a  mere  phase,  it  must 
proceed  from  the  simplest  and  nearest  form  of 
ponderable  substance  by  the  evolution  of  synthe- 
ses, which  in  turn  become  automatic,  to  the  pres- 
entation in  matter  commensurate  to  itself  and  its 
will,  and  that  this  process  of  evolution  may  be  as 
various  in  its  applications  as  the  known  and  un- 
known properties  of  substance,  ponderable  and 
imponderable,  may  demand.  The  smallest  form 
of  ponderable  matter  is  complex  enough  to  allow 
us  to  be  true  to  even  Monism. 

Science  does  not  yet  know  the  real  distinction, 
if  any  exists,  between  living  and  so-called  non- 


32      SOME    THINGS   WHICH   SCIENCE   DOES   NOT   KNOW 

living  matter.  True,  Haeekel  declares  the  differ- 
ence to  be  in  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  power 
of  reproduction ;  but,  as  Professor  Shaler  in  "The 
Individual"  says :  "In  some  unknown  way  the  mole- 
cule and  the  crystal  alike  tend  to  increase  their 
kind." 

Verworn,  in  "General  Physiology,"  asserts  the 
distinction  to  consist  in  the  capability  of  living  mat- 
ter for  the  "metabolism  of  proteids" ;  but  while  it 
perhaps  may  not  be  properly  called  the  "metabo- 
lism of  proteids,"  yet  a  similar  action  is  noted  in 
crystals,  and  even  may  exist  in  molecular  aggre- 
gates.   (Shaler,  "The  Individual.") 

For  all  these  reasons  and  many  more  which  will 
suggest  themselves,  a  thoughtful  man  is  still  en- 
titled, without  losing  his  common  sense,  without 
sullying  the  whiteness  of  "pure  reason,"  to  de- 
clare that  Science  may  have  failed  to  discover  the 
great  life,  the  eternal  being,  of  the  universe  to  be 
that  very  unity  of  units,  one  and  the  many,  whose 
eternal  processes  of  life  it  undertakes  to  measure 
by  a  specialized  evolution  which  begins  and  ends. 


Chapter  III 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

I  have  for  some  years  pushed  the  search  of  the 
microscopic  into  the  substance  of  living  things,  ex- 
pecting possibly  somewhere  and  sometime  to  ob- 
tain some  light  upon  the  organic  ultimate  unit, 
and  thereby  justify  such  conclusions  as  have  been 
reached  and  promulgated  by  a  class  of  mate- 
rialistic scientists  who,  instead  of  standing  in  awe 
at  the  sight  of  the  ever-retreating  mystery  of  life, 
declare  that  they  have  demonstrated  the  hope  of 
man's  immortality  to  be  a  delusion.  I  am  frank 
to  say  that,  owing  either  to  stupidity  or  lack  of  some 
knowledge  attained  by  them  and  unpublished  to 
the  world  for  which  they  labor,  I  have  found 
neither  the  ultimate  unit  of  life  nor  the  evidence 
of  the  delusion. 

It  is  an  easy  matter  to  dismiss  the  whole  mys- 
tery of  physical  and  psychical  existence  by  the 
assertion  that  the  microscope  or  chemical  analy- 
sis has  revealed  the  fact  that  all  life  is  resolved 
in  its  finality  to  the  cell — that  there  it  begins, 
there  it  operates  in  community,  and  there  it  ends. 
If  it  were  true  that  the  so-called  cell  is  the  unit 
of  life,  this  might  well  discourage  the  further 
search  for  light  upon  the  subject,  for  we  should 
be  compelled  to  admit  that  if  life  commences  with 

33 


34  THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

the  cell  it  will  end  with  the  cell.  But  it  is  not  true ; 
the  unit  cell  is  but  the  adopted  unit  of  physiology. 
It  is  the  unit  of  its  analysis  in  theory,  and  the 
unknown  sea  of  activities  is  thus  far  quite  beyond 
its  reach. 

Much  depends  upon  what  we  mean  by  "cell"  and 
what  we  understand  by  "life."  If  by  "cell"  we 
mean  any  primary  physical  appearance  which 
evidences  life,  then  the  cell  might  be  the  unit  of 
living  matter,  but  in  that  case  I  should  ask  if  we 
have  discovered  the  cell,  and  the  answer  would 
have  to  be,  no;  because,  aside  from  the  "cell"  as 
understood  physiologically,  there  are  evidences  of 
life  in  portions  when  separated  from  it.  If  by 
"life"  we  mean  capacity  for  adaptive  movements 
responsive  to  stimulus,  then,  again,  what  is  or- 
dinarily understood  as  the  cell  is  not  the  unit  of 
living  substance.  That  which  in  itself  is  complex 
is  not  a  unit,  except  as  it  is  considered  relatively 
to  a  unity  in  which  it  is  embraced.  There  are  va- 
rious intricate  movements  in  the  cell,  particularly 
the  segmenting  cell,  which  are  responsive  to  stim- 
uli from  within  the  cell.  Life  appears  only  where 
there  are  two  or  more  of  something,  unity  and 
units. 

The  accepted  cell  is  for  physiological  pur- 
poses the  unit,  but  this  is  only  so  when  consider- 
ing the  life  processes  of  the  whole  body.  Behind 
all  this  is  the  "thing  itself,"  that  which  manifests 
in  the  cell,  but  which  is  not  necessarily  limited  to 
it,  that  which  demands  the  process;  there  is  ef- 
fort, is  will,  is  self. 

Not  that  physiology  or  biology  demonstrates 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  35 

their  existence,  but  that  they  do  not  demonstrate 
their  absence.  The  data  of  these  sciences  are  not 
only  consistent  with  but  compel  the  presence  of 
something  akin  to  them,  and  the  fact  that  this  is 
so  arms  the  cohorts  on  the  spiritual  side  of  the 
question  and  disarms  the  materialists,  unless  it  be 
finally  conceded  that  mind  and  matter  are  but  op- 
posite poles  of  the  same  substance,  in  which  case 
we  have  the  true  basis  for  a  monistic  conception 
of  the  universe. 

Man,  and  for  that  matter  any  animal,  is  ap- 
parently a  simple  machine  enough  in  his  last 
analysis  as  physical  animal.  He  is  but  a  congre- 
gation of  cells  operating  in  essential  harmony,  or 
many  cells  operating  as  one  cell ;  but  all  this  falls 
far  short  of  solving  the  mystery  or  putting  an  end 
to  serious  inquiry  into  the  origin  and  destination 
of  man. 

The  cell  itself  is  not  simple;  it  is  as  far  from 
being  so  as  is  that  vast  congregation  of  its  kind 
in  man;  it  is  tantalizingly  complicated,  exceed- 
ingly intricate  in  its  activities,  wonderfully  sur- 
prising in  its  potentialities,  either  as  a  whole  or 
when  separated  into  pieces,  and  it  is  infinitely 
small  in  its  ever-receding  units.  Nothing  has  yet 
been  found  in  the  cell  so  little  that  there  have  not 
been  undeniable  evidences  of  something  yet  more 
minute  behind  or  within  it.  Without  the  nucleus 
the  protoplasm  exists  for  a  while;  without  the 
protoplasm  the  nucleus  survives;  with  a  bit  of 
protoplasm  and  a  bit  of  nucleus  you  may  have 
continued  life  capable  of  repair  and  growth.  The 
nucleus  is  but  a  minute  speck  in  the  substance  of 


36  THE  LIVING  ENVIRONMENT 

the  cell,  and  when  it  is  examined  under  powerful 
lenses  is  itself  exceedingly  complex  and  puzzling ; 
it  has  within  its  substance,  small  as  it  is,  other 
bodies,  known  as  chromosomes,  and  these  in  turn 
may  be  perceived  to  be  constituted  of  yet  smaller 
bodies,  and  by  parity  of  reasoning  they  probably 
would,  if  we  were  able  to  see  them,  lead  us  down 
a  long  line  of  changing  forms  within  forms  long 
before  we  reached  that  elusive  thing,  the  unit  of 
life. 

^  We  might  as  well  expect  a  man  to  perform  the 
notoriously  impossible  feat  of  lifting  himself  by 
his  own  boot  straps  as  to  expect  the  remarkable 
activities  of  the  cell  to  present  themselves  to  our 
observations  in  that  body  if  it  were  the  unit  of 
organized  life.  Nor  am  I  here  ignoring  the  prob- 
able chemical  factors  which  should  be  considered. 
We  know  as  little  about  occult  chemistry  as  we  do 
about  the  mechanism  of  the  cell,  but  we  do  know 
that  the  tendency  of  chemical  and  physical  ener- 
gies is  to  an  inevitable  equilibrium,  and  that  in 
protoplasm  quite  the  contrary  is  the  fact.  Its 
growth  and  its  activities  all  depend  upon  its  lack 
of  equilibrium. 

As  the  modem  study  of  the  germ  cell  pro- 
ceeds, it  results  in  a  curious  but  not  surprising 
grouping  of  the  biologists  about  different  centers 
of  opinion.  Of  course  the  great  puzzle  which  all 
are  seeking  to  solve  is  the  cause  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  fertilized  ovum  into  the  particular  in- 
dividual who  appears  to  come  from  it,  and  this 
mystery  includes  the  inner  ones  of  heredity  and 
its  bearers. 


THE   LIVING   ENVIKONMENT  37 

It  need  not  be  said,  for  everybody  knows  it, 
that  the  mystery  has  not  been  solved.  No  sooner 
do  the  groping  fingers  of  the  scientist  lay  hold 
upon  a  new  discovery  in  the  elements  or  activities 
of  the  cell,  and  cause  him  to  imagine  that  the  goal 
is  at  hand,  than  some  other  investigator  in  Eng- 
land, Germany,  or  France,  or  here  at  home,  lo- 
cates with  his  microscope,  or  reveals  by  chemi- 
cal experiments,  some  new  factor  which  entirely 
upsets  the  beautiful  and  apparently  satisfactory 
theory  which  has  nearly  been  adopted.  When  it 
was  ascertained  that  the  nucleus  of  the  sperma- 
tozoon and  that  of  the  ovum  fused  and  became  one 
nucleus  in  which  appeared  certain  bodies  which 
always  were  of  a  definite  number  in  a  given  spe- 
cies, and  which  were  called  chromosomes,  it  was  a 
natural  conception  that  these  bodies  were  the 
bearers  of  heredity.  They  may  be,  probably  are, 
but  many  biologists  do  not  think  so.  However, 
upon  this  discovery  Weismann  reduced  the  opera- 
tions of  the  cell  to  a  system  with  an  elaborate 
division  of  the  substance  into  "ids,"  "idants," 
"biophors,"  etc.,  in  which  certain  potentialities  ap- 
peared. Spencer  indulged  in  the  idea  that  there 
were  "physiological  units"  in  the  sperm  and  germ 
cells ;  Eyder  advanced  the  dynamical  hypothesis ; 
others,  unable  to  reach  any  satisfactory  explana- 
tion, rehabilitated  the  discarded  idea  of  a  vital 
force  under  the  somewhat  apologetic  title  of  "neo- 
vitalism."  We  find  by  some  experiments  that  the 
substance  of  the  cell  is  not  differentiated  so  that 
one  part  will  not  have  all  the  potentiality  of  defi- 
nite development  which  every  other  part  has ;  and 


38  THE   LIVING   ENVIEONMENT 

by  others  that  it  is  so  differentiated.  We  are  con- 
fronted with  these  "physiological  units"  on  the 
one  hand,  as  determining  the  outcome  of  the  proc- 
ess of  development,  and  on  the  other  by  the  state- 
ment that  the  substance  of  the  sperm  cell  an'd  the 
ovum  cell  coalesces. 

As  the  substance  of  each  cell  is  like  the  other, 
it  would  almost  seem  that  by  such  a  fusion  all 
special  inheritance  from  the  parents  would  be  lost, 
particularly  as  we  are  asked  to  consider  the  cell  so 
produced  by  fusion  to  be  a  machine  and  all  its  op- 
erations mechanical. 

Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  perceive  how  there  can  be 
any  heredity  except  such  as  is  the  result  of  the  char- 
acteristic structure  of  the  plasm  belonging  to  the 
particular  form  of  animal  life  from  which  the  egg 
came.  If  we  supply  the  chromosomes  with  a  per- 
sistent differentiation,  then  we  have  some  pos- 
sible bearer  of  heredity,  or  if  we  admit  the  "ids" 
and  "idants,"  etc.,  of  Weismann;  but  if  these  are 
themselves  but  products  of  the  mechanical  opera- 
tions of  the  cells,  the  mystery  of  heredity  is  as 
dense  as  ever. 

Now  I  do  not  know  what  the  truth  is  as  to  he- 
redity, whether  it  is  a  myth  or  not ;  whether  it  is 
the  result  of  association  and  suggestion  or  not; 
whether  the  chromosomes  are  its  bearers  or  not; 
or  whether  at  the  fusion  of  the  plasm  of  the  nuclei 
any  definite,  special  bodies  remain  with  undis- 
turbed potentialities  or  not;  these  are  problems 
for  the  biologists,  and  so  long  as  they  range 
themselves  persistently  upon  opposite  sides  of 
the  question  involved,  plain  men  must  be  con- 


THE   LIVING   ENVIKONMENT  39 

tent  to  select  such  views  as  appeal  to  their 
reason. 

Certainly  if  a  biologist  commences  a  search  for 
the  factors  which  control  heredity  and  takes  it  for 
granted  that  Ryder  is  correct  when  he  says  that 
^Tendencies'  and  Troclivities'  are  words  that 
have  no  legitimate  place  in  the  discussion  of  the 
data  of  biology  any  more  than  they  have  in  natu- 
ral philosophy  or  physics,"  he  must  of  necessity 
end  in  mere  mechanics  without  a  mind  or  soul. 
If  he  predetermines  with  Haeckel  that  there  is  no 
individual  soul,  he  will  find  abundant  reason  in  the 
data  of  biology  for  reducing  everything  to  con- 
densing points  of  ether. 

Biological  data  are  very  accommodating;  they 
will  give  an  ample  supply  of  arguments  on  any 
side  of  the  question;  they  only  require  that  you 
name  your  desired  conclusion  in  advance. 

The  reason  for  this  is  that  the  ultimate  springs 
of  life  are  hidden  in  the  rock  of  Being  itself. 

Aside  from  its  importance  as  an  isolated  sci- 
ence for  its  own  sake,  Biology  has  a  value  not  to 
be  properly  measured  by  the  special  investigators 
in  that  field,  but  as  I  have  suggested  before,  by 
the  constructors  in  the  work  of  generalization.  If 
it  has  any  value  to  the  average  thinking  man  be- 
yond the  mere  gratification  of  curiosity,  it  is  be- 
cause of  what  it  adds  to  his  general  knowledge  of 
life.  No  man  in  making  a  survey  of  any  object 
contents  himself  with  a  measurement  in  one  di- 
rection only;  he  must  ascertain  not  only  length 
but  breadth,  not  only  length  and  breadth  but  thick- 
ness.   In  arriving  at  some  rational  conclusion  con- 


40  THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

cerning  the  probable  duration  of  individuality,  we 
must  consider  not  only  the  physical  aspect  but 
the  psychical,  if  we  do  not  assume  the  extraordi- 
nary attitude  of  considering  the  individual  as  a 
being  whose  external  dimensions  are  a  full 
measure  of  his  contents.  Either  we  have  an  irre- 
pressible conflict  between  the  two  sciences  of  psy- 
chology and  biology,  or  they  compensate  each 
other.  Considered  biologically  and  accepting  the 
cell  as  the  unit  of  life,  man  and  all  animals  have 
their  beginning  in  time,  and,  consequently,  their 
ending  in  time.  But  supposing,  as  is  the  fact,  that 
Science  utterly  fails  to  reach  far  enough  back  to 
locate  the  dynamic  force  behind  physical  life 
pushing  it  into  manifestation,  what  then?  Why, 
we  are  justified  in  refusing  to  accept  its  one-sided 
assertion  that  immortality  is  a  delusion,  and  that 
Science  demonstrates  that  fact. 

We  appeal  for  an  equation  from  the  investiga- 
tors of  the  outward  manifestation  to  the  students 
of  the  manifesting  and  manifested,  to  the  psy- 
chologists. It  is  true  that  they  cannot  reveal  to  us 
the  unit,  and  we  find  ourselves  merely  reducing 
the  size  of  objectivities  and  segregating  the  or- 
ganic centers  of  perceiving  subjectivity. 

Wherever  we  find  psychological  phenomena, 
there  we  find  running  parallel  with  it  physiologi- 
cal phenomena,  not  occupying  the  relationship  of 
cause  and  effect,  but  as  presenting  evidently  two 
phases  of  the  same  activity.  No  intellect  gigantic 
enough  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  distinction  be- 
tween mind  and  matter,  if  such  distinction  exists, 
has  as  yet  made  its  appearance.     The  profound 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 


THE  LIVING  ENVIEONMENT  41 


researches  of  our  great  specialists  in  the  field  of 
cytology  have  and  should  have  commanded  our 
respect  and  admiration,  but  the  weight  of  a  great 
name  in  such  labors  should  not  crush  our  rational 
hopes.  To  be  able  to  demonstrate  how  the  cells 
work,  to  portray  the  machinery  set  up  by  them, 
is  not  to  make  apparent  why  they  work  or  why 
they  need  the  machinery.  That  the  heart  is  the 
force  pump  of  the  arterial  system,  that  the  liver  se- 
cretes bile,  that  the  stomach  and  intestines  digest 
food,  that  the  human  body  is  in  those  respects  a 
machine,  have  been  facts  so  familiarly  known  for 
centuries  as  to  no  longer  cause  comment.  Cer- 
tainly this  knowledge  has  not  been  sufficient  in 
the  past  to  seriously  disturb  the  thoughtful  man 
in  his  confidence  in  immortality.  All,  in  addition 
to  these,  that  has  been  demonstrated  in  recent 
years  in  the  marvelous  progress  made  by  biolo- 
gists is  that  this  larger  physical  machine  incloses, 
or  rather  is  resolvable  into,  smaller  and  smaller 
machines  until  we  arrive  at  the  germ  cell.  True, 
the  battle  now  wages  there,  to  ascertain  if  pos- 
sible how,  from  this  inconceivably  intricate  "ma- 
chine," microscopically  small,  the  wonderful, 
thinking,  acting,  loving  "machine"  called  man  is 
evolved.  This  battle,  for  battle  it  is,  is  being 
waged  not  over  the  germ  cell  of  man  directly,  but 
the  egg  cell  of  the  worm,  the  sea  urchin,  and  others 
whose  eggs,  by  reason  of  their  availability  and 
transparency,  afford  opportunities  for  research 
without  undue  disturbance  of  the  contents.  In  the 
light  of  the  deductions  drawn  by  a  few  of  the 
great  investigators  in  the  field  of  cytology,  an  or- 


42  THE  LIVING  ENVIRONMENT 

dinary  man  approaches  the  microscopic  examina- 
tion of  such  cells  with  fear  and  trembling,  his 
brave  hopes  of  immortality  are  about  to  be  de- 
stroyed, and  he  is  to  find  that,  after  all,  the  "for- 
tuitous concourse  of  atoms"  is  before  him,  and  he 
will  stand  at  the  edge  of  an  abyss  beyond  which 
is  no  life. 

If  he  be  thoughtful,  however,  his  approach  is 
the  end  of  that  fear,  for  he  will  find  beneath  his 
eye  such  a  wonderful  complication  full  of  startling 
potentialities  as  will  push  that  cumbersome, 
gross,  and  tangibly  apparent  machine  called  man 
far  into  the  background  as  an  evidence  of  prece- 
dent will  and  consciousness. 

Lest  it  be  thought  that  a  layman  should  not  take 
upon  himself  the  liberty  to  draw  his  own  infer- 
ences from  what  he  sees  and  from  what  others 
have  reported,  it  will  not  be  out  of  place  to  sug- 
gest that  here,  as  in  many  other  matters  scientific, 
the  masters  of  specialty  disagree  most  emphati- 
cally among  themselves  as  to  even  how  this  "ma- 
chine" does  its  work.  Many  questions  remain  un- 
answered and  many  problems  unsolved ;  and  if  the 
study  of  the  physical  egg  alone  be  relied  upon  for 
explanation,  will  remain  unanswered  and  un- 
solved. The  germ  is  a  mighty  small  affair,  yet 
it  contains  within  its  invisible  self  problems  which 
will  be  the  sphinxes  of  science  for  all  time  to 
come. 

That  many  of  the  questions  which  now  puzzle 
the  scientists  will  sometime  be  answered,  there 
can  be  little  doubt,  but  that  there  will  ever  remain 
an  unlifted  veil  is  equally  certain.    If  there  be 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  43 

heredity,  what  elements  of  the  cell  are  the  bearers 
of  it?  Does  the  centrosome  exist  at  all?  If  so,  is  it 
an  element  of  the  egg,  or  is  it  an  appearance  only, 
an  effect,  produced  by  the  constriction  of  the 
plasmic  substance?  Does  it  enter  with  the  sperm 
cell  or  is  it  there  already?  Does  it  pull  or  push? 
What  is  the  unit  of  material  life?  Is  there  any? 
Is  the  substance  of  the  egg  differentiated  or  not? 
Do  certain  portions  have  specialized  potentialities 
or  not?  Is  the  unequilibrated  condition  of  proto- 
plasm the  cause  of  consciousness  or  the  effect? 
What  is  the  preforming  principle  involved  in  this 
microscopic  particle  which  produces  such  inevit- 
able, such  unfailing  results  ? 

All  these  questions,  with  many  others  that  I 
will  not  mention,  have  engaged  the  attention 
of  earnest  students  and  untiring  investigators. 
Some  have  been,  some  will  be,  and  many  never 
can  be,  fully  answered.  And  there  are  many  rea- 
sons why  they  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  with 
demonstrations  of  the  truthfulness  of  the  answer. 
The  powers  of  the  microscope  are  limited ;  beyond 
a  certain  point  we  shall  never  be  able  to  go  with 
the  use  of  the  lenses,  and  it  must  be  said  in  that 
connection  that  at  the  point  where  we  must  stop 
we  shall  yet  find  complications,  intricacy,  and 
marvelous  evidences  of  organization.  Even  as- 
suming that  we  should  instead  discover  an  ap- 
parently undifferentiated  substance  as  protoplasm 
was  once  supposed  to  be,  we  should  be  no  nearer 
the  demonstrative  solution  of  life,  but  should 
be  compelled  to  resort  to  occult  chemistry  for 
further  investigation ;  unless,  indeed,  the  hitherto 


44  THE   LIVING   ENVIKONMENT 

unaccomplished  feat  of  producing  spontaneous 
generation  should  be  performed.  When  con- 
sciousness shall  be  produced  in  artificially  manu- 
factured living  substance,  and  the  unequilibrated 
condition  of  such  substance  preserved  thereby, 
chemistry  will  have  gone  far  toward  disturbing 
the  serenity  of  our  hopes  concerning  continuity 
of  individual  life,  but  will  not  even  then  have  de- 
stroyed them  utterly.  Even  in  the  artificial  pro- 
duction of  such  living  substance  we  might  yet  be 
able  to  assert  that  the  successful  chemist  has  but 
produced  an  essential  environment  for  a  living 
unit  to  find  opportunity,  as  has  probably  been 
done  by  Loeb  in  chemically  assisting  the  segmen- 
tation of  the  unfertilized  ovum  of  the  Sea  Urchin. 
Even  Loeb's  famous  experiments  begin  with  a  liv- 
ing organized  cell.  The  mystery  of  life  is  elusive 
and  it  slips  away  from  the  profoundest  inquir- 
ing savant  as  from  the  hungry  minds  of  those  who 
are  prone  to  accept  the  greatness  of  a  name  as  a 
guarantee  of  the  incontestable  certainty  of  deduc- 
tions and  conclusions  presented  under  its  author- 
ity. 

We  should,  however,  not  forget  that  the  conten- 
tion made  in  this  work  is  not  that  the  immortality 
of  the  individual  is  a  demonstrable  fact  in  the 
light  of  recent  science,  but  that  the  contrary  has 
not  been,  as  asserted,  demonstrated.  I  have  so 
far  failed  to  find  in  the  forward  movements  made 
in  the  biological  and  psychological  fields  any  rea- 
son to  abandon  my  convictions  in  that  regard,  and 
that  there  is  no  necessity  for  the  uneasiness  which 
is  apt  to  be  engendered  by  the  discoveries  of  the 


THE   LIVING   ENVIKONMENT  45 

biologists  is  admitted  by  C.  0.  Whitman  in  bis 
prefatory  note  to  "Biological  Lectures,"  1894,  in 
these  words :  "While  Biology  is  certainly  indebted 
to  physics  for  some  of  its  metaphysics,  it  is  to  the 
credit  of  physics  to  have  made  it  clear  that  mech- 
anism, indisputable  as  are  its  methods,  atfords  no 
fmidamental  explanation  of  anything.  As  Karl 
Pearson  has  so  well  said,  the  mystery  of  life  is 
no  less  nor  no  greater  because  a  dance  of  organic 
corpuscles  is  at  bottom  a  dance  of  inorganic 
atoms.  What  dances  and  why  it  dances  is  not  ex- 
plained by  reducing  size  to  the  lowest  limit  of  di- 
visibility and  just  as  little  by  the  assumption  of 
ultraphysical  causes.  .  .  .  The  ultimate  mystery 
is  beyond  the  reach  of  both  mechanism  and  vital- 
ism. .  .  .  Some  place  the  secret  of  life  in  the  cell, 
others  in  smaller  units,  but  no  one,  so  far  as  I 
know,  has  looked  upon  the  unit  as  anything  more 
than  the  seat  of  the  mystery." 

If  the  memory  of  the  gill  clefts,  those  ghostly 
reminiscences  of  our  aquatic  ancestors,  appears 
at  a  certain  point  in  the  progress  of  segmentation 
of  the  cell  and  formation  of  the  embryo,  by  what 
conceivable  process  can  it  be  said  that  thereafter 
in  the  embryo  arising  from  the  same  egg  a  "mem- 
ory" of  the  characteristics  of  the  parents  make  its 
appearance,  unless  we  recognize  many  units  in  the 
one? 

The  gill-cleft  "memory"  does  not  appear  until  a 
certain  point  in  the  synthesis  is  reached ;  hence,  it 
is  the  memory  (if  it  be  a  memory)  of  that  particu- 
lar synthetic  organism  as  it  stands  at  that  point 
of  time  constructed  out  of  the  daughter  cells  of 


46  THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

one  cell.  The  subsequent  presentation  of  parental 
characteristics  is  the  memory  of  another  synthe- 
sis and  the  ultimate  personality  of  still  another. 
We  are  dealing  with  the  functions  of  cells,  we 
must  bear  in  mind,  which  were  set  apart  in  the 
living  bodies  of  the  parents  as  specialized  genera- 
tive cells.  It  would  be  fully  consonant  with  bi- 
ological data,  not  opinions,  for  the  inference  to  be 
made  that  the  individual  preceded  and  made  pos- 
sible the  ultimate  synthesis.  Now,  I  do  not  at  all 
say  that  these  changes  are  produced  by  memory, 
for  the  "unknown  factors"  are  unknown ;  whether 
a  "dynamical  theory  of  inheritance"  is  true; 
whether  there  are  units  bearing  specific  motions, 
or  whether  the  very  nature  of  the  protoplasm  com- 
pels in  some  mysterious  way  the  formation  of  the 
body,  I  do  not  know,  neither  does  anybody  else, 
but  I  do  know  that  the  field  is  yet  open  for  reason- 
able theories  of  any  kind,  not  barring  even  that  of 
a  dominant  unit  of  force  unifying  as  its  own  the 
activities  of  the  many. 

If  I  indulge  in  a  legitimate  exercise  of  scien- 
tific imagination,  imtil  some  clearer  explanation 
has  been  given  than  has  as  yet  appeared,  of  the 
movements  and  functions  of  the  centrosome,  I  can 
even  suppose  that  body  to  be  in  turn  a  congeries 
of  vast  numbers  of  its  kind  of  varying  values, 
units  of  infinitely  small  proportions,  but  as 
capable  of  having  ascribed  to  them  will  and  sensi- 
tiveness as  is  the  atom,  and  of  being  laden  with  a 
weight  of  memories  as  great  as  that  ascribed  to 
the  microscopically  small  ovum  and  sperm  cells. 

From  such  investigations  as  have  been  made 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  47 

with  the  eggs  of  such  lower  forms  of  life  as  the 
sea  urchin  and  thread  worm,  the  segmentation  of 
the  egg  is  attended  with  the  most  marvelous  activ- 
ity of  that  exceedingly  minute  body,  the  centro- 
some,  which  seems  in  some  inexplicable  manner  to 
preside  over  the  separation  of  the  cells  and  the 
partition  of  the  chromosomes.  Whether  we  are 
unable  to  see  other  bodies  within  it  or  not  is  not 
so  material ;  inability  is  but  a  limitation  measured 
by  our  capacity  of  sight  as  increased  by  the  use  of 
lenses. 

Upon  the  entrance  of  the  heretofore  invisible 
(to  the  unaided  eye)  spermatozoon  into  the  minute 
ovum  egg,  there  appears  accompanying  it  as  a 
section  thereof,  or  at  least  contained  in  a  section 
thereof,  an  exceedingly  minute  body  or  point 
which,  when  the  nuclei  of  the  ovum  and  sperm  cell 
coalesce  into  one  nucleus,  which  they  do  speedily, 
takes  up  a  position  on  one  side  of  the  nucleus. 

It  divides,  or  appears  to  be  divided,  into  two, 
one  of  which  goes  to  the  other  side  of  the  nucleus, 
and  then  a  figure  is  formed,  the  Karyokynetic  fig- 
ure, in  which  rays  reach  from  the  cytoplasm  to  the 
center  of  the  nucleus  proceeding  from  the  centro- 
some  on  either  side.  From  that  the  division  of 
the  cell  commences,  and  the  process  is  repeated 
on  and  on  through  the  segmentation  of  the  cells. 

It  has  the  appearance  of  dividing  itself  at  each 
fission  and  supplying  each  daughter  cell  with  a 
like  centrosome,  unless,  indeed,  we  may  suppose 
this  remarkable  body  to  be  in  reality  a  unity  of 
units,  and  that  what  to  a  certain  point  appears  to 
be  the  division  of  the  centrosome  is  in  fact  a  sep- 


48  THE   LIVING   ENVIEONMENT 

aration  into  numbers  of  existing  units,  which  ap- 
pear to  view  upon  separation  from  the  other  by 
reason  of  rapidity  of  growth  and  expansion. 

Of  course  I  know  the  question  of  what  the  cen- 
trosome  is  has  been  discussed  by  the  ablest  biolo- 
gists in  this  country  and  Europe,  but  while  the 
question  remains  open,  as  I  fancy  it  will  for 
a  while,  as  to  whether  it  is  an  ultimate  organ  of 
the  cell  or,  on  the  other  hand,  a  derivative  struc- 
ture, I  am  at  liberty  to  be  true  to  my  own  thesis, 
that  wherever  life  is  there  are  many  in  the  One. 

The  astounding  supposition  that  in  it  may  be 
many  units  of  forces  organic  is  no  more  a  burden 
for  the  intelligence  to  carry  than  is  the  supposi- 
tion that  the  germ  cell  itself  recapitulates  from  its 
"unconscious  memory"  the  history  of  evolution 
from  unicell  to  vertebrate,  recalls  in  synthetic  or- 
der the  fish  gills,  is  burdened  with  "race  memory," 
and  finally  stands  forth  with  the  recollections  of 
parental  characteristics,  both  physical  and  mental. 
Scripture  advises  the  sluggard  to  "go  to  the  ant," 
and  I  ask  consideration  for  a  moment  of  what 
George  Komanes  says  about  its  brain  (p.  46, 
"Mental  Evolution  in  Animals") :  "Knowing  in  a 
general  way  that  mass  plus  structure  of  brain  is 
necessary  for  intelligence,  we  do  not  know  how 
far  the  second  of  these  two  factors  may  he  in- 
creased at  the  expense  of  the  first,  (Italics 
mine.)  And  as  a  mere  matter  of  complexity,  I 
am  not  sure  that  even  the  brain  of  an  ant  is  to  be 
considered  more  wonderful  than  the  ovum  of  a  hu- 
man being.  .  .  .  While  in  the  case  of  ants,  Du- 
jardin  says  that  the  degree  of  intelligence  stands 


THE   LIVING   ENVIEONMENT  49 

in  an  inverse  proportion  to  the  amount  of  pedun- 
cular bodies  and  tubereules." 

Now,  when  we  consider  that  with  the  highest 
powers  of  the  microscope  this  remarkable  center, 
the  centrosome,  is  yet  barely  visible  and  recog- 
nized as  a  factor  in  segmentation  of  the  cell  more 
by  what  it  does  and  by  its  attendant  characteristic 
figure  than  by  its  size,  we  may  well  pause  be- 
fore pronouncing  finally  upon  its  nature  and 
origin. 

The  cerebral  activities  of  the  brain  are  com- 
paratively easy  to  map  as  to  location,  but  when 
we  approach  the  most  potential  and  mysterious  of 
all  organized  substance,  the  germ  cell,  we  reach 
limitations,  owing  to  the  infinitesimal  smallness 
of  what  we  are  studying.  The  results  are  big,  the 
seat  of  the  causes  recedes  even  from  the  micro- 
scope's eye. 

Is  there  any  absurdity  in  the  thought,  then,  that 
in  this  body,  the  centrosome,  may  be  more  than 
one  potential  unit  of  force,  the  manifestation 
therein  of  more  than  one  individual? 

As  I  have  stated  in  another  place,  up  to  a  cer- 
tain number  of  cell  divisions  of  the  sea  urchin's 
egg  they  may  be  separated  and  two  or  more 
smaller  urchins  produced;  beyond  that  point  se- 
lective synthesis  has  proceeded  so  far  that  the 
specialization  of  the  units  prevents  any  such  re- 
sults. The  dominance  of  the  one  has  prevailed; 
the  unity  is  its ;  the  living  environment  belongs  to 
it ;  it  remains  the  conscious  unit  of  energy ;  it  pre- 
sides ;  it  experiences ;  it  is  the  individual  in  activ- 
ity. 


50  THE   LIVING   ENVIEONMENT 

Shall  such  a  supposition  be  shown  to  be  an  ab- 
surdity? Certainly  not  by  the  mere  urging  of  a 
contrary  opinion,  but  only  by  the  reduction  of  our 
present  working  units  to  yet  smaller  ones,  and 
even  then  they  will  appear  as  many  in  one.  The 
old  distinction  between  soul  and  body  can  in  my 
view  only  be  modified  by  modern  science  to  the 
extent  of  analyzing  the  units  of  a  living  environ- 
ment and  leaving  unexplained  the  underlying 
activity  by  reason  of  which  it  assumes  the  form  it 
has.  Either  this,  or  there  is  no  individual,  and 
such  a  conclusion  our  consciousness  contradicts. 
The  old  saying  that  "the  body  is  not  the  man"  may 
then  well  be  paraphrased  by  "the  environment  is 
not  the  individual." 

Prof.  Alfred  H.  Lloyd  has  called  the  individual 
a  "relationship."  Professor  Miinsterburg,  of 
Harvard,  designates  it  as  an  "attitude,"  and  be- 
cause the  word  "relationship"  appears  to  embrace 
more  of  the  idea  which  I  wish  to  convey  of  the  in- 
dividual, I  have  adopted  the  word  in  preference  to 
the  other. 

Perhaps  I  am  wrong  in  thinking  that  an  attitude 
may  be  taken  and  never  repeated  of  necessity, 
while  a  relationship  is  eternally  self -existent,  but 
if  I  am,  I  shall  make  no  mistake  in  adopting  the, 
to  me,  very  pregnant  word  used  by  Professor 
Lloyd.  From  the  nature  of  individuality  every 
individual  is  apt  egotistically  to  consider  himself 
as  something  separate  and  apart  from  the  rest  of 
the  universe  of  life.  Li  a  restricted  sense  this  is 
true,  but  in  a  wider  and  it  seems  to  me  more  grat- 
ifying one  it  is  not  true.    Both  from  the  revela- 


THE  LIVING  ENVIRONMENT  51 

tions  of  the  microscope  and  the  remarkable  phe- 
nomena presented  during  a  rather  extensive  study 
of  experimental  psychology  I  have  become  con- 
vinced that  we  have  not  given  sufficient  recogni- 
tion to  the  position  in  7nedia  res  which  the  individ- 
ual occupies.  In  fact,  it  now  appears  difficult  for 
me  to  understand  what  an  individual  is  without  at 
the  same  time  embracing  in  the  term  the  idea  of 
many  individuals. 

Considered  physically  from  the  body  of  the  ma- 
ture man  back  to  the  last  known  analysis  of  the 
cell,  he  is  a  mass  of  millions  of  living  units  intri- 
cately associated  together,  to  no  one  of  which  has 
it  as  yet  been  possible  to  ascribe  the  dominant 
ascendency,  and  if  we  were  to  attempt  to  look  for 
the  conscious  individual  in  the  midst  of  this  vast 
concourse  of  physical  units  we  should  find  our- 
selves confronting  the  necessity  of  finding  some 
physical  center  of  control  which  must  be  a  unit  to 
which  all  stimuli  must  report  and  from  which  all 
motive  force  must  issue.  The  moment  we  en- 
deavor to  avoid  this  by  the  creation  of  a  hypo- 
thetical synthesis,  or  by  contemplating  man  as  a 
syncytium,  we  have  abandoned  the  physical  side 
of  the  question  so  far  as  "physical"  goes  in  biolog- 
ical terminology,  as  we  are  looking  for  unity  of 
consciousness  or  self -consciousness. 

Physically  it  is  not  difficult  to  construct  a  syn- 
thesis. We  may  conceive  of  the  various  centers 
as  forming  a  community  in  which,  while  each  is 
laboring  for  its  self-preservation,  its  situation 
necessarily  compels  it  at  the  same  time  to  perform 
its  functions  for  the  benefit  of  others.    There  is 


52  THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

thus  an  exchange  of  force,  an  interplay  of  func- 
tional activity  which  makes  it  easy  to  build  the 
synthesis. 

When  we  undertake,  however,  the  task  of  con- 
structing a  mental  synthesis  or  rather  a  synthetic 
consciousness,  we  are  confronted  with  insur- 
mountable difficulties  from  the  start.  The  psychi- 
cal activities  of  the  cell  centers  of  the  brain  are 
not  a  common  product,  a  sum  total,  unless,  in- 
deed, we  are  prepared  as  suggested  before  to  ad- 
mit of  some  one  center  in  which  all  discharges  or 
their  psychical  products  are  added  together  syn- 
thesized and  recognized. 

The  same  stimulus  applied  to  the  optic  nerve 
and  the  auditory  nerve  results  in  entirely  differ- 
ent products — one  is  light,  the  other  sound.  I  do 
not  know  of  any  manner  in  which  the  cognizing 
center  which  receives  the  impression  of  light  can 
report  its  sensation  as  light  to  the  center  which  re- 
ceived the  sensation  as  sound,  nor  vice  versa.  As 
I  view  a  beautiful  landscape,  the  sweet  smell  of 
the  wild  flowers  salutes  my  olfactory  nerves,  the 
waving  of  the  yellow  com,  the  mist  of  the  distant 
mountain  side,  the  sparkling  spring  pour  their 
light  into  my  eyes  with  a  multitude  of  color  effects 
to  be  recognized;  the  humming  of  the  bees,  the 
song  of  birds,  and  a  dozen  other  sounds  call  for 
recognition.  Different  centers  are  reached;  dif- 
ferent effects  produced.  It  may  seem  easy  to  say 
that  the  whole  man  perceives  the  whole  picture, 
but  what  is  the  whole  man  physically  or  psychi- 
cally? To  lodge  these  various  sensations  in  cen- 
ters foreign  to  each  other,  though  connected,  each 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  63 

speaking  a  different  language,  does  not  and  can- 
not make  one  inclusive  sensation. 

This  difficulty  of  constructing  a  synthetic  con- 
sciousness has  been  recognized  and  conceded  by 
no  less  a  psychologist  than  Professor  James,  of 
Harvard  University.^ 

Because  of  the  comparatively  unequilibrated 
condition  of  the  cortical  cells  of  the  cerebrum  and, 
therefore,  their  probable  capacity  to  receive  any 
and  all  forms  of  motion  set  up  by  sensation  and  to 
return  again  to  their  former  condition  as  tahla 
rasa,  so  far  as  sensation  is  concerned,  they  prob- 
ably are  the  seat  of  the  arranging  and  analyzing 
of  this  multiplicity  of  stimuli  products. 

This  does  not  remove  the  difficulty,  however, 
for  there  are  millions  of  these  cells  that,  while 
adapted  to  intricate  connections,  are  yet  separate 
and  individual.  If  there  is  at  last  some  one  cell  in 
which  a  final  unification  of  consciousness  resides, 
we  may  fall  back  upon  even  the  physical  perse- 
verance of  the  cell  microscopic,  dried,  and  the 
sport  of  the  winds,  as  is  the  case  with  some  of  the 
tardigrada.  This,  of  course,  is  but  the  improbable 
but  possible  result  if  we  seek  for  the  individual 
consciousness  as  a  unit  in  the  material  cells.  The 
whole  physical  life  is  a  living  environment,  a  rela- 
tionship of  numbers.  Where  there  are  two,  there 
is  an  invisible  third  uniting  them;  where  three, 
the  fourth  and  so  on  from  the  physical  unit  to  the 

1  Since  writing  this  book  I  have  read  Professor  James's  Pluralistic 
Universe,  and  I  refer  the  reader  to  it  for  consideration  of  his  present 
attitude  on  this  matter,  and  also  for  information  as  to  how  this 
master  views  Hfe  from  the  psychological  data. 


54  THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

vast  concourse  of  atoms  in  the  living  man ;  thence 
on  to  the  Unity  for  aught  that  all  the  deductions 
so  far  drawn  from  the  data  accumulated  under 
the  microscope  and  in  the  chemical  laboratory 
may  rightfully  say  to  the  contrary.  The  indi- 
vidual from  this  standpoint  is  never  born,  he  is 
there  when  the  unified  living  environment  is  there, 
and  he  is  what  he  is  physically  because  of  where 
he  is. 

If,  as  contended  by  Cope,  all  development  is 
preceded  by  effort,  and  effort  imports  energy,  and 
energy  is  conscious,  then  the  individual  may  be 
an  energy  form,  a  unit  in  that  unity  which  so  mys- 
teriously energizes  the  ether  or  substance  with  a 
force  unknown  to  our  mundane  physics. 

The  organic  is  not  a  result,  an  effect,  but  that 
by  reason  of  which  the  organism  is  produced,  it 
is  inherent  determinate  force.  So  with  the  syn- 
thetic ;  it  is  not  the  result  but  a  determinate  caus- 
ing force ;  the  synthesis  is  a  process  and  a  result. 
Neither  the  organic  nor  the  synthetic  are  in  ap- 
pearance at  any  time;  they  are  above,  beneath, 
within,  and  always  unseen  and  untouched.  The 
individual  is  and  must  be  the  same.  He  is  never 
visible  or  tangible  except  in  the  forms  of  his  ac- 
tivity; he  is  never  born,  he  can  never  die.  The 
synthesis  of  the  two  or  any  number  of  units  is  the 
product  of  the  synthetic  activity  behind  them,  and 
it  is  immaterial  whether  that  activity  is  mechani- 
cal or  chemical,  for,  after  all,  chemistry  is  the  me- 
chanics of  nature.  The  indisposition  of  materialis- 
tic scientists  to  in  any  manner  recognize  or  acknowl- 
edge the  reality  of  anything  in  the  nature  of  spirit 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  65 

or  soul  or  mind  transcending  the  known  forms  of 
matter  and  their  action  and  interactions  is,  it 
appears  to  me,  far  more  irrational  than  even  the 
old-fashioned  orthodox  conception  of  a  specially 
created  soul.  If  the  individual  mind  is  the  mere  re- 
sult of  the  "fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms,"  then 
something  has  been  produced  which  is  different 
from  atoms,  greater  than  them,  and,  as  an  effect, 
greater  than  its  cause,  and  which  cannot  be  ac- 
counted for  by  the  individual  activities  of  atoms. 
To  merely  call  it  phenomenon  gives  us  nothing  but 
a  word  in  place  of  explanation. 

Even  if  we  were  able  theoretically  to  resolve 
consciousness  into  units  of  sentience.  Science  has 
no  formula  which,  without  destroying  the  unit  as 
such,  can  organize  consciousness  out  of  units  of 
sentience,  unless,  as  I  have  intimated  elsewhere, 
we  drive  the  sentience  of  the  units  finally  into 
some  one  cell  center  which  is  no  longer  a  unit  but 
by  reason  of  its  unified  consentience  is  a  unity. 

But  this  results  from  prejudiced  attempts  to  ac- 
count for  the  individual  only  by  physics.  Hydro- 
gen and  oxygen  H^O  is  water.  Hydrogen  is  not 
water ;  neither  is  oxygen ;  but  the  product  is  a  third 
something  which  is  neither — it  is  water.  That  is 
tangible,  visible  third — and  if  by  reason  of  the  ad- 
dition thereto  of  another  proportion  of  oxygen 
the  formula  reads  H^O^,  we  have  no  longer  water, 
but  another  which  is  neither  hydrogen,  oxygen, 
nor  water,  but  peroxide  of  hydrogen. 

It  is  evident  enough  in  physics  that  the  con- 
struction of  synthetic  visible  forms  of  motion  is 
the  measure  of  utility  in  many  machines,  but  it  is 


56  THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

because  the  forms  of  motion  are  compensated  and 
modified  and  climaxed  in  an  ultimate  unit  of  mo- 
tion which  is  localized  and  visible. 

But  this  is  precisely  what  we  cannot  do  with  the 
conscious  cells  as  units.  Each  is  more  or  less  spe- 
cialized, and  by  reason  of  its  position  and  limita- 
tions is  responsive  to  stimuli  in  a  given  manner 
and  only  so.  If  consciousness  of  light  follows  in 
one  center  of  cells  from  a  physical  vibration  of  a 
wire,  and  a  musical  sound  is  the  result  of  the 
same  impulse  in  another,  there  must  be  either  a 
third  center  which  from  them  receives  both  and 
recognizes  one  cause  with  a  variety  of  sensations, 
or  we  must  abandon  the  attempt  to  measure  the 
individual  consciousness  by  physics  and  admit 
that  the  third  is  always  beyond  and  transcenden- 
tal to  the  two. 

All  this  is  metaphysical,  to  be  sure,  but  then  all 
that  I  desire  is  to  record  the  conviction  that  not- 
withstanding our  remarkable  advance  in  science, 
there  are  yet  fields  unexplored  and  grounds  for 
belief  yet  rational  and  undisturbed. 

That  the  method  by  which  a  physical  synthesis 
is  constructed  which  mechanically  operates  as 
one  will  not  result  in  the  production  of  a  soul  is 
evident  from  Haeckel's  own  data. 

Eeferring  to  the  psychological  phenomena  ob- 
served in  the  formation  of  the  blastula,  he  says: 
"The  sensations  also  fall  into  groups:  (1)  The 
sensation  of  the  individual  cells,  which  reveal 
themselves  in  the  assertion  of  their  individual  in- 
dependence and  their  relation  to  neighboring  cells 
(with  which  they  are  in  contact,  and  partly  in 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  57 

direct  combination,  by  means  of  protoplasmic 
fibers) ;  (2)  the  common  sensation  of  the  entire 
commmiity  of  cells,  which  is  seen  in  the  individual 
formation  of  the  blastula  as  a  hollow  vesicle." 
Again,  commenting  upon  some  "modern  repre- 
sentatives" of  the  earliest  "cell  communities,"  he 
says:  "In  all  these  coenobia  we  can  easily  distin- 
guish two  different  grades  of  psychic  activity:  (1) 
the  cell  soul  of  the  individual  cells  (the  *elemen- 
tary  organisms')  and  (2)  the  communal  soul  of 
the  entire  colony." 

It  is  easy  to  put  into  simple  language  and  say, 
that,  given  a  number  of  cells  bound  together  by 
protoplasmic  fibers  and  in  contact  with  each  other, 
we  have  each  cell  limited  as  to  how,  where,  and 
when  it  shall  move,  by  its  position  relative  to 
those  in  contact  with  it  and  by  the  character  and 
direction  of  the  stimulus  which  causes  the  sensa- 
tion. 

Let  one  cell  be  stimulated,  it  will  respond  by  its 
own  specific  form  of  motion  only  limited  by  its 
neighbors;  it  will  forward  the  stimulation  along 
the  "protoplasmic  fiber"  connecting  it  to  its  next 
neighbors,  each  of  whom  will  respond  by  its  own 
specific  form  of  motion  limited  only  by  its  neigh- 
bors, and  when  all  the  cells  receive  the  impulse, 
which  they  do  practically  simultaneously,  the 
whole  mass  must  move  in  one  direction  with  a  spe- 
cific movement  which  is  the  synthesis  of  all  these 
motions.  This  is  mechanics,  and  all  we  have  done 
is  to  bind  together  by  "protoplasmic  fibers"  a 
number  of  cells  which  individually  may  move  spe- 
cifically and  have  created  one  general  movement 


58  THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

which  may  have  originated  with  any  one  of  the  in- 
dividual cells. 

No  doubt  the  living  environment  of  man  does 
physically  something  similar,  but  how  does  that 
help  us  to  create  a  soul?  By  increasing  the  com- 
plexity of  the  community  by  the  introduction  of 
cell  centers  and  the  ganglionic  function  we  cer- 
tainly never  get  away  from  the  law  which  governs 
this  primitive  type,  for  we  have  simply  multi- 
plied the  communities  and  increased  the  connec- 
tions. 

Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  one  cell  in  the  com- 
munity when  touching  a  curved,  smooth,  hard  ob- 
ject should  be  by  its  primitive  simplicity  able  to 
be  sensitive  only  to  smoothness;  let  us  imagine 
its  neighbor  gifted  similarly  with  the  faculty  of 
sensitiveness  to  hardness,  and  yet  another,  the 
curved  surface,  and  so  on  throughout  the  com- 
munity. 

The  first  one  touches  the  object ;  if  it  thinks,  its 
only  thought  is  "smoothness";  it  passes  the  im- 
pulse along  to  the  next  cell;  this  one  then,  if  it 
could  speak,  would  say  "hardness";  the  stimula- 
tion goes  to  the  next  and  it  will  respond  with 
"curvature."  Now  here  we  have  three  separate 
cells  with  their  individual  sensations,  but  by  what 
process  will  the  whole  community  rise  up  and  say : 
"It  is  a  smooth,  curved,  hard  object"? 

It  may  move  away  from  it  by  reason  of  the 
hard  impact  or  it  may  glide  over  it  as  the  result 
of  the  curved  smooth  surface,  but  it  will  not  be 
able  to  give  any  reason  for  it.  No  such  process  as 
this,  however  intricate  the  combination  of  factors 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  59 

engaged  in  it  may  be,  can  account  for  the  unity  of 
consciousness  or  memory. 

Haeckel  himself  clearly  draws  the  line  between 
facts  and  theories^  between  demonstration  and 
"provisional  hypothesis,"  and  properly  declares 
that  "the  man  who  renounces  theory  altogether, 
and  seeks  to  construct  a  pure  science  with  certain 
facts  [italics  mine]  alone,  as  often  happens  with 
wrong-headed  representatives  of  our  ^exact  sci- 
ences,' must  give  up  the  hope  of  any  knowledge 
of  causes,  and,  consequently,  of  the  satisfaction 
of  reason's  demand  for  causality." 

Yet  notwithstanding  his  full  recognition  of  this 
broad  distinction  between  what  is  tentatively  as- 
sumed and  clearly  demonstrated  facts,  he  sur- 
mounts his  structure,  which  is  almost  entirely 
founded  upon  tentative  assumptions,  with  such 
capstones  as  these :  "The  belief  in  the  immortality 
of  the  human  soul  is  a  dogma  which  is  in  hope- 
less contradiction  with  the  most  solid  empirical 
truths  of  modern  science,"  and  "it  was  the  gigan- 
tic progress  of  biology  in  the  present  century,  and 
especially  in  the  latter  half  of  the  century,  that 
finally  destroyed  the  myth." 

I  have  prefaced  what  I  wish  to  say  further 
concerning  the  profound  mystery  of  conscious- 
ness and  its  unity  with  this  reference  to  Pro- 
fessor HaeckePs  admitted  position  concerning  the 
method  by  which  a  pure  science  should  be  con- 
structed, because  I  think  it  will  be  apparent  that 
he  has  been  guilty  of  a  violation  of  his  own  rule. 

To  a  mind  which  is  satisfied  with  a  normal  phys- 
ical synthesis  resulting  from  evolution  and  which 


60  THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT 

is  capable  of  producing  an  effect  astonndingly 
greater  than  any  known  cause,  the  chemical  activi- 
ties of  the  cerebral  cells  and  the  organs  of  sense 
may  produce  a  "sum  total"  equivalent  to  all  we 
recognize  as  soul. 

In  referring  to  the  senses  of  man,  Haeckel  says : 
"In  harmony  with  the  great  law  of  ^division  of 
labor'  the  originally  indifferent  *sense  cells'  of  the 
skin  undertook  different  tasks,  one  group  of  them 
taking  over  the  stimulus  of  the  light  rays,  another 
the  impress  of  the  sound  waves,  another  the  chem- 
ical impulse  of  odorous  substance,  and  so  on.  In 
the  course  of  a  very  long  period  these  external 
stimuli  effected  a  gradual  change  in  the  physio- 
logical and  later  in  the  morphological  properties 
of  these  parts  of  the  epidermis,  and  there  was  a 
correlative  modification  of  the  sensitive  nerves 
which  conduct  the  impressions  they  receive  to  the 
brain.  Selection  improved,  step  by  step,  such 
particular  modifications  as  proved  to  be  useful, 
and  thus  eventually,  in  the  course  of  many  million 
years,  created  those  wonderful  instruments  the 
eye  and  the  ear,  which  we  prize  so  highly;  their 
structure  is  so  remarkable  that  they  might  well 
lead  to  the  erroneous  assumption  of  a  ^creation  on 
a  preconceived  design.'  The  peculiar  character  of 
each  sense  organ  and  its  specific  nerve  has  thus 
been  gradually  evolved  by  use  and  exercise — that 
is  by  adaptation — and  has  thus  been  transmitted 
by  heredity  from  generation  to  generation.  .  .  . 
Without  the  senses  there  is  no  knowledge." 

Thus,  then,  without  the  evolution  during  mil- 
lions of  years,  resulting  in  those  modifications  of 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  61 

the  conducting  nerves  and  the  development  of  the 
appropriate  senses,  there  could  be  no  knowledge. 
Possibly  this  would  be  true  if  the  assumption  that 
the  individual,  as  well  as  his  knowledge,  con- 
sciousness and  mind,  was  the  product  of  such  an 
evolution  were  true  also. 

Each  individual  is  then  a  specific  machine,  and 
these  products,  consciousness  and  knowledge,  can 
only  come  because  of  this  intricate,  inherited, 
evolved  machinery. 

I  am  somewhat  puzzled,  however,  to  know  why 
knowledge,  self -consciousness,  and  memory  put  in 
their  appearance  in  abnormal  cases  where  this  es- 
sential machinery  has  been  seriously  injured,  de- 
stroyed, and  its  coordination  rendered  impossible ; 
where  these  inherited  "correlative  modifications 
of  the  sensitive  nerves  which  conduct  the  impres- 
sions they  receive  to  the  brain"  no  longer  remain, 
and  where  the  final  and  most  essential  links  in  the 
chain  of  evolution  are  wanting. 

One  of  the  brightest  scholars  in  the  college 
which  she  has  honored  with  her  attendance  is  the 
well-known  Helen  Keller.  Owing  to  serious  ill- 
ness when  an  infant  of  about  nineteen  months,  she 
lost  the  use  of  all  her  sense  organs  except  those  of 
smell,  taste,  and  touch;  yet  in  spite  of  this  fact 
she  is  a  learned  young  woman,  who  is  familiar 
with  three  languages,  at  least,  and  who  in  every 
study  which  she  has  undertaken  has  demonstrated 
that  knowledge  may  be  acquired  on  a  large  plan 
without  all  the  senses,  and,  indeed,  with  only  those 
which  are  usually  considered  the  lower  ones. 
Music  reaches  her  soul,  not  through  the  ears,  but 


62  THE  LIVING  ENVIEONMENT 

by  means  of  the  tactile  sense  only.  The  simple 
"sense  cells"  of  the  skin  are  sufficient  to  convey  to 
her  mind  not  only  the  mere  physical  vibrations  of 
the  musical  instrument,  but  sufficient  characteris- 
tic stimulation  to  arouse  all  the  feelings,  create  all 
the  enthusiasm,  and  produce  all  the  evidences  of 
similar  emotion  felt  by  the  more  fortunate  mortal 
who  is  in  possession  of  all  the  "soul  cells"  of  a 
normal  human  being. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  enter  into  any  elaborate 
discussion  of  the  phenomena  in  her  case;  I  must 
refer  anybody  interested  in  the  further  study  of 
the  matter  to  Dr.  Walderstein's  work  on  "The 
Subconscious  Self,"  and  to  her  own  story  of  her 
life.  It  serves  my  purpose  to  illustrate  the  con- 
tention that  we  by  no  means  reveal  the  mystery 
of  consciousness  and  memory  by  dissecting  the 
organs  by  which  they  seem  to  work,  and  that  we  no 
more  readily  construct  a  synthetic  consciousness 
which  will  account  for  it  as  we  know  it  by  build- 
ing a  physical  synthesis  of  its  ordinary  phenome- 
nal activities  in  the  cells  of  the  central  system. 

There  seems  to  be  something  in  the  nature  of 
the  human  individual  which  enables  it  to  do  in  a 
few  years  that  which  it  took  the  associating  proto- 
zoa millions  of  years  to  accomplish.  This  indi- 
vidual appears  to  be  able  to  get  along,  when  nec- 
essary to  do  so,  without  the  tools  which  evolu- 
tion labored  for  ages  to  supply  him  with  and  to 
adapt,  when  essential,  by  substituting  others  for 
them. 

It  is  conceivable  that  our  senses  are  limitations 
rather  than  extensions,  for  the  reason  that  spe- 


THE  LIVING   ENVIEONMENT  63 

cialization  is  limitation,  and  all  use  of  the  senses 
a  specialization  upon  objectivities  in  ponderable 
matter.  As  we  know  little  about  the  qualities  of 
imponderable  matter,  our  knowledge  is  equally 
small  of  our  capacities  therein. 

It  is  this  conscious  unity  in  us  all,  and  as  I  think 
in  the  universe,  which  appeals  to  me  as  giving 
form  always  to  the  unification  which  it  transcends. 

Without  such  an  individual  there  is  no  explana- 
tion for  that  internal  universe  which  has  been  con- 
structed within  the  living  environment,  the  grand 
multitude  which  awaits  the  command  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  paint  the  conscious  dreams  and  to  con- 
struct the  syllogisms  of  individual  life. 

Whatever  may  be  the  method  of  storage  of  this 
vast  congregation  of  experience  and  thoughts,  it 
is  evident  that  its  character  receives  whatever 
value  it  has  by  reason  of  passing  through  the 
portals  of  the  living  environment  of  the  individ- 
ual. It  is  he  who  weighed,  gauged,  analyzed,  and 
catalogued  them,  and  he  alone  who  can  rationally 
utilize  them.  That  a  multitude  of  impulses  are  re- 
ceived and  not  perceived  at  the  time  of  their  en- 
trance is  an  undoubted  fact,  but  it  is  also  a  fact 
that  their  value  does  not  appear  until  they  are 
lifted  to  the  level  of  the  consciousness  of  the  in- 
dividual. 

As  the  individual  may  select  and  cull  from  the 
multitude  of  objects  in  the  environment  without, 
rejecting  from  his  attention  the  repulsive  and  dis- 
agreeable, so  is  he  able  to  exercise  the  same  de- 
liberation and  choice  from  those  within.  Both  are 
environment — the  great  universe  without  which 


64  THE   LIVING   ENVIKONMENT 

bombards  his  senses  incessantly  with  its  colors, 
sounds,  and  odors ;  its  never-ceasing,  heaving,  and 
surging  impulses,  its  shadows  and  lights ;  indeed, 
all  that  goes  to  make  up  the  visible,  tangible  uni- 
verse ;  and  the  counterpart  within  which  is  the  po- 
tential recapitulation  of  all  through  which  he  has 
passed.  It  is  the  history  in  full  of  his  life ;  every- 
thing which  he  has  encountered  is  builded  into  it ; 
it  is  the  living  environment  grown,  developed, 
filled  out,  but  it  is  not  the  individual.  It,  the  in- 
ternal, like  the  external,  environment,  bombards 
him  constantly  with  its  unnumbered  impulses ;  as 
the  external  may  not  be  avoided  but  insists  upon 
making  its  impressions,  whether  in  the  light  of 
consciousness  or  not,  so  do  these  from  within. 
From  without  we  see  and  hear  and  feel  innumer- 
able things  of  which  consciousness  knows  nothing, 
and  they  are  buried  in  the  teeming  abyss  of  the 
interior  environment,  to  again  steal  past  the 
portals  of  consciousness  to  the  external  as  in- 
voluntary acts.  The  individual  acts  when  from 
this  lake  filled  by  the  sea  he  empties  forth  where 
and  what  he  wills  and  selects,  or  when  from  the 
swelling  sea  without  he  invites  to  the  waiting  lake 
within  some  particular  crested  wave.  Neither  the 
sea  nor  the  lake  is  the  individual. 

Whether  these  experiences  and  thoughts  are  of 
permanent  value  to  the  individual,  whether  they 
persist  after  the  dissolution  of  the  community  of 
the  living  environment,  is  a  subject  which  I  may 
not  discuss  at  this  point,  but  will  content  myself 
with  suggesting  that  perhaps  thoughts  themselves 
are  attended  with  forms  of  motion.    We  may  be 


THE   LIVING   ENVIRONMENT  65 

able  to  find  them  capable  of  rendering  themselves 
potential  in  more  than  one  place,  and  that  at  the 
same  time.  If  so,  we  may  say  that  at  the  disso- 
lution of  the  community  of  units  each  takes  its  de- 
parture with  what  is  its  own. 


Chapter  IV 


EELATIONSHIP 

There  is  a  host  of  reasons  for  holding  stead- 
fastly to  the  belief  in  the  immortality  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  those  who  can  recognize  the  force  of 
George  J.  Eomanes's  suggestion  that  because  we 
are  only  familiar  with  mind  in  association  with 
brain  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  that  is  the 
only  form  of  substance  with  which  mind  is  con- 
nected. We  may  postulate  one  universal  mind,  and, 
from  the  wondrous  beauty,  the  play  of  forces,  the 
unfailing  regularity  of  rhythmic  movements,  the 
everywhere-present  life,  and  the  ethical  advances 
of  the  world,  hug  the  conviction  that  the  world  it- 
self lives,  "the  world  thinks";  yet  we  shall  find 
from  the  very  nature  of  mind  itself,  even  from  its 
kaleidoscopic  combinations,  strong  grounds  for 
asserting  that  the  individual  cannot  be  lost.  When 
I  say  that  the  individual  cannot  be  lost,  I  do  not 
mean  to  hide  behind  a  veil  of  transcendental  mys- 
ticism and  fail,  as  is  too  often  done,  to  clothe  this 
individual  with  consciousness,  self -consciousness. 
Self-conscious  individuality  does  not  necessarily 
demand  an  attendant  memory  of  the  experiences 
of  the  past;  it  does  include  the  past  in  the  con- 
scious present,  however,  and  the  capacity  of  re- 
calling by  association  and  relationship  of  ideas 

66 


BELATIONSHIP  67 

the  train  of  experiences  which  as  prior  causes 
have  built  up  the  effect  of  the  present.  Mind  is  a 
good  forgetter  as  well  as  a  good  rememberer;  a 
good  specializer,  as  well  as  a  good  generalizer. 
The  past  may  be  drawn  into  consciousness  by  an 
effort  of  the  will  and  by  attention,  but  it  presents 
itself  always  by  association  and  relationship  with 
the  present  whether  we  will  or  not. 

All  that  I  know  of  mind,  its  operations  and  its 
qualities,  is  measured  by  what  I  know  of  myself. 
I  know  nothing,  but  as  I  stand  in  the  halls  of  my- 
self and  watch  the  play  of  lights  and  shadows 
cast  there  by  objectivities  about  me,  I  can  con- 
ceive of  no  qualities  of  mind  which  I  have  not; 
my  definition  of  mind  is  given  in  terms  of  self- 
experience.  All  the  learned  and  exhaustive  works 
upon  psychology  are  the  results  of  self-analysis. 
No  man  knows  what  is  going  on  in  the  mind  of  an- 
other except  as  he  witnesses  the  phenomena  of 
that  mind  and  translates  it  into  the  reflection  of 
his  own.  The  qualities  of  mind  are  the  same 
wherever  we  find  them;  if  this  were  not  so,  there 
could  be  and  would  be  no  understanding  of  the 
motives  of  our  fellow-men,  no  such  thing  as  justice 
or  practical  government.  We  study  and  attempt 
to  analyze  the  phenomenal  activities  of  animals 
by  reason  of  our  recognition  of  this  fact  that  the 
qualities  of  mind  are  the  same  everywhere.  This 
force  which  animates  us,  which  glistens  in  the  eye, 
moves  the  muscular  arm,  springs  in  the  tiger,  and 
demonstrates  its  presence  in  all  living  things,  is 
what  we  understand  as  mind,  and  its  peculiar 
qualities  are  known  to  us  only  as  our  own  meas- 


68  KELATIONSHIP 

ure  of  it  is  filled.  Whatever  may  be  the  effect  pro- 
duced by  the  exercise  of  these  qualities  in  diverse 
environments,  they  remain  the  same. 

Mind  may  be,  and  there  is  much  reason  to  be- 
lieve it  is,  one  great  force-pervading  substance. 
Abstruse  and  profoundly  metaphysical  as  the 
thought  seems,  it  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  ex- 
ceedingly difficult  to  grasp  that  the  consciousness 
of  the  one  is  absolutely  dependent  upon  its  paral- 
lel manifestation  as  the  many. 

Potentiality  is  but  a  word  to  cover  the  great  fact 
that  nothing  can  be  added  to  or  taken  from  the 
universe,  and  all  individuals  are  therefore  the 
output  of  what  is  and  must  be  in  potentiality 
eternally  in  the  one  mind.  The  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  therefore  not  to  be  measured  in  its  mere 
objectivity  in  this  environment,  but  in  that  which 
it  really  is. 

Its  individuality  is  necessarily  an  experience  of 
the  universal  mind,  its  consciousness  a  part  of 
that  experience,  and,  being  in  the  life  of  the  one, 
is  not  and  cannot  be  lost. 

"The  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms"  is  an  ex- 
planation of  phenomenal  activities  which  our  ig- 
norance uses  only  when  we  have  exhausted  our- 
selves in  scientific  research  along  one  avenue  of 
investigation  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  To  the 
man  who  allows  the  particles  to  blind  his  eyes  to 
the  force  behind  the  flying  dust,  there  probably  is 
absurdity  in  the  suggestion  that  the  lives  of  the 
many  are  in  the  life  of  the  One.  To  him,  however, 
who  can  find  in  natural  science,  in  biology,  and  in 
psychology  evidences  strong  and  convincing  that 


EELATIONSHIP  69 

the  mystery  of  life  is  redolent  with  mind,  comes 
the  assurance  that  the  relationship,  which  makes 
his  consciousness,  his  individuality,  can,  from  the 
very  law  of  relationship  and  association,  never  be 
lost  from  the  mind  of  the  one,  but  is  an  essential 
to  its  existence. 

It  has  not  appeared  impossible  to  me.  to  stand 
squarely  upon  the  theses  presented  by  Haeckel  in 
his  chapter  on  The  Evolution  of  the  World, 
and  reach  an  opinion  diametrically  opposed  to  his 
concerning  the  value  and  immortality  of  the  in- 
dividual. Indeed,  to  my  mind,  he  has  presented 
hypotheses  which  result  in  strengthening  the  con- 
viction long  existent  that  the  true  monistic  philos- 
ophy demands  the  indestructibility  of  the  individ- 
ual in  its  relation  as  such  to  the  universe  and 
the  process  of  evolution  itself.  I  shall  try  to  give 
my  reasons  in  this  chapter  as  based  upon  the  the- 
ses in  question  offered  by  Haeckel.  Abbreviated, 
these  theses  are  as  follows : 

"I.  The  extent  of  the  universe  is  infinite  and 
unbounded;  it  is  empty  in  no  part,  and  every- 
where filled  with  substance. 

"II.  The  duration  of  the  world  is  equally  in- 
finite, etc. 

"III.  Substance  is  everywhere  and  always  in 
uninterrupted  movement  and  transformation ;  no- 
where is  there  perfect  repose  and  rigidity,  yet  the 
infinite  quantity  of  matter  and  of  eternal  chang- 
ing force  remains  constant. 

"IV.  This  universal  movement  of  substance  in 
space  takes  the  form  of  an  eternal  cycle  or  of  a 
periodical  process  of  evolution. 


70  RELATIONSHIP 

"V.  The  phases  of  this  evolution  consist  in  a 
periodic  change  of  consistency,  of  which  the  first 
outcome  is  the  primary  division  into  mass  and 
ether — the  ergonomy  of  ponderable  and  impon- 
derable matter. 

"VI.  This  division  is  effected  by  a  progressive 
condensation  of  matter  as  the  formation  of  count- 
less infinitesimal  centers  of  condensation  in  which 
the  inherent  primitive  properties  of  substance — 
feeling  and  inclination — are  the  active  causes. 

"VII.  While  minute  and  then  larger  bodies  are 
being  formed  by  this  pyknotic  process  in  one  part 
of  space,  and  the  intermediate  ether  increases  its 
strain,  the  opposite  process — the  destruction  of 
cosmic  bodies  by  collision — is  taking  place  in  an- 
other quarter." 

The  eighth  lays  down  the  proposition  that  the 
heat  generated  by  the  collision  of  these  bodies 
"represents  the  new  kinetic  energy  which  effects 
the  movements  of  the  resultant  nebulae  and  the 
constitution  of  new  rotating  bodies." 

Of  course  this  is  a  theory,  a  scientific  theory, 
based  upon  observation  within  the  limitations  of 
the  senses,  but  for  the  purposes  of  this  chapter  I 
accept  it. 

We  are  not  to  think  of  a  time  when  these  two, 
ether  and  thinking  substance  (force),  were  spread 
out  in  infinity  as  quiescent  or  homogenous  sub- 
stances, but  as  set  forth  in  III  and  VII,  the  proc- 
ess of  transformation  and  organization  (for  the 
word  organization  applies  here  as  much  as  to  the 
concourse  of  atoms  in  my  body)  as  going  on  eter- 
nally. 


EELATIONSHIP  71 

This  eternal  differentiation  has  to  be  assumed 
in  order  to  get  rid  of  the  idea  of  an  extra  force,  a 
creative  Divinity.  I  do  not  think  it  accomplishes 
the  purpose  except  as  far  as  it  may  subtract  the 
word  "creative."  These  theses  supply  the  very 
eternal  conditions  essential  to  the  conception  of 
an  eternal  thinking  One  and  supply  all  the  requi- 
site qualities  and  quantities  for  eternal  individ- 
uals whose  number  may  not  be  increased  or  di- 
minished. 

In  the  first  place,  we  have  an  eternal  complica- 
tion, an  intricate  combination  of  thinking  sub- 
stance and  condensing  ether.  Such  an  eternal 
activity  may  well  be  an  eternal  mind,  forever  pre- 
senting itself  as  an  eternal  body;  indeed,  as  it 
embraces  all  there  is  of  mind,  it  could  not  well  be 
anything  else.  The  mere  fact  that  the  vast  bodies 
of  ether  break  up  in  other  parts  of  the  infinity  is 
not  an  insurmountable  barrier  to  the  thought,  for 
as  we  see  in  the  theses,  the  heat  generated  thereby 
represents  new  kinetic  energy  for  the  construction 
of  rotating  bodies. 

While  we  are  called  upon  to  try  to  think  in  the 
regions  of  eternal  space  and  conceive  the  eternal 
conditions,  we  need  not  hesitate  to  suggest  that  for 
aught  we  know  the  vast  infinity  of  ether  crackling 
as  "thinking  substance"  may  be  (and  I  think  it  is) 
the  cerebrum  of  the  One — all  may  be  there,  the 
history  of  the  clash  of  spheres,  the  "collision  of 
swiftly  moving  bodies,"  all  of  the  changing  pic- 
tures, may,  as  the  epitomized  history  of  my  life 
repeats  itself  in  memory,  roll  its  majestic  circle 
in  this  infinite  abyss  of  "thinking  substance"  and 


72  RELATIONSHIP 

ether.  What  is  the  character  of  its  subjectivity 
and  objectivities !  Who  am  I  that  I  should  go  so 
far  as  to  measure  the  infinite?  I  can  no  more  "by 
searching  find  out  God"  than  Haeckel  by  a  word 
can  give  the  "Lord  God  his  congeP  But  I  can  see 
in  HaeckeFs  provisional  eternal  substances  just 
that  which  I  have  suggested,  and  more.  As  sug- 
gested in  the  Introduction,  when  I  am  told  that 
there  is  a  "tendency"  in  anything  to  move,  even 
my  comparatively  feeble  Imowledge  of  physics 
compels  me  to  understand  by  that  that  a  force 
resides  in  that  which  feels  the  tendency  and  that 
what  the  tendency  results  in  is  the  measure  of  the 
exercise  of  the  force.  Even  if  it  were  possible  to 
conceive  of  the  ether  as  undifferentiated,  having 
a  "tendency"  to  move,  and  about  to  be  for  the  first 
time  differentiated  by  countless  infinitesimal  cen- 
ters of  condensation,  then,  by  virtue  of  the  very 
law  of  force,  it  would  condense  in  a  determinate 
manner  and  a  definite  differentiation,  and  that 
would  mean  that  the  "thinking  substance"  in  the 
ether  which  has  a  "tendency"  to  condense  is  dif- 
ferentiated and  not  homogenous. 

Professor  Haeckel  dismisses  Du  Bois  Eey- 
mond's  second  "world  enigma,"  viz.,  the  first 
"origin  of  movement,"  in  these  words:  "In  our 
opinion,  this  second  %orld  enigma'  is  solved  by 
the  recognition  that  movement  is  as  innate  and 
original  a  property  of  substance  as  is  sensation." 
(P.  241,  "The  Kiddle  of  the  Universe.")  Now 
the  trouble  is  in  getting  my  mind  to  the  stick- 
ing point  of  the  "recognition."  "Innate  and 
original"    properties    are    as   enigmatic    as    the 


RELATIONSHIP  73 

enigma  which  he  tells  us  is  so  easily  "solved"  by 
them. 

"Movement"  is  not  demonstrated  as  an  "innate 
property"  of  anything  within  our  experience,  but 
as  the  result  of  something  else,  and  that  is  force, 
or,  if  it  serves  a  better  purpose  to  call  it  so,  "think- 
ing substance,"  and  we  know  that  any  first  move- 
ment is  likewise  definite  as  the  product  of  definite 
forces. 

If  we  are  to  consider  "movement"  as  an  "innate 
property"  of  substance,  it  appears  to  me  that  we 
must  abandon  the  thesis  that  "forces  are  not  com- 
municated from  one  thing  to  another,  but  move- 
ments are." 

If  we  are  to  think  of  "feeling  and  inclination" 
as  the  "active  causes"  of  this  differentiation  of 
substance  into  countless  "infinitesimal  centers  of 
condensation,"  we  shall  not,  I  apprehend,  escape 
that  enigma  of  Du  Bois  Eeymond,  What  caused 
the  first  movement? 

A  substance,  infinite,  saturated  with  sensitive- 
ness, in  the  absence  of  something  to  arouse  its 
sensitiveness  by  stimulation  of  some  sort,  unless 
it  remain  quiescent,  immovable,  is  unthinkable. 
The  moment  we  supply  that  "something,"  force, 
it  may  respond  exactly  in  commensuration  to  that 
force,  and  we  have  a  commencement  of  differen- 
tiation with  a  tendency  to  return  to  equation. 

But  when,  as  is  the  case  with  the  thesis  pre- 
sented by  Haeckel,  this  differentiation  never  com- 
mences, but  is  eternal  (this  being  his  only  reply 
to  Du  Bois  Eeymond) ,  then  we  have  no  longer  the 
reason  for  assuming  this  "force,"  this  "thinking 


74  EELATIONSHIP 

substance'^  as  being  a  unit,  merely  a  force,  but 
rather  unity  of  units  of  force,  the  force  of  forces, 
eternally.  The  "infinitesimal  centers  of  condensa- 
tion" of  substance  would  then  be  eternal,  inde- 
structible motion  forms  in  the  ether. 

A  universe  constructed  on  these  theses  without 
this  recognition  of  units  of  force  would  in  the 
course  of  eons  run  down  and  equate  itself. 

Unless  what  Professor  Haeckel  means  by  the 
"division  into  mass  and  ether — the  ergonomy  of 
ponderable  and  imponderable  matter,"  is  covered 
by  the  expression  "motion  forms  in  the  ether,"  in- 
cluding continuity  of  the  ether  into  every  part  of 
the  mass,  it  will  be  difficult  to  see  how  the  "inter- 
mediate ether  increases  its  strain,"  or  how  there 
could  be  any  strain  at  all. 

Assuming  these  "infinitesimal  centers  of  con- 
densation of  the  ether,"  these  units  of  force,  these 
individual  forms  of  motion  in  the  ether  to  be  thus 
in  the  substance,  a  continuity  of  the  substance, 
and  not  detached  from  it,  and  there  is  a  strain,  an 
eternal  strain,  and  the  basis  for  a  belief  that  the 
relationship  is  eternal. 

What  an  immense  complexity  of  relations  is 
thereby  established,  what  immeasurable  capacity 
for  thought,  consciousness,  and  memory,  and  a 
means  of  intercommunication  as  far  transcending 
the  human  nerves  as  the  traverse  of  light  tran- 
scends the  rapidity  of  sound  waves,  we  do  not  know 
and  cannot  know.  Eef erring  again  to  Eomanes's 
declaration  that  it  is  a  non  sequitur,  that  because 
we  only  know  mind  as  associated  with  brain, 
therefore  there  is  no  other  form  of  mind,  we  find 


BELATIONSHEP  75 

mind  associated  in  us  with  ganglionic  centers,  but 
Eomanes  in  an  experiment  made  upon  the  Naked- 
eyed  Medusae  found  that  the  manubrium  or  tongue 
of  the  bell-shaped  animal  would  deflect  toward 
the  exact  spot  which  he  irritated  on  the  edge  of 
the  bell  or  body.  Thus  far  the  existence  of  gangli- 
onic centers  was  assuredly  known,  but  he  cut  out 
the  manubrium  or  tongue  and  to  his  astonishment 
found  (as  he  says  on  pp.  110-111,  "Jelly  Fish,  Star 
Fish,  and  Sea  Urchins")  that  "no  matter  how 
small  a  portion  of  this  organ  I  used,  and  no  matter 
from  what  part  of  the  organ  I  cut  it,  this  portion 
would  do  its  best  to  bend  over  to  the  side  which  I 
irritated.  .  .  .  We  have  here,  then,  a  curious  fact, 
and  one  which  it  will  be  well  to  bear  in  mind  dur- 
ing our  subsequent  endeavors  to  frame  some  sort 
of  a  conception  regarding  the  nature  of  these 
primitive  nervous  tissues. 

"The  localizing  function,  which  is  so  very  eflSi- 
ciently  performed  by  the  manubrium  of  the  Me- 
dusa, and  which  if  anything  resembling  it  oc- 
curred in  the  higher  animals  would  certainly  have 
definite  ganglionic  centers  for  its  structural  co- 
relative  (italics  mine),  is  here  shared  equally  by 
every  part  of  the  exceedingly  tenuous  contrac- 
tile tissue  that  forms  the  outer  surface  of  the 
organ." 

Now  this  is  a  diffusion  of  ganglionic  function, 
not  a  mere  sensitiveness  such  as  in  the  lowest  or- 
ders of  life  withdraws  its  substance  away  from 
the  irritation. 

That  may  or  may  not  be  suggestive  of  a  little 
consideration  of  the  thought  that,  because  we  are 


76  RELATIONSHIP 

accustomed  to  perceiving  the  exercise  of  the  gan- 
glionic functions  as  associated  with  deJS.nite  gan- 
glionic centers,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that 
ganglionic  function  may  not  be  exercised  without 
such  centers,  and  hence,  to  go  further,  that  be- 
cause we  are  accustomed  to  find  mind  so  associ- 
ated, it  does  not  necessarily  follow  but  that  it  may 
exist  not  so  associated. 

Possibly  Haeckel  does  not  consider  that  this 
opinion  of  Eomanes's  bears  upon  an  "important" 
point  in  the  monistic  philosophy,  and  therefore 
may  not  wish  to  be  taken  as  "at  one"  with  him  in 
that  matter ;  but  when  Eomanes  tells  us  that  be- 
cause we  are  only  familiar  with  mind  in  associa- 
tion with  brain  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that 
that  is  the  only  form  of  substance  with  which  mind 
is  connected,  he  does  not  have  in  view  Haeckel's 
idea  of  incipient  mind  or  mere  "mind  stuff."  This 
is  evident  when  we  recall  that  Eomanes  suggests 
that  such  a  mind  may  so  transcend  the  human  as 
to  be  a  form  of  mind  beycnd  our  analysis.  This 
is  a  difference  from  Haeckel  upon  a  very  "impor- 
tant" matter;  indeed,  it  involves  the  very  soul  of 
HaeckePs  work. 

Consciousness  of  abstract  things  requires  life  in 
abstract  things ;  we  actually  build  them  into  our- 
selves and  they  are  our  living  environment.  As 
I  have  gone  at  length  into  the  subject  in  the  chap- 
ter on  The  Living  Environment,  I  will  not  mul- 
tiply words  by  discussing  it  at  this  point.  Stand- 
ing squarely  upon  the  idea  of  the  One  as  being  the 
foundation  of  true  Monism,  I  insist  that  as  we  also 
find  the  many,  and  as  we  likewise  are  aware  that 


EELATIONSHIP  77 

mind  as  we  know  it  is  one  in  character,  notwith- 
standing that  we  find  it  expressing  in  many,  we 
are  justified  in  assuming  the  one  mind  to  be  in  its 
operations  similar  to  that  mind  with  which  we  are 
familiar  in  the  many. 

When  we  consider  the  Universal  Mind  we  find 
reasons  to  believe  that  just  that  character  of  as- 
sociated objectivities  existing  in  the  human  mind 
in  unbroken  association  and  relationship  makes 
the  living  environment  of  it,  and  just  that  char- 
acter of  associated  ideas  found  to  constitute  the 
conscious  memory  of  the  human  mind  is  in  un- 
broken association  and  relationship  in  it, 

I  think  it  is  evident  that  in  the  case  of  the  indi- 
vidual human  mind  the  consciousness  of  the  One, 
the  individual,  is  dependent  upon  the  parallel  con- 
sciousness of  the  many.  We  are  in  the  world  of 
vast  differentiation,  active  in  millions  of  cortical 
cells,  each  of  which,  as  we  have  endeavored  to 
show  elsewhere,  is  a  unit  in  itself,  and  our  con- 
sciousness of  the  world  is  dependent  upon  the  uni- 
fication of  these.  This  is  not  equivalent  to  admit- 
ting what  is  asserted  by  Haeckel,  that  the  sum  of 
their  activities  constitutes  consciousness,  but  quite 
the  contrary,  that  the  unification  of  their  activities 
provides  us  with  the  object  of  consciousness. 
Sleep  comes  with  its  apparent  loss  of  conscious- 
ness when  the  senses  cease  to  receive  impressions 
from  without,  and  the  connections  of  the  cortical 
cells  are  withdrawn  from  each  other  within. 

In  sleep  the  many  prevail;  in  wakefulness  to 
the  world  the  one.  That  this  is  comparative  and 
not  absolute  is  within  the  experience  of  us  all. 


78  EELATIONSHIP 

So  far  as  we  know,  for  untold  eons  of  time  in- 
finite space  has  been  filled  with  the  evidences  of 
the  many ;  our  knowledge  of  the  vast  systems  upon 
systems  which  fill  it  is,  great  as  it  is,  exceedingly 
limited.  Certainly  all  we  know  is  based  upon  the 
uniformity  of  law,  the  loyalty  of  force,  and  the 
evidences  of  unity.  Here  on  this  little  world,  our 
environment  of  to-day,  we  find  mind,  and  it  is  one 
thing,  one  force,  loyal  to  its  law,  and  it  does  not  re- 
quire undue  effort  of  scientific  faith  to  grasp  the 
conception  that  it  is  the  same  coextensive  with  all 
its  manifestation  in  the  universe. 

The  one  and  the  many  may  be  rationally  con- 
ceived as  ever  in  existence.  Time  and  Eternity 
may  keep  the  one  and  the  many  in  eternal  balance 
of  unification  so  far  as  our  present  scientific  inves- 
tigations can  inform  us. 

What  we  know  as  the  association  of  ideas  is, 
otherwise  expressed,  the  law  of  relationship.  We 
are  also  all  tolerably  familiar  with  the  phenomena 
of  associated  memories.  The  odor  of  the  carna- 
tion will,  with  the  passing  of  a  second  of  time, 
bring  into  the  present  the  dim  and  misty  past ;  all 
that  went  with  the  fragrance  of  the  pink,  however 
small  a  part  it  may  have  itself  played  in  the  expe- 
rience, comes  trooping  to  the  memory — ^houses, 
rooms,  familiar  faces  of  the  past,  long-forgotten 
voices,  feelings,  griefs,  pleasures,  all  are  so  linked 
together  that  they  form  one  picture  in  the  now. 
Such  associative  links  will  even  thrust  before  the 
memory  facts  to  the  nonexistence  of  which,  with- 
out the  suggestive  link,  we  would  take  our  solemn 
oath. 


EELATIONSHIP  79 

This  law  of  relationship,  it  is  not  irrational  to 
assert,  is  the  law  of  mind,  and  if  such  be  perceived 
to  be  its  action  in  your  mind,  there  are  no  scien- 
tific data  which  demand  of  you  that  you  deny  it  to 
the  One  Mind. 

"In  Him  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being" 
is  more  than  a  religious  assertion ;  it  is  a  scientific 
declaration. 

The  One  Mind  is  infinite,  true,  but  it  is  because 
of  this  that  I  insist  that  we  cannot  be  taken  out 
of  it.  Its  infinity  is  ours;  it  surely  has  not  less 
than  my  mind,  and  while  we  must  acknowledge 
that  its  intellect  is  so  transcendentally  beyond  our 
conception  as  to  be  a  mystery,  yet  its  hold  upon  all 
its  relationships  must  likewise  transcend  our  ex- 
perience. 


Chapter  V 


THE   WITNESSES 

The  weight  of  a  great  name  usually  lends  force 
to  an  expression  of  opinion  on  any  subject  of 
general  interest,  and  we  are  sometimes  given  to 
unreasonably  yielding  our  own  views  on  that  ac- 
count. Anything  Mr.  Gladstone  might  have  to 
say  concerning  the  inspiration  of  the  Scriptures, 
the  divinity  of  Christ,  or  the  ethical  value  of  the 
phonograph  was  hailed  with  approving  nods  a 
few  years  ago,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  his 
transcendent  greatness  consisted  in  qualities  of 
mind  bearing  in  an  entirely  different  direction. 
We  do  not  think  sufficiently  for  ourselves  and  lean 
too  confidingly  upon  others  merely  because  of 
their  prominence  in  the  world  of  thought,  no  mat- 
ter how  that  prominence  was  obtained  or  in  what 
field  of  labor.  For  instance,  the  views  of  ex- 
President  Harrison  concerning  the  relations 
which  should  exist  between  the  United  States 
and  her  possessions  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans  have  profound  value,  and  ought  to  have, 
expressed  as  they  were  by  a  man  whose  whole 
life  training  had  qualified  him  to  form  rational 
conclusions  on  the  subject,  but  his  opinion  as  to 
the  probability  of  communicating  with  the  pos- 
sible inhabitants  of  Mai*s  might  or  might  not  be 
as  valuable  as  yours  or  mine. 

80 


THE    WITNESSES  81 

When  such  a  grave  question  as  the  one  upon  the 
answer  to  which  hang  the  hopes  of  all  humanity 
is  propounded,  any  opinion  adverse  to  the  inbred 
expectancy  of  the  human  mind  should  be  expressed 
at  least  tentatively  and  with  hesitating  modesty. 
It  should  never  be  clothed  in  the  brazen  armor 
of  dogmatic  assurance,  nor  conlidently  asserted 
even,  until  all  probabilities  as  to  individual  im- 
mortality are  exhausted. 

Even  if  the  whole  faculty  of  physicists  and  psy- 
chologists should  assure  us  that  there  was  no 
other  alternative,  we  would  yet  have  the  feeling 
that,  after  all,  they  are  but  men  like  ourselves, 
confessedly  by  their  own  theories  but  expressing 
the  evanescent  products  of  machines,  and  have  not 
reached  any  further  into  the  mystery  of  being 
than  you  or  I  in  our  own  consciousness. 

It  is  quite  a  cheering  thought,  nevertheless,  that 
the  scientific  thinkers  do  not  agree  in  such  a 
conclusion  as  Professor  Haeckel  has  reached; 
quite  the  contrary;  and,  strange  to  say,  as  he 
frankly  admits  in  his  own  book,  the  older  they 
grow  in  their  work  the  wider  the  field  of  their 
mental  vision,  the  more  voluminous  the  data  which 
they  gather,  usually  the  more  convinced  are  they 
that  the  conclusions  to  which  they  leaped  eagerly 
in  the  freshness  of  youth  were  prematurely 
reached  and  rested  on  an  insecure  foundation. 

Nearly  every  man  of  great  scientific  attainments 
in  biological,  physiological,  and  psychological  re- 
searches has  found  it  convenient  and  sometimes 
necessary  to  write  something  about  the  immortal- 
ity of  man.    It  is  a  subject  which  suggests  itself 


82  THE   WITNESSES 

frequently  in  the  study  of  the  origin,  development, 
and  life  of  mankind,  and  I  have,  like  many  others, 
interested  myself  deeply  in  the  task,  a  pleasurable 
one,  of  discovering  how  these  great  thinkers 
viewed  that  question,  and  have  been  contented 
in  finding  that  just  as  there  are  always  conflicts 
of  opinion  upon  scientific  constructive  theories, 
so  there  are  in  relation  to  this.  If  you  are  prone 
to  believe  that  our  biologists  are  a  harmonious 
family  in  relation  to  the  conclusions  to  be  reached 
from  the  facts  ascertained,  or  even  as  to  the  mean- 
ing of  the  phenomena  themselves,  you  have  but  to 
read  the  theses  of  the  various  writers  upon  the 
subject,  or  the  lectures  delivered  from  time  to 
time  at  the  laboratories,  to  find  out  for  yourselves 
that  while  great  strides  have  been  made,  the  mean- 
ing of  the  wonderful  egg  and  its  characteristic 
activities  is  largely  a  subject  of  discussion  by 
learned  men  with  divergent  views.  This  is 
likewise  the  case  in  the  field  of  psychology, 
although  we  certainly  have  approached  nearer 
to  the  time  when  it  may  properly  be  called  a 
science. 

The  scientific  world  is  really  in  too  much  of  a 
hurry;  just  as  it  has  for  the  first  time  in  a  few 
thousand  years  of  man's  history  begun  to  open 
the  cases  of  Nature's  sealed  mysteries,  the  first 
few  cans  have  so  swelled  its  dignity  that  it  is 
too  much  inclined  to  assume  the  attitude  of  know- 
ing all  about  it.  The  world  has  but  commenced 
its  era  of  science;  it  yet  rocks  the  cradle  of  ex- 
perimental knowledge ;  it  has  but  outlined  the  tre- 
mendous future,  and  many  of  the  pioneers  in  this 


THE   WITNESSES  83 

wonderful  work,  as  they  cool  down  in  their  de- 
clining years,  fully  realize  these  facts  and  have 
the  courage  of  their  greatness  to  come  forth  and 
say  so  before  the  great  doors  of  the  Hereafter 
clang  behind  them.  They  admit  their  ignorance 
of  some  things  and  ask  the  world  to  wait. 

The  idea  of  another  life,  immortal,  freed  from 
the  distresses,  crosses,  and  suffering  of  this,  with 
the  associated  idea  of  a  God,  is  an  old  one.  It 
has  inspired  the  poet's  song;  has  been  the  theme 
from  which  all  the  grandeur,  sublimity,  and  power 
of  harmony  in  modem  music  drew  their  vitality. 
Mozart,  Handel,  Haydn,  all  voiced  their  great 
hope  and  ideal  of  mankind.  It  gave  to  the  world 
its  first  impulse  in  painting.  Michelangelo  and 
Eaphael  threw  this  expectation  of  humanity  upon 
the  screen  in  living  colors;  it  has  fired  the  soul 
of  eloquence;  it  has  been  the  warp  and  woof  of 
human  government,  and  has  been  enlarged,  be- 
littled, distorted,  modeled  and  remodeled,  diluted 
and  crystallized  in  creeds  by  theologians — it  is  old. 
It  has  no  longer  the  charm  of  novelty.  Science 
has.  Its  new  light  has  for  a  time,  and  will  for  a 
greater  time,  outshine  the  old,  and  it  is  not  strange 
that  in  the  freshness  and  vigor  of  youth,  with 
the  prizes  of  fame  and  preferment  alluringly  held 
up  before  them,  the  students  of  science  should 
fiiid  in  its  newness,  its  fresh  impulses,  its  novel 
revelations,  its  doorways  opening  into  strange 
paths,  a  substitute  for  the  old.  They  seem  to 
forget  that  even  the  doctrine  of  Monism  is  in- 
clusive, and  that  the  universe  is  still  sparkling 
with  many  facets. 


84  THE   WITNESSES 

The  results  of  this  newness  of  modem  science 
are  not  novel  in  the  world's  history,  for  every 
new  departure,  whether  in  literature,  art,  music, 
poetry,  government,  economics,  or  education,  has 
commenced  in  just  the  same  all-absorbing,  exclu- 
sive, repudiating,  self-assertive  manner.  Such 
changes  in  the  direction  of  the  world's  thought 
push  everything  else  out  of  the  way  for  a  time, 
but  this  cannot  and  does  not  last. 

The  world  has  its  rhythm;  it  is  much  like  the 
man;  its  progress  is  in  the  attaining  of  the  new, 
but  it  always  retains  the  old,  and  eventually  builds 
it  into  its  life. 

The  new  is  almost  always  exclusive  in  its  ef- 
fects upon  its  possessor,  and  it  is  difficult  to  find 
a  human  being  who  is  not  compelled,  because  of 
his  greater  tendency  to  specialize  than  to  gener- 
alize, to  subscribe  to  some  ism.  Isms  are  always 
exclusive,  and  by  their  formulated  rules  compel 
a  repudiation  of  anything  which  appears  to  be 
antagonistic. 

Now,  when  we  come  to  the  constructive  work 
of  modern  science,  we  find  that  it  is  of  necessity 
first  destructive.  It  cannot  easily  build  upon  the 
old  foundations;  biology  abandons  Bonnet,  and 
psychology  has  little  use  for  the  works  on  mental 
science  of  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
But  this  abandonment  is  for  science  and  for  scien- 
tific purposes  only;  it  is  not  because  there  was  no 
truth  in  the  old  masters,  but  because  it  is  easier 
and  perhaps  more  conducive  to  the  attainment  of 
harmony  to  put  the  wine  in  "new  bottles."  In 
this  work  of  construction,  among  the  useless  ma- 


THE   WITNESSES  85 

terial  is  seemingly  found  the  idea  of  God  and 
immortality,  but  that  is  only  because  modem  sci- 
ence has  not  builded  up  to  its  capstone  quite  yet. 
The  sound  of  contesting  languages  is  not  yet  over ; 
there  are  indications  of  Babelistic  confusion  of 
tongues  even  now.  This  will  not  last,  but  possibly 
it  will  be  found  finally  that  the  "stone  which  the 
builders  rejected"  is  the  "chief  stone  of  the  cor- 
ner." 

The  greatest  achievement  of  modem  civilization 
has  been  in  the  development  of  the  spirit  of  tol- 
eration, and,  as  Professor  Haeckel  justly  claims, 
the  marvelous  progress  of  Science  owes  its  im- 
petus to  the  full  untrammeled  liberty  conceded  to 
thinkers  to  express  themselves  without  fear  of 
the  rack  or  the  stake.  It  is  certainly  true  that 
enlightened  people  do  not  any  longer  hurry  such 
men  as  Giordano  Bruno  and  John  Huss  out  of 
the  world  in  a  blaze  of  glory,  nor  does  the  holy 
inquisition  seek  its  victims  among  the  unbelievers 
and  heterodox.  The  days  when  to  express  an 
opinion  adverse  to  the  ruling  of  the  ecclesiastics 
was  equivalent  to  signing  one's  own  death  war- 
rant have  departed,  probably  forever.  Such  eru- 
dite and  intellectual  giants  as  Haeckel,  Spencer, 
Huxley,  Darwin,  Wallace,  Lodge,  Crookes,  James, 
and  many  more  who  tower  above  all  others  in 
their  special  fields  of  labor,  have  found  the  nine- 
teenth century  a  most  fortunate  and  advantageous 
era  in  which  to  live.  Their  privilege  to  speak, 
their  opportunity  to  be  heard,  the  respect  with 
which  their  utterances  are  treated,  are  all  owing 
to  the  spirit  of  toleration  and  the  fact  that  the 


86  THE   WITNESSES 

general  level  of  intelligence  has  slowly  but  surely 
risen.  Yet  I  am  very  certain  that  there  are  strong 
indications  that  the  same  spirit  which,  when  in  its 
unbounded  and  unlicensed  cruelty,  found  an  op- 
portunity to  glorify  God  by  burning  at  the  stake 
such  as  refused  to  wear  the  yoke  of  orthodoxy, 
prevails  to  a  great  extent  to-day.  I  mean  to  say 
that  persecution  is  a  weapon  as  freely  used  in  this 
day  and  generation  as  ever  it  was  in  the  history 
of  the  world,  but  its  wielders  are  no  longer  the 
Church  and  the  priests  alone,  but  the  scientists 
themselves.  Not  all,  but  some.  It  is  remarkable, 
too,  that  the  victims  of  their  wrath  and  intolerance 
are  of  their  own  number.  Broadest  of  all  men 
should  the  true  scientists  be,  and  broadest  of  all 
men  the  true  scientist  is.  Yet  we  are  to-day  face 
to  face  with  the  fact  that  if  a  thinker  thinks  too 
far,  so  far  that  he  is  unfortunate  enough  to  get 
a  trifle  away  from  the  beaten  path  of  a  cult  or  a 
theory  or  a  school,  he  must  make  up  his  mind  that 
his  worst  enemies  and  most  uncompromising  an- 
tagonists will  be  those  of  his  own  school  of  sci- 
ence. 

"Orthodox"  and  "heterodox"  are  rather  curi- 
ous words  to  apply  to  science,  yet  they  have  crept 
into  our  vernacular  in  that  association. 

Science  is  knowledge,  knowledge  acquired  by 
and  through  the  use  of  the  senses ;  it  should  fling 
wide  open  the  doors  which  give  ingress  to  data; 
there  should  be  no  such  thing  as  forbidden  fruit, 
and  no  fences  across  rights  of  way.  Merely  be- 
cause we  have  accepted  a  theory  as  in  all  probabil- 
ity a  rational  one  because  based  upon  facts  which 


THE    WITNESSES  87 

appear  to  demand  it,  we  should  not  shut  out  eyes 
to  other  pressing  data  which  seem  not  to  fit  into 
the  theory ;  neither  should  an  investigator  be  com- 
pelled to  go  into  Coventry  because  he  happens  to 
be  the  one  who  sincerely  believes  that  he  has  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  such  facts. 

Evolution  and  Monism  are  widely  accepted  to- 
day as  rational  hypotheses;  indeed,  they  almost 
approach  demonstration;  but  the  fact  that  they 
just  fail  of  absolute  demonstration  leaves  always 
open  the  possibility  that,  after  all,  they  may  be 
entirely  unfounded  and  erroneous.  But  even  con- 
ceding that  they  have  all  the  force  of  demonstra- 
tion, yet  they  are  very  inclusive,  and  have  not  as 
yet  entirely  explained  the  workings  of  the  Uni- 
verse, and  presumably  never  will. 

It  is  a  matter  of  profound  regret  that  the  mys- 
terious realm  of  psychic  phenomena,  telepathy, 
and  what  is  commonly  known  as  spiritualism, 
should  be  not  only  unknown  territory  to  Science, 
but  unrecognized  and  forbidden. 

In  common  with  most  other  men  who  feel  that 
nothing  is  so  vulgar  that  it  will  not  bear  investi- 
gation, I  had  hailed  with  delight  the  advent  into 
the  field  of  the  occult  of  men  of  such  standing  in 
the  scientific  world  as  Wallace,  Crookes,  James, 
Lodge,  Myers,  Hodgson,  and  Hyslop,  because  I 
felt  that  they  would  be  able  to  make  such  thorough 
and  unflinching  investigations  as  would  reveal 
either  its  absolute  worthlessness  or  its  profound 
value. 

How  have  the  results  of  the  efforts  of  some 
of  them  been  received  by  the  scientists'?     With 


88  THE    WITNESSES 

contumely  and  contempt.  Haeckel  voices  the  opin- 
ions of  many  scientific  men  when  he  considers 
that  they  have  been  led  astray  by  "excess  of  im- 
agination and  defect  of  critical  faculty." 

Now  the  modern  theory  of  evolution  owes  fully 
as  much  to  Wallace  as  to  Darwin,  yet  nobody  ever 
considered  it  necessary  to  charge  him  with  "ex- 
cess of  imagination  or  defect  of  critical  faculty" 
in  connection  with  that  matter.  It  required  a  keen 
observer  and  one  possessed  of  critical  faculty  of 
a  high  order.  If  this  is  not  so,  of  what  value  is 
all  his  labor  in  gathering  data  tending  to  sustain 
the  evolutionary  doctrine! 

Crookes  and  Lodge  certainly  appear  to  tran- 
scend most  of  their  contemporaries  in  physics,  yet 
the  same  faculties  which  gave  them  their  position 
in  the  scientific  world  become  "excess  of  imag- 
ination" the  moment  that  they  apply  them  to  the 
study  of  anything  which  is  unpopular  and  hetero- 
dox to  Science. 

These  abnormal  phenomena  demand  explana- 
tion, and  so  long  as  they  remain  unexplained  by 
Science  they  are  standing  obstructions  to  the 
demonstration  of  anything  by  Science  concern- 
ing the  psychic  side  of  life.  If  they  are  un- 
certain and  spasmodic,  then  those  elements  are 
to  be  read  into  the  scheme  of  evolution  and 
Monism,  and  it  no  longer  remains  true  that 
Science  is  positive  and  definite  in  its  analysis  of 
life. 

It  is  a  simple  matter  of  a  few  words  for  a  sci- 
entist to  declare  that  telepathy  has  "no  more 
existence  than  the  groans  of  spirits,"  but  what  do 


THE   WITNESSES  89 

words  amount  to  in  the  solution  of  such  a  ques- 
tion? Many  men  of  no  mean  attainments  say- 
that  it  does  exist,  and  that  they  have  proved  it. 
K  it  does  exist,  it  very  materially  affects  the  atti- 
tude taken  not  only  by  Haeckel  but  others  as  to 
the  properties  of  the  etheric  substance  and  the 
modification  of  the  forms  of  motion  in  the  cere- 
bral cells  by  stimuli  reaching  them  by  channels 
other  than  via  the  senses.  Unsolved,  it  remains 
a  possible  contradiction  even  to  the  monistic  con- 
ception of  brain  and  soul  as  presented  by  Haeckel. 
Probably  that  is  why  it  seems  to  have  no  more 
existence  than  "the  groans  of  spirits,"  for  it 
might  require  a  rather  serious  alteration  of  the 
whole  schematic  framework  of  mechanical  life. 
Personally,  I  regard  such  men  as  James,  Lodge, 
Crookes,  Hyslop,  Wallace,  and  the  others  whom 
I  have  mentioned  with  profound  admiration,  for  I 
think  that  the  consideration  of  such  matters  be- 
longs preeminently  to  Science.  It  is  not  strange 
when  we  recall  how  some  of  them  have  been  treat- 
ed by  the  "orthodox"  among  the  scientists  that 
these  men  hold  a  warm  comer  in  the  hearts  of 
the  people.  They  are  bringing  their  precise  and 
logical  methods  to  bear  upon  questions  of  vital 
importance  to  humanity,  and  whatever  their  ulti- 
mate decision  may  be,  it  will  be  received  with 
respect. 

Why  have  I  indulged  in  this  strain  of  philoso- 
phy? Because  I  have  in  mind  a  much  more  ra- 
tional explanation  than  Professor  Haeckel  for  the 
recantation  on  the  part  of  so  many  of  the  masters 
in  science  who  have  enjoyed  (?)  the  felicity  of 


90  THE   WITNESSES 

standing  with  him  in  his,  to  me,  hopeless  views 
of  life  and  its  meaning. 

I  quote  first  from  Haeckel  himself  (p.  93,  "The 
Eiddle  of  the  Universe") : 

"Eudolph  Virchow,  the  eminent  founder  of  cel- 
lular pathology,  was  a  pure  Monist  in  the  best 
days  of  his  scientific  activity.  .  .  .  Virchow  pub- 
lished his  general  biology  views  on  the  processes 
of  man,  which  he  takes  to  be  purely  mechanical 
natural  phenomena."  I  have  abbreviated  the  quo- 
tation, for  it  speaks  for  itself  in  the  chapter  on 
the  Nature  of  the  Soul.  It  is  sufficient  to  say 
that  twenty-eight  years  afterwards  Virchow  "rep- 
resented the  diametrically  opposite  view." 

E.  Du  Bois  Reymond,  whom  Haeckel  calls  one 
of  the  "most  famous  living  scientists,"  after  hav- 
ing done  his  great  part  in  the  destruction  of 
transcendentalism  and  vitalism,  recanted,  and 
declared  that  consciousness  was  an  insoluble 
problem. 

Haeckel  cites  a  similar  change  from  the  mere 
mechanical  theory  to  the  spiritualistic  on  the  part 
of  the  great  Wilhelm  Wundt,  whom  he  calls  the 
"ablest  living  psychologist."  To  them  he  adds 
Kant  and  Baer,  and  suggests  even  others  who 
after  having  found  all  the  truth,  found  some 
more. 

I  am  at  this  point  constrained  to  say  that  even 
George  John  Romanes,  whose  opinion  seems  to 
Professor  Haeckel  to  coincide  with  his  own  (per- 
haps he  does  not  mean  concerning  immortality), 
gave  strong  evidences  of  an  approaching  change 
in  his  views,  if  indeed  any  change  was  necessary, 


THE   WITNESSES  91 

shortly  before  his  death,  if  the  preface  to  the 
posthumous  volume  "Mind,  Motion,  and  Monism" 
is  of  any  value  as  evidence.  I  quote  the  words 
of  C.  Lloyd  Morgan,  principal  of  University  Col- 
lege, Bristol:  "The  subjects  here  discussed  fre- 
quently occupied  Mr.  Komanes^s  keen  and  versa- 
tile mind.  Had  not  the  hand  of  Death  fallen  upon 
him  while  so  much  of  the  ripening  grain  of  his 
thought  still  remained  to  be  finally  garnered,  some 
modifications  and  extensions  (italics  mine)  of  the 
views  set  forth  in  the  *Essay  on  Monism'  would 
probably  have  been  introduced.  Attention  may 
be  drawn  for  example  to  the  sentence  on  page 
139,  italicized  by  the  author  himself,  in  which  it 
is  contended  that  the  will  as  agent  must  he  iden- 
tified with  the  principle  of  causality, 

"I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  chapter  on 
the  World  as  an  Eject  would,  in  a  final  revision 
of  the  essay  as  a  whole,  have  been  modified  so  as 
to  lay  stress  on  this  identification  of  the  human 
will  with  the  principle  of  causality  in  the  world 
at  large,  a  doctrine  the  relation  of  which  to  the 
teaching  of  Schopenhauer  will  be  evident  to  the 
students  of  philosophy." 

It  is  with  a  considerable  degree  of  confidence  in 
the  correctness  of  my  understanding  of  the  testi- 
mony of  Professor  Komanes  that  I  quote  also 
from  the  volume  of  his  "Essays"  edited  by  Prof. 
C.  Lloyd  Morgan,  and  particularly  from  the  pa- 
per entitled  "Mind  in  Men  and  Animals":  "On 
the  side  of  its  philosophy  I  am  in  complete  agree- 
ment with  the  most  advanced  idealist,  and  hold 
that  in  the  doctrine  of  self -consciousness  we  each 


92  THE   WITNESSES 

of  US  possess  not  alone  our  only  ultimate  knowl- 
edge, or  that  alone  which  is  'real  in  its  own  right/ 
but  likewise  the  only  mode  of  existence  that  the 
human  mind  is  capable  of  conceiving  as  existence, 
and  therefore  the  conditio  sine  qua  non  to  the 
possibility  of  an  external  world.  With  this  as- 
pect of  the  matter,  however,  I  am  not  here  con- 
cerned. Just  as  the  functions  of  an  embryologist 
are  confined  to  tracing  the  mere  history  of  devel- 
opmental changes,  and  just  as  he  is  thus  as  far 
as  ever  from  throwing  any  light  upon  the  deeper 
questions  of  the  how  and  the  why  of  life,  so  in 
seeking  to  indicate  the  steps  whereby  self-con- 
sciousness has  arisen  from  the  lower  stages  of 
physical  development,  I  am  as  far  as  anyone  can 
be  from  throwing  any  light  upon  the  intrinsic  na- 
ture of  that  the  probable  genesis  of  which  I  am 
endeavoring  to  trace.  It  is  as  true  to-day  as  it 
was  in  the  days  of  Solomon,  that  "As  thou  know- 
est  not  how  the  bones  do  grow  in  the  womb  of 
her  that  is  with  child,  thou  knowest  not  what  is 
the  way  of  the  Spirit." 

What  the  particular  individual  views  were  which 
these  great  men  finally  held  does  not  concern  us 
in  the  discussion,  because  the  object  of  this  book 
is  not  to  present  a  new  or  an  old  special  theory, 
but  merely  emphatically  to  combat  the  assertion 
that  the  individual  has  been  proved  to  be  scien- 
tifically mortal,  or  the  imagination  that  any  proof 
exists  which  is  at  all  of  a  character  to  disturb  our 
spiritual  equanimity.  I  only  desire  to  show  that 
these  masters  of  science  when  the  fire  for  making 
bricks  had  burned  down  found  that  they  had  good 


THE    WITNESSES  93 

bricks,  but  that  the  plans  of  the  building  which 
some  of  them  had  in  mind  showed  bad  archi- 
tectural designs. 

My  reading  of  physiology  has  taught  me  that  it 
is  difficult,  for  some  of  the  very  reasons  set  forth 
by  Professor  Haeckel  in  his  general  analysis  of 
the  cellular  brain,  for  men  past  the  prime  of  life 
to  change  their  habits  of  thought;  hence,  they 
rarely  are  able  to  acquire  a  new  art  or  learn  an 
unfamiliar  language,  but  adhere  to  the  ideas 
formed  in  earlier  life.  Most  old  men  live  much  in 
the  past,  the  sensitivity  of  the  cells  is  not  as  keen, 
new  sensations  fail  to  arouse  them,  and  the  cur- 
rent events  are  not  so  interesting. 

"The  power  of  visualization  is  lost,  pleasure  in 
music  disappears,  memory  becomes  weak  save  in 
narrow  lines  (italics  mine) ;  a  new  language,  a 
new  science,  or  a  new  handicraft  appears  as  a 
very  serious  undertaking,  and,  as  a  rule,  is  only 
indifferently  acquired."  (Donaldson,  "The  Growth 
of  the  Brain.") 

How  often,  may  I  ask,  do  we  find  a  politician 
changing  his  party  lines  in  old  age?  Or  a  church- 
man his  creed? 

I  may  be  permitted  to  suggest  also  that  these 
men  so  criticised  by  Haeckel  were  of  unusually 
strong  intellects,  concededly  so,  and  if  they  did 
achieve  the  new,  recast  the  old,  cease  to  think  on 
former  lines,  it  was  because  they  were  giants  and 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule  and  hence  ex- 
ceptions to  Haeckel' s  rule  of  senility. 

It  is  hardly  consistent  to  suggest  that  these  sci- 
entists changed  from  their  early  positions,  pos- 


94  THE   WITNESSES 

sibly  because  of  the  approach  of  old  age,  and,  in 
addition,  to  advance  as  a  reason  for  the  spiritual- 
istic tendencies  of  such  men  as  Zollner,  Fechner, 
Wallace,  and  Crookes  the  suggestion  that  they 
have  been  led  astray  by  the  "powerful  influence  of 
dogmas  which  a  religious  education  printed  on  the 
brain  in  early  youth."  The  rule  ought  to  work 
either  one  way  or  the  other — either  early  impres- 
sions should  prevail  in  old  age  or  should  not. 

If  "purified  monism"  has  returned  "after  a 
lapse  of  two  hundred  years"  to  the  "profound 
thought  of  Spinoza,"  I  question  whether  we  may 
not  be  compelled  to  look  elsewhere  than  to  "The 
Eiddle  of  the  Universe"  to  find  the  evidences  of 
the  return.  Not  that  I  doubt  the  fact,  but  fail 
there  to  find  the  evidences.  The  solution  of  "The 
Eiddle  of  the  Universe"  as  presented  by  Haeckel 
strikes  me  as  a  far  reach  away  from  the  majestic 
thesis  of  Spinoza.  Contrast  the  absolute  denial  of 
any  individual  immortality  presented  by  Haeckel 
in  his  statement  that  the  "Godless  world  system" 
of  Atheism  "substantially  agrees  with  the  monism 
or  pantheism  of  the  modem  scientists"  and  his 
express  limitation  of  his  conception  of  immortal- 
ity in  these  words,  "When  we  take  the  idea  of  im- 
mortality in  the  widest  sense  and  extend  it  to  the 
totality  of  the  knowable  universe,  it  has  a  scien- 
tific significance ;  it  is  then  not  merely  acceptable 
but  self-evident  to  the  monistic  philosopher,"  with 
the  propositions  of  Spinoza.  Prop.  XXI  (Part  V, 
The  Ethics) :  "Nevertheless,  in  God  there  is  nec- 
essarily an  idea  which  expresses  the  essence  of 
this  or  that  human  body  under  the  form  of  eter- 


THE   WITNESSES  95 

nity."  ^  Prop.  XXIII :  "The  human  mind  cannot 
be  absolutely  destroyed  with  the  body,  but  there 
remains  something  of  it  which  is  eternal." 

A  portion  of  Spinoza's  note  under  the  last  prop- 
osition reads  as  follows:  "But  notwithstanding, 
we  feel  and  know  that  we  are  eternal.  For  the 
mind  feels  those  things  which  it  conceives  by 
understanding  no  less  than  those  things  which  it 
remembers.  For  the  eyes  of  the  mind  whereby 
it  sees  and  observes  things  are  none  other  than 
proofs.  Thus,  although  we  do  not  remember  that 
we  existed  before  the  body,  yet  we  feel  that  our 
mind,  in  so  far  as  it  involves  the  essence  of  the 
body,  under  the  form  of  eternity,  is  eternal,  and 
that  thus  its  existence  cannot  be  defined  in  terms 
of  time  or  explained  through  duration."  Prop. 
XXXIX:  "He  who  possesses  a  body  capable  of 
the  greatest  number  of  activities  possesses  a 
mind  whereof  the  greatest  part  is  eternal." 

I  quote  also  from  a  letter  of  Spinoza  to  Olden- 
berg  (Letter  XV)  for  fear  that  these  propositions 
may  be  considered  as  standing  by  themselves  not 
e  satisfactory  expression  of  Spinoza's  monistic 
idea  of  immortality  of  the  individual  mind:  "As 
regards  the  human  mind,  I  believe  that  it  is  also 
a  part  of  nature ;  for  I  maintain  that  there  exists 
in  nature  an  infinite  power  of  thinking,  which,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  infinite,  contains  subjectively  the 
whole  of  nature,  and  its  thoughts  proceed  in  the 
same  manner  as  nature — that  is,  in  the  sphere  of 

*  AH  the  quotations  from  Spinoza  in  this  book  are  from  the  trans- 
lation by  R.  H.  M.  Elwes  in  Bohn's  edition  of  the  "  Chief  Works  of 
Benedict  de  Spinoza." 


96  THE    WITNESSES 

ideas.  Further,  I  take  the  human  mind  to  be  iden- 
tical with  this  said  power,  not  in  so  far  as  it  is  in- 
finite and  perceives  the  whole  of  nature,  but  in  so 
far  as  it  is  finite  and  perceives  only  the  human 
body.  In  this  manner  I  maintain  that  the  human 
mind  is  a  part  of  an  infinite  understanding." 

The  spiritual  feeling  which  pervades  the  works 
of  Spinoza,  notwithstanding  the  cold,  formulated 
propositions  in  which  his  philosophy  is  set  forth, 
bears  a  striking  contrast  to  the  pessimism  which 
colors  the  ethics  of  Haeckel.  However  little  we 
may  agree  with  Spinoza,  his  work  makes  upon 
us  a  profound  impression ;  we  feel  the  earnestness 
and  human  sympathy  which  warms  it,  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  one  leaves  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Uni- 
verse" depressed  and  filled  with  wonder  that  even 
if  the  doleful  conclusions  of  the  whole  matter  were 
true,  and  Haeckel  a  final  judge  of  the  case,  he 
should  have  felt  it  necessary  to  write  it.  In  any 
event,  Spinoza,  it  seems  to  me,  was  a  poor  wit- 
ness to  summon. 

I  take  the  liberty  here  to  quote  a  few  lines  from 
Professor  Shaler's  recent  work  ("The  Individual," 
p.  304) :  "The  point  is  that  we  know  properties  of 
matter  are  so  complex  and  our  ignorance  as  to 
the  range  of  these  properties  so  great,  that  the 
facts  of  death  cannot  be  made  a  safe  basis  for  a 
conclusion  as  to  the  survival  of  the  intelligence." 

These  words  and  many  more  are  cheering  and 
hopeful  coupled  with  the  true  scientific  mental  at- 
titude of  expectant  waiting. 

I  shall  not  multiply  the  pages  of  this  chapter 
by  further  quotations,  but  content  myself  with  the 


THE   WITNESSES  97 

suggestion  that  advanced  scientists,  with  hardly 
an  exception,  find  in  their  widening  field  of  knowl- 
edge great  and  cogent  reasons  for  waiting  before 
springing  the  trap  which  executes  final  judgment 
upon  the  hope  of  the  world. 

In  the  note  to  a  lecture  upon  Immortality  de- 
livered by  Professor  James,  of  Harvard,  he  ex- 
presses surprise  that,  contrary  to  his  expecta- 
tions, he  could  not  find  in  recent  scientific  books  a 
single  positive  denial  of  man's  possible  immortal- 
ity. He  had  not  at  that  time  the  opportunity  of 
reading  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Universe." 


Chapter  VI 


CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN 

As  an  introduction  to  what  I  wish  to  say  re- 
garding consciousness,  I  shall  put  and  try  to  re- 
ply, to  some  extent  at  least,  to  a  question  which 
has  often  been  asked  and  remained  unanswered  to 
our  satisfaction:  What  is  pain? 

Probably,  like  many  other  queries,  this  will  re- 
main unsettled  just  to  the  degree  that  we  are 
unable  to  explain  what  consciousness  is,  but  I 
think  it  will  yet  be  evident  that  just  so  far  as  we 
are  able  to  understand  what  consciousness  is,  we 
shall  have  a  comprehension  of  the  nature  of  pain. 
I  believe  there  is  reason  to  consider  pain  as  a 
phase  rather  than  an  object  of  consciousness  it- 
self. I  might  define  consciousness  as  the  sense  of 
effort,  and  pain  as  the  consciousness  aroused  by 
the  disturbance  of  automatic  action.  Professor 
Cope,  in  "Primary  Factors  of  Organic  Evolution," 
says:  "Whatever  be  its  nature,  the  preliminary 
to  any  animal  movement  which  is  not  automatic 
is  an  effort.  And  as  no  adaptive  movement  is 
automatic  the  first  time  it  is  performed,  we  may 
regard  effort  as  an  immediate  source  of  all  move- 
ment. Now,  effort  is  a  conscious  state,  and  is  a 
sense  of  resistance  to  be  overcome.  When  an  act 
is  performed  without  effort,  resistance  has  been 

98 


CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN  99 

overcome,  and  the  mechanism  necessary  for  the 
performance  of  the  act  has  been  completed.  The 
stage  of  automatism  has  been  reached." 

As  the  same  author  has  in  another  place  sug- 
gested, that  energy  become  automatic  is  uncon- 
scious, we  are  able  to  conceive  the  effort  to  have 
been  conscious  in  the  long  stages  of  evolution  in 
building  up  the  complex  machines  within  machines 
which  constitute  what  I  have  called  the  living  en- 
vironment ;  desire  producing  effort,  effort  leading 
to  adaptation,  and  the  resulting  adaptation  becom- 
ing automatic,  and,  therefore,  unconscious.  We 
can  readily  comprehend,  as  he  suggests,  that  the 
heart,  the  lungs,  the  stomach,  and  all  the  organs 
were  brought  into  existence  as  such  consciously, 
and  thereafter  performed  their  functions  auto- 
matically. 

If  this  be  a  reasonable  theory,  and  it  seems  to 
me  to  be  such,  then  any  disturbance  of  the  auto- 
matic movements  of  these  organs  or  any  organs 
of  the  body  results  in  an  awakening  of  conscious- 
ness in  the  repair  of  the  injury  causing  the  dis- 
turbance. Such  repair  is  a  revival  of  effort,  the 
same  in  kind  as  the  original  effort  which  created 
the  organ,  and  not  being  effort  directed  rhythmic- 
ally in  response  to  repeated  stimulations,  is  ef- 
fort demanded  suddenly  and  out  of  the  regular 
procession  of  evolution.  All  such  effort  is  a  state 
of  consciousness,  and  as  consciousness  may  be 
said  to  have  abandoned  the  processes  of  the  organ 
in  its  automatic  condition  and  to  have  been  di- 
rected regularly  in  order  to  efforts  in  response  to 
stimuli  upon  the  periphery  of  the  living  environ- 


100  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  PAIN 

ment  coming  from  the  external  and  assailing  it 
from  many  points,  its  sudden  and  unwonted  direc- 
tion to  the  demands  of  repair  in  the  hitherto  auto- 
matic center  results  in  a  centralization,  or  rather 
a  specialization  and  intensification  of  conscious- 
ness in  one  direction.  To  all  efforts  of  energy 
which  demand  specialization  of  consciousness  just 
to  the  degree  of  expenditure  of  energy,  we  give 
the  name  of  pain,  or  its  opposite,  pleasure.  If 
the  specialization  is  in  the  direction  of  the  at- 
tainment of  the  new,  we  call  the  consciousness 
pleasure;  if  directed  to  the  rehabilitation  of  a 
disturbed  automatism,  we  call  it  pain. 

Such  a  unit  of  force  as  we  have  conceived  the  in- 
dividual to  be  is  limited,  limited  to  what  it  is  in 
itself,  and  it  is  only  by  virtue  of  the  successive 
layers  of  automatic  centers  in  its  living  environ- 
ment that  it  may  be  said  to  always  be  able  to 
utilize  practically  its  entire  consciousness  in  the 
acquiring  rather  than  the  retaining.  The  with- 
drawal of  it  in  any  degree  from  this  creative,  or- 
ganizing field  of  effort  and  its  specialization  upon 
the  reorganizing  is  pain. 

Perhaps  I  may  make  the  idea  clearer  by  saying 
that  in  this  view,  ecstasy,  pleasure,  and  pain  are 
but  so  many  gauging  marks  upon  the  thermometer 
of  consciousness.  The  touch  of  the  point  of  a  pin 
may  be  pleasurable,  a  slight  prick  by  it  annoying, 
because  consciousness  is  to  a  degree  withdrawn 
from  its  generalization  and  more  or  less  special- 
ized, while  the  deep  penetration  by  the  instrument 
would  be  pain.  This  is  all,  however,  the  ex- 
pression of  the  degree  to  which  consciousness 


CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN  101 

is  withdrawn  from  generalization  to  specializa- 
tion by  effort  on  the  part  of  the  particular  cen- 
ter in  doing  over  again  what  it  has  done  in  or- 
ganizing the  automatic  action  of  the  epithelial 
cells. 

Pain  and  pleasure  are  but  names  for  direction 
and  degrees  of  consciousness.  They  are  one  and 
the  same  thing — consciousness.  The  beating  of 
my  heart  is  an  automatic  movement,  and  I  am 
unconscious  ordinarily  of  it,  but  if  I  direct  my 
attention  fixedly  to  it,  the  rhythmic  pulsations  be- 
come disturbed  and  there  is  more  or  less  pain  as 
a  result.  The  act  of  swallowing  is  automatically 
performed  by  the  muscles  of  the  esophagus,  and  I 
am  unconscious  of  their  movements  under  ordi- 
nary circumstances,  yet  if  I  pay  attention  to  the 
act  of  swallowing  and  attempt  to  analyze  the  proc- 
ess, I  shall  find  it  exceedingly  difficult  to  resist  the 
desire  to  expel  the  food  or  liquid  which  I  am  at- 
tempting to  swallow;  there  is  pain. 

Pain  is  only  possible  when  there  is  a  degree  of 
generalization  on  the  part  of  consciousness. 

If  the  disturbance  of  the  automatic  process  is 
sufficient  to  centralize  the  entire  consciousness  of 
the  unit  of  force,  unconsciousness  results,  and  we 
find  an  evidence  of  this  in  the  fact  that  the  indi- 
vidual succumbs  at  a  certain  point  and  syncope  or 
fainting  results.  If  the  consciousness  be  with- 
drawn by  artificial  helps,  from  generalization,  as 
in  the  administration  of  anaesthetics,  there  is  no 
pain,  and  in  true  sleep,  however  induced,  whether 
naturally  or  by  hypnotic  suggestion,  there  is  no 
pain.    From  this  position  we  should  not  say  "con- 


102  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND   PAIN 

sciousness  of  pain,"  but  "consciousness  is  pain." 
To  attempt  to  explain  the  absence  of  pain  in  such 
a  state  by  merely  saying  the  individual  is  uncon- 
scious is  to  give  but  half  an  explanation.  It  ap- 
pears more  probable  that  the  individual  cannot 
carry  the  weight  of  such  a  centralization  of  con- 
sciousness, and  hence  there  is  an  inhibition  of  the 
connectivities  between  the  sense  organs  and  the 
cerebrum. 

A  man  suffering  severe  pain,  and  who  at  the 
same  time  is  in  the  condition  which  we  usually  call 
conscious,  has  but  a  feeble  power  to  generalize. 
He  exhibits  a  disposition  to  avoid  conversation; 
he  cannot  read  with  profit ;  he  is  unfitted  for  busi- 
ness, and  there  is  a  general  incapacity  for 
thought ;  consciousness  is  otherwise  engaged ;  it  is 
specializing  upon  a  work  which  is  a  return  to  the 
organization  of  automatic  processes. 

I  have  said  that  conscious  effort  in  acquiring 
the  new  is  pleasure,  and  it  may  be  objected  to  this 
that  there  is  also  pleasure  in  repeating  the  old, 
and  likewise  pain  sometimes  in  acquiring  the  new. 
To  this  I  shall  suggest  that  if  by  repeating  the 
old  is  meant  the  reviving  of  past  sensations,  we 
do  so  by  building  them  upon  the  basis  of  the  pres- 
ent ;  they  are  never  the  same  as  they  were  before ; 
they  are  added  to  the  horizon  of  our  environ- 
ment as  new  factors.  In  acquiring  the  new  there 
can  be  no  pain  unless  in  the  acquisition  there  is  a 
disturbance  of  the  automatism  and  therefore  the 
necessary  readjustment.  There  is  no  pain  except 
where  consciousness  is  comparatively  withdrawn 
from  the  external  world  environment  of  objects 


CONSCIOUSNESS   AND  PAIN  103 

and  an  unwonted  consciousness  of  the  living  en- 
vironment of  the  body  aroused. 

The  peace  and  pleasure  of  the  individual  de- 
pends upon  the  harmonious,  undisturbed  action 
and  interaction  of  his  living  environment. 

Such  a  theory  as  I  have  outlined  to  explain  the 
nature  of  pain  would  more  rationally  lend  sup- 
port to  the  conception  of  the  unit  of  consciousness 
as  the  synthesizing  force  rather  than  the  synthetic 
product  of  the  activities  of  the  cells.  The  prog- 
ress made  by  physiological  and  biological  investi- 
gation in  the  vast  complexity  of  cells  in  the  physi- 
cal animal,  the  division  and  subdivision  into  spe- 
cialized centers,  the  inability  to  frame  any  scheme 
that  will  construct  such  a  synthesis  out  of  them  as 
will  account  for  the  unity  of  consciousness  only 
adds  force  to  the  suggestion  that  the  unit  of  con- 
sciousness is  the  unifying  and  synthesizing  force 
as  a  cause  of  organization. 

The  abandonment  by  biologists  of  the  idea  of  a 
vital  force  does  not  necessarily  include  an  abridg- 
ment of  belief  in  a  vital  unit,  and  if  it  did,  it  would 
not  be  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  Science  when 
it  has  abandoned  a  truth  to  again  return  to  it  as 
clad  in  different  garments  and  called  by  a  differ- 
ent name. 

I  again  suggest  that  consciousness  demands  two 
or  more,  and  cannot  reside  in  the  one  nor  in  any 
number  of  units,  but  is  the  quality  of  a  force  al- 
ways found  in  the  unit  of  unification  and  that  is 
the  individual;  it  is  always  above,  beyond,  and 
something  organic  rather  than  the  sum  total.  It 
is  never  bom  and  consequently  can  never  die,  and 


104  CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN 

as  units  and  unity  are  conceived  of  as  always  as- 
sociated, it  is  indestructible. 

It  would  seem  apparent  that  if  consciousness 
was  the  result  of  the  synthetic  activities  of  the 
sentient  cells,  that  where  any  disturbance  of  their 
automatic  action  occurs,  as  in  the  case  of  injury, 
there  should  be  an  abbreviation  of  consciousness 
during  the  interference,  but  this  is  not  so.  There 
is  rather  an  increase  of  intensity  of  it,  a  distinc- 
tive specialization  which  we  call  pain  up  to  the 
point  of  comparatively  complete  focusing  of  it, 
where,  as  I  have  before  suggested,  syncope  and 
unconsciousness  supervene.  Here,  I  should  say 
that  the  word  unconsciousness  is  really  a  mis- 
nomer, for  it  is  in  reality  the  cessation  of  general- 
ization on  the  part  of  consciousness.  We  have 
various  names  for  such  centralization  of  con- 
sciousness in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life;  we  call 
it  concentration,  absorption  of  mind,  and  absent- 
mindedness,  and  any  such  intensity  of  conscious- 
ness in  one  direction  really  results  in  comparative 
unconsciousness.  This  may  seem  paradoxical,  but 
it  is  clearly  true.  When  one  concentrates  his  at- 
tention upon  a  single  object  for  the  purpose  of  the 
attainment  of  the  new,  if  it  be  only  to  study  the 
microscopical  cell,  he  is  oblivious  to  his  surround- 
ings; he  is  unconscious  relatively  to  them  just  to 
the  degree  that  he  is  conscious  of  the  object  which 
he  is  examining.  This  is  elemental,  of  course,  and 
within  the  experience  of  everybody,  but  it  often 
happens  that  the  commonplace  is  very  suggestive 
and  frequently  offers  the  basis  of  solution  for 
problems  which  have  long  puzzled  the  world. 


CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN  105 

Such  a  concentration  of  consciousness  as  I  have 
just  referred  to  is,  of  course,  pleasurable,  but  if 
we  reverse  the  conditions  and  conceive  of  such 
concentration  as  directed  to  the  theretofore  auto- 
matic centers  we  have  but  consciousness  again 
shading  into  unconsciousness  in  the  same  manner, 
and  up  to  a  point  where  generalization  ceases  we 
call  it  "pain." 

Consciousness  of  environment  in  the  unifying, 
organizing  unit  is  dependent  upon  the  sentience 
of  interacting,  automatic  organs,  and  its  compara- 
tive specialization  in  utilization  of  the  organism  is 
pleasure,  while  the  same  specialization  upon  the 
reorganizing  of  automatic  centers  is  pain. 

The  consciousness  aroused  by  the  stimuli  of  new 
sensations  up  to  the  point  of  disturbance  of  auto- 
matic centers  is  pleasure;  the  consciousness  im- 
puted to  the  individual  by  aroused  consciousness 
in  automatic  centers  is  pain. 

It  would  not  be  out  of  place  to  ask,  if  when  we 
speak  of  consciousness  of  the  individual,  we  have 
in  mind  the  idea  that  he  is  supposed  to  be  con- 
scious of  everything,  that  nothing  may  be  sup- 
posed to  take  place  around  him  or  within  his  en- 
vironment of  which  he  has  no  knowledge  ?  If  we 
accept  the  definition  given  by  Professor  Haeckel, 
that  it  is  best  conceived  as  "internal  perception," 
then  the  measure  of  consciousness  is  not  what  it 
perceives  but  its  capacity  for  perception. 

The  vast  number  of  occurrences  in  the  environ- 
ment of  an  individual  are  not,  by  any  means,  all 
counted  in  the  area  of  consciousness,  but  while 
producing  their  physical  effects  are  salted  down, 


106  CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN 

if  I  may  be  permitted  to  use  such  an  apt  illustra- 
tion, to  be  possibly  at  some  future  time  freshened 
in  the  area  of  consciousness.  For  instance,  the 
events  occurring  immediately  about  me  as  I  walk 
the  streets  of  a  large  crowded  city  appear  to  have 
made  no  intimate  acquaintance  with  my  conscious- 
ness, yet  if  some  demand,  say  growing  out  of  a 
necessity  for  my  testimony  in  a  lawsuit,  is  made 
upon  me,  I  find  myself  able  to  lift  into  conscious 
memory  the  details  of  events  which  otherwise 
would  have  remained  buried  in  the  abyss  of  my 
central  system. 

Now  my  consciousness  does  not  in  such  a  case 
depend  upon  conscious  impressions  made  at  the 
time  of  the  occurrence,  but  rather  upon  its  own 
capacity  to  recover  from  the  environment  within 
(the  preserved  experiences,  the  epitomized  events 
which  make  up  the  chain  of  my  life,  the  living 
environment),  a  necessary  and  valuable  incident, 
and  build  it  into  the  selected  life  of  self.  In  other 
words,  I  mean  to  accept  without  cavil  the  truth 
of  the  statement  (p.  184,  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Uni- 
verse") that  "the  momentous  announcement  of 
modern  physiology  that  the  cerebrum  is  the  or- 
gan of  consciousness  and  mental  action  in  men 
and  the  higher  mammals,  is  illustrated  and  con- 
firmed by  the  pathological  study  of  its  diseases." 

Thus,  there  is  a  great  difference  between  de- 
claring the  cerebrum  to  be  the  cause  of  conscious- 
ness and  asserting  that  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  the 
organ  of  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  not  the 
contents  which  it  holds,  but  the  holder  itself,  and 
therefore,  in  discussing  what  we  are  conscious  of. 


CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN  107 

we  are  not  discoursing  upon  consciousness  itself, 
but  the  objects  of  consciousness.  This  is  precisely 
the  distinction  which  exists  between  subject  and 
object  and  the  one  which  Du  Bois  Eeymond  and 
others  have  found  to  involve  a  problem  which  is 
insoluble. 

George  John  Eomanes,  in  his  essay  "Origin 
of  Human  Faculty,"  as  presented  in  the  volume 
of  essays  edited  by  Professor  Morgan,  says :  "For 
it  is  the  faculty  of  self -consciousness  which  thus 
enables  a  mind  to  set  one  idea  before  another 
as  an  object  of  its  own  thought ;  by  means  of  this 
faculty  the  mind  is  able,  as  it  were,  to  stand  out- 
side of  itself  (italics  mine)  "and  so  to  perceive 
objectively  the  ideas  which  are  passing  subjec- 
tively, and  this  just  as  independently  as  if  it  were 
regarding  an  external  series  of  dissolving  views. 
How  is  it  that  such  a  state  of  matters  is  possible 
whereby  a  mind  can  thus,  as  it  were,  get  outside 
of  its  own  existence^'  (italics  mine)  "and  so  re- 
gard its  own  ideas  as  objective  to  itself!  This  is 
the  mystery  of  all  mysteries,  the  bottomless  abyss 
of  personality"  (italics  mine). 

Professor  Haeckel  freely  admits  that  the  physi- 
ological theory  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  con- 
sciousness is  by  no  means  generally  adopted,  so 
that  the  question  whether  the  individual  is  im- 
mortal would  rather,  so  far  as  consciousness  is 
concerned,  resolve  itself  into  a  query  whether  the 
contents  of  individual  consciousness  are  depend- 
ent for  continuity  upon  the  organs  which  mediated 
them  and  which  will  ultimately  disappear. 

Inasmuch  as  we  know  nothing  about  the  nature 


108  CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN 

of  consciousness  in  its  last  analysis,  and  appar- 
ently cannot,  it  is  evident  that  while  a  scientist 
undoubtedly  has  the  right  to  his  own  opinion  as 
to  its  continuity  after  death  of  the  organs,  he 
should  hesitate  to  declare  any  other  opinion  im- 
possible in  the  light  of  modem  science. 

We  know  little  about  the  qualities  of  conscious- 
ness, whether  it  is  rhythmic  in  its  character  or 
not,  whether  it  rests  or  not,  whether  it  shines  with 
diffusive  light  which  reaches  everything  at  once  or 
rather  focuses  its  rays  in  successive  directions. 

Here  I  am  speaking  of  consciousness  itself,  not 
of  its  activity  through  its  organs  in  the  cerebrum ; 
there  we  find  that  it  is  rhythmic,  that  it  does  rest, 
that  it  focuses  its  perceptive  rays  of  light;  it  is 
in  an  environment  of  objects,  and  therefore  de- 
mands successive  objects  to  perceive.  It  is  not 
omniscient  and  general;  certainly  not  when  op- 
erating in  these  organs,  but  limited,  special. 

That  it  should  therefore  find  difficulty  in  per- 
ceiving objects  in  its  environment  by  reason  of 
breaks  in  the  connection  with  it,  such  as  injury 
to  the  cerebrum,  is  not  strange,  nor  is  it  a  con- 
clusive evidence  that  it  itself  is  caused  by  the 
organs  so  injured.  I  am  not  conscious  of  being 
in  my  office  when  I  am  at  home,  yet  my  conscious- 
ness has  not  died;  my  consciousness  of  that  par- 
ticular office  is  inactive,  I  admit. 

This  is  elementary,  but  has  no  less  force  for  that 
reason. 

The  fallacious  argument  from  cerebral  injury, 
stimulation  of  the  organs,  multiplicity  of  appar- 
ent personalities,  appears  to  me  to  merely  amount 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  PAIN  109 

to  this :  consciousness  does  not  know  everything, 
and  it  is  not  omniscient,  does  not  perceive  objects 
which  it  does  not  perceive;  therefore,  it  is  the 
effect  of  its  own  incompetent  organs  as  the  canse 
of  its  existence. 

This  mysterious  consciousness  again  seems  to 
have  the  power  to  select  for  its  own  perception 
and  to  choose  from  the  physical  centers  such  as 
it  desires  to  lift  into  its  own  area,  nor  will  the 
mere  physical  explanation  of  association  of  ideas 
completely  satisfy  the  call  for  a  cause.  Such  an 
explanation  as  the  physical  association  of  received 
impressions  is  founded  upon  the  idea  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  paths  of  least  resistance,  established 
as  perceived  impressions  and  associations  of  them, 
and  presumably  such  a  physical  phenomenon  oc- 
curs simultaneously  with  the  psychological  one  of 
recalling  an  experience  forming  a  unit  in  the  chain 
of  associated  events  which  have  made  their  previ- 
ous impression,  however  slight,  upon  the  organs 
of  consciousness.  What,  however,  are  we  to  do 
with  the  events  that  have  not  at  the  time  of  their 
occurrence  made  any  impression  upon  the  organs 
of  consciousness,  when  we  find  them  coming  up 
out  of  the  depths  of  unconsciousness  to  conscious- 
ness ?  The  conclusion  readily  reached,  of  course,  is 
that  they  made  their  impression  upon  the  subcon- 
sciousness, and,  from  the  view  which  I  take  tenta- 
tively, of  the  one  and  the  many  both  physically 
and  psychically,  I  am  prepared  to  admit  that  these 
stimulations  did  produce  effects  in  subconscious- 
ness. That  is  not  the  difficulty  which  at  present 
confronts  us,  but  that  other  which  calls  for  some 


110  CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN 

physical  explanation  of  how  and  why  conscious- 
ness afterwards  deliberately  selects  these  particu- 
lar sensations  and  perceives  them. 

As  an  illustration  of  what  I  think  to  be  a  com- 
mon experience  enough  to  be  practically  beyond 
denial,  I  refer  to  the  phenomena  witnessed  in  hyp- 
notic experiments.  I  have  seen  a  person  hypno- 
tized and  such  liberties  taken  with  his  person  and 
apparel  as  would  have  been  indignantly  resented 
in  the  normal  condition,  injuries  inflicted  which 
would  have  caused  instant  and  excruciating  pain, 
but  which  were  submitted  to  without  a  word  of 
protest  or  a  sign  of  objection.  Just  prior  to 
arousing  him  the  operator  informed  him  that 
upon  awakening  he  would  remember  all  that  had 
taken  place ;  needless  to  say,  he  did.  He,  for  the 
first  time,  i3erated  the  operator  for  permitting 
such  acts  and  taking  such  liberties  with  him,  and 
declared  that  he  had  suffered  pain. 

I  am  aware  that  we  have  been  inundated  with 
accounts  of  such  performances  until  they  are  com- 
monplace and  tiresome,  but  that  does  not  remove 
the  fact  out  of  the  way,  that  such  a  subject  brings 
up  at  suggestion  a  "familiar  spirit"  from  the 
region  of  subconsciousness  and  introduces  him  to 
consciousness.  The  point  upon  which  I  wish  to 
lay  stress  is  that  the  "organs"  of  consciousness  at 
command  of  the  will  select  out  of  unconnected  im- 
pressions one  which  it  wants,  and  find  in  it  an 
object  of  present  consciousness  with  the  element 
of  pastness  in  it. 

I  have  linked  together  pain  and  consciousness 
in  this  chapter,  not  because  the  suggested  theory 


CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN  111 

proves  anything,  but  because  it  has  appeared  to 
me  to  present  more  clearly  and  to  my  mind  most 
forcibly  the  insolubility  of  the  problem  of  con- 
sciousness. It  is  our  experience  that  the  auto- 
matic is  always  the  result  of  the  conscious,  and  as 
I  have  before  stated.  Professor  Cope  considers  all 
adaptive  movements  as  effort,  and  effort  as  at- 
tended with  consciousness,  the  consciousness 
merging  into  automatism  when  effort  ceases.  If 
this  is  so,  my  consciousness  is  an  effort  of  energy 
toward  adaptation  and  is  not  now  and  cannot  have 
been  automatic,  but  considering  that  the  move- 
ments of  unicells  are  "impulsive  and  automatic" 
(Haeckel),  the  question  arises,  how  did  conscious- 
ness arise  out  of  any  combination  of  such  cells 
with  nothing  but  automatism  as  a  precedent 
cause  ? 

Of  course  if  we  follow  Haeckel  far  enough  to 
coincide  with  his  "conviction  that  even  the  atom 
is  not  without  a  rudimentary  form  of  sensation 
and  will"  (p.  225,  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Universe"), 
then  we  are  at  liberty  to  conceive  of  units  of  force 
in  substance  which  are  as  true  to  the  law  of  their 
being  as  are  atoms,  unless  we  admit  what  he  calls 
the  extreme  probability  that  "they  (the  atoms) 
are  not  absolute  species  of  ponderable  matter — 
that  is,  not  eternally  unchangeable  particles"; 
only  in  that  case  I  must  ask  what  brought  these 
differentiated  atoms  into  existence?  Professor 
HaeckePs  reply  undoubtedly  is  found  in  these 
words:  "We  adhere  firmly  to  the  pure,  unequiv- 
ocal monism  of  Spinoza;  matter  or  infinitely  ex- 
tended substance,  and  spirit  (or  energy),  or  sensi- 


112  CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  PAIN 

tive  and  thinking  substance,  are  the  two  funda- 
mental attributes  or  principal  properties  of  the 
all-embracing  divine  essence  of  the  world,  the  uni- 
versal substance"  (p.  21,  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Uni- 
verse"). 

Does  this  in  the  last  analysis  explain  differenti- 
ation? I  find  myself  here  just  where  I  do  at  the 
close  of  another  chapter  in  this  book,  imable  to 
understand  how  infinite  substance  and  infinite 
spirit  (energy)  can  produce  variety  and  individu- 
ality. It  strikes  me  that  without  another  and  ad- 
ditional force,  aliunde,  we  should  have  eternally 
an  immovable  sea  of  substance.  The  very  moment 
that  we  conceive  it  as  condensing,  or  breaking  up, 
or  differentiating,  we  have  imported  a  foreign 
force,  one  unknown  to  science  and  not  recognized 
by  Monistic  philosophy. 

If  Monism  demands,  as  is  claimed  by  some,  that 
all  manifestation  should  come  from  one  thing, 
then  the  assumption  of  One  Infinite  Eternal  Sub- 
stance and  "Spirit,'^  or  force,  does  not  and  can- 
not account  for  the  differentiation  in  the  Universe 
on  such  a  monistic  theory.  We  do  not  know  what 
force  is,  neither  have  we  any  real  knowledge  of 
the  nature  of  "Spirit" ;  they  are  words,  and  words 
only,  used  by  Professor  Haeckel,  as  by  all,  to  oc- 
cupy a  relation  to  the  problem  similar  to  the  X  in 
algebra.  Movement  is  summarily  disposed  of  by 
Haeckel  by  calling  it  an  "innate  property"  of  sub- 
stance. These  again  are  only  words;  what  is  an 
innate  property?  It  is  something,  and  if  Monism 
demands  that  all  things  shall  come  from  one  thing, 
then  such  a  state  of  substance  does  not  consti- 


CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN  113 

tute  it,  but  is  clearly  a  dualism,  or  I  should  rather 
suggest,  a  trinity.  We  have  infinite  eternal  ex- 
tended substance,  which,  according  to  the  defini- 
tion, cannot  exist  without  force  or  spirit,  and  then 
we  have  the  "innate  property"  of  substance  or 
"movement." 

If  we  are  to  rely  upon  mere  words,  it  seems  to 
me  that  it  will  require  but  a  substitution  of  names 
for  these  words  and  we  shall  have  all  the  requi- 
sites of  even  the  orthodox  trinity.  Father  (sub- 
stance), Holy  Ghost  (spirit  or  force),  and  Son 
(innate  property  of  movement).  I  do  not,  of 
course,  say  that  this  is  the  Trinity,  but  that  it 
could  be,  and  further,  that  such  an  hypothesis  as 
Haeckel  presents  is  no  more  Monism  than  is  such 
a  conception  of  the  Trinity.  It  has  always  been 
claimed  that  "In  Him  we  live  [Force]  and  move 
[innate  property  of  movement]  and  have  our 
being  [substance],"  so  that  even  trinitarianism  is 
IMonism. 

It  is  not  at  all  necessary  in  order  to  escape 
dualism  (if  it  be  essential  that  we  escape  it)  that 
we  postulate  the  inconsistent  hypothesis  of  un- 
differentiated eternal  substance,  undifferentiated 
eternal  force,  and  innate  property  of  movement, 
for  by  assuming  "innate  property  of  movement" 
as  eternally  in  manifestation,  we  have  either  dif- 
ferentiated substance  or  force,  and  I  can  see  no 
reason  why  we  should  be  compelled  to  encumber 
ourselves  with  the  conception  of  "innate  property 
of  movement,"  when  we  may  as  reasonably  con- 
ceive of  eternal  units  of  "force"  or  "spirit"  as  a 
differentiation  amply  sufficient  to  account  for  all 


114  CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN 

the  phenomena  of  the  Universe.  "Movement" 
would  follow  such  a  differentiation  of  force,  but 
with  undifferentiated  substance  and  force  it  might 
be  innate  in  some  transcendental  manner,  but 
would  hardly  manifest  itself. 

Perhaps  I  am  wrong,  but  my  reading  of  Spi- 
noza has  not  resulted  in  the  same  construction  of 
his  meaning  as  that  given  by  Professor  Haeckel. 
The  "thinking  substance"  of  Haeckel  which  can 
think  by  being  organized  is,  it  seems  to  me,  vastly 
different  from  the  "thinking  thing"  which  Spinoza 
says  God  is.  Spinoza's  "thinking  thing"  thinks. 
Its  modes  of  thought  are  the  individualizations 
which  fill  the  universe. 

HaeckePs  "thinking  substance"  is  like  the 
"mind  stuff"  of  Professor  Clifford,  a  substance 
which  does  not  think  as  a  whole,  but  breaks  up  or 
rather  condenses  and  by  reason  of  such  conden- 
sation bestows  upon  variety  a  faculty  of  thinking. 
I  have  presented  a  few  of  Spinoza's  propositions 
in  the  chapter  on  The  Witnesses. 

That  the  modes  of  thinking  are  in  eternal,  in- 
cessant process  of  change  there  is  no  doubt ;  that 
nothing  remains  as  it  is  is  equally  free  from 
doubt;  that  the  panorama  of  the  universe  is 
change,  I  freely  admit,  but  may  it  not  be  that  the 
act  of  changing  itself  constitutes  consciousness? 

A  fair  summing  up  of  this  suggestion  would  be 
this :  change  implies  effort,  effort  is  consciousness. 
We  should  then  look  for  consciousness,  not  in  the 
operation  of  complexities,  that  is,  in  the  "chemical 
activities"  of  the  cerebrum,  but  in  the  act  of  the 
building  of  the  complexities  themselves.    The  very 


CONSCIOUSNESS  AND  PAIN  115 

fact  that,  when  accomplished  and  the  complexity 
established,  consciousness  subsides  into  automa- 
tism is  a  strong  indication  that  consciousness  is 
associated  with  effort  and  may  be,  therefore,  said 
to  be  the  sense  of  effort.  Death  of  the  body  is  the 
result  of  consciousness,  and,  therefore,  death  is 
necessary  to  life. 

Again  I  may  conclude  that  as  consciousness  is 
not  the  complexity,  but  the  changing  attitude  of 
that  selective  synthesis  whose  activity  produces  it, 
and  as,  therefore,  that  which  possesses  it  cannot 
be  born  or  come  into  existence,  but  ever  is,  we 
have  no  reason  to  say  that  because  its  complexity 
of  environment  has  ceased  as  such,  that  it  likewise 
has  done  so. 

This  activity,  this  unit  of  force,  is  the  individ- 
ual, and  because  he  walks  past  the  windows  of  our 
eyes  in  the  very  apparent  complexity  of  body,  and 
recedes  into  the  complexity  of  the  cell  under  the 
microscope,  shall  we,  in  the  light  of  our  un- 
bounded ignorance  of  the  nature  of  ether  and  its 
capabilities,  say  that  the  consciousness  which  was 
is  not  I  The  very  cells  in  which  its  last  activity 
presented  itself,  the  cerebral  cells,  have  finally 
become  automatic,  and  the  old  man  finds  his  brain 
a  machine  which  grinds  out  that,  and  that  only, 
which  consciousness  brought  there  by  effort.  He 
is  senile ;  his  brain  produces  the  past ;  it  is  not  the 
field  of  effort ;  what  is  1  "With  no  longer  a  use  for 
the  now  automatic  machine,  what  scientific  rea- 
son is  there  to  say  that  the  individual  is  not  as 
before  making  effort!  The  field  of  his  conscious- 
ness has  been  all  the  time  pushing  up  with  the 


116  CONSCIOUSNESS   AND   PAIN 

least  stable  and  least  fixed  portion  of  his  living 
environment,  and  as  we  shade  ponderable  matter 
off  into  ether,  let  ns  not  yet  hesitate  to  conjecture 
that  the  organic  efforts  of  the  individual  during 
what  we  call  life  have  shaded  off  likewise  into  a 
field  of  acquisition,  of  complexities  of  which  we 
know  nothing. 

Evolution  carries  too  many  potentialities,  selec- 
tivities,  memories,  tendencies,  inherent  capacities, 
and  adaptations,  and  biology  too  many  ids  and 
idants,  chromosomes,  centrosomes,  plasms,  and 
mysterious  powerful  invisibilities  to  induce  a  ra- 
tional man  to  haul  down  his  flag  of  immortality 
just  because  some  sciences  do  not  go  any  further 
than  they  can. 


Chapter  VII 


MEMOEY 

If  there  is  any  one  attribute  of  mind  which  is 
the  foundation  of  all  the  others  it  is  memory,  for 
without  it  there  is  and  can  be  no  consciousness, 
and  its  absence  would  render  the  wonderful  germ 
cell  from  which  each  individual  body  came  as  im- 
potent to  evolve  the  physical  structure  which 
comes  from  it  as  is  the  amoeba. 

For  these  reasons  some  consideration  of  the 
nature  and  phenomena  of  memory  is  of  impor- 
tance. 

That  there  can  be  no  consciousness  without 
memory  is,  I  think,  clearly  apparent  when  we 
realize  that  it  is  only  by  the  contrast  of  the  suc- 
ceeding moment's  sensations  with  those  preceding 
it  that  we  have  any  conceivable  basis  for  compari- 
son or  appreciation  of  differences,  and  this  is  true 
whether  we  are  engaged  in  processes  of  thought  or 
receiving  impressions  through  the  senses  from 
without.  Consciousness  has  been  frequently 
called  a  stream,  but  it  must  be  a  stream  in  which 
the  departing  wave  does  not  recede  from  sight 
until  the  incoming  raises  its  crest  to  the  eyes.  It 
is  the  change  and  the  knowledge  of  the  change  and 
its  character  which  constitutes  consciousness  and 
that  necessitates  memory. 

117 


118  MEMORY 

That  there  may  be  memory  without  conscious- 
ness will  as  clearly  make  itself  apparent  when  we 
consider  the  automatic  processes  of  the  various 
organs  of  the  human  system.  So  long  have  they 
performed  their  functions  that  the  work  is  done, 
as  far  as  we  are  concerned,  unconsciously. 

Memory  may  then  be  said  to  be  the  vehicle  of 
consciousness,  and  we  may  be  certain  that  wher- 
ever we  find  consciousness  there  will  memory  be 
likewise,  and  that  just  in  the  proportion  that  mem- 
ory is  deficient  will  consciousness  be  dim  and  un- 
certain, but  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that 
where  consciousness  is  not  present  memory  is  ab- 
sent. 

What,  then,  is  memory!  If  we  are  to  confine 
ourselves  to  the  physical  phenomena,  as  I  have 
already  said  in  a  previous  chapter,  it  is  possible 
to  conceive  of  an  actual  preservation  of  distinc- 
tive forms  of  motion  caused  by  the  sensations  pro- 
duced by  objects  whether  we  resort  to  the  indi- 
vidual cerebral  cells  or  to  combinations  of  such 
cells.  Such  a  possibility  I  find  to  be  admitted  by 
Professor  Bain.  He  estimates  the  number  of  cells 
in  the  gray  covering  of  the  hemispheres  of  the 
brain  to  amount  to  1,200,000,000,  and  "hence  there 
is  no  improbability  in  supposing  an  independent 
nervous  track  for  each  separate  acquisition."  Of 
course,  this  would  only  amount  to  the  establish- 
ment of  an  inner  environment  constructed  of 
forms  of  motion,  probably  correspondences  of  the 
objects  causing  the   sensations   or   stimulations. 

Incoming  impulses  or  those  aroused  by  intro- 
spection may  cause  discharges  of  energy  along 


MEMORY  .  119 

tracks  and  among  cells  holding  an  associative  re- 
lationship to  them  and  bring  before  the  mind 
recollections.  But,  as  I  have  suggested  before, 
there  is  no  physical  explanation  for  the  sense  of 
pastness,  nor,  indeed,  I  may  add,  for  the  sense  of 
forgetfulness  so  often  felt  by  us. 

Not  infrequently  we  hunt  for  an  idea,  one  which 
we  feel  to  be  an  old  friend;  we  can  almost  catch 
it,  but  it  eludes  us,  and  it  is  only  after  persistent 
effort  that  we  succeed  in  making  it  stand  and 
deliver. 

Now,  in  such  an  instance  it  is  apparent  that 
somehow  we  travel  in  avenues  close  by  the  elusive 
idea;  we  can  almost  see  it  "around  the  comer," 
but  I  candidly  confess  myself  as  yet  unable  to 
find  a  physical  cause  for  our  knowledge  of  its 
absence.  Physical  and  psychical  phenomena  are 
cooperative,  and  yet  there  are  occasions  when  one 
or  the  other  appears  to  precede  the  coordinate 
phenomena  as  the  immediate  cause  of  the  opera- 
tion of  both.  Possibly  there  may  be  an  unknown 
and  unmeasured  physical  attendant  upon  psychi- 
cal phenomena. 

Eeturning  to  the  sense  of  forgetfulness,  we  shall 
find,  I  believe,  that  the  operation  of  the  law  of 
association  of  ideas  fails  to  be  an  adequate  ex- 
planation. The  existence  of  the  elusive  idea  is 
suggested,  of  course,  by  other  thoughts  with  which 
our  attention  is  engaged  and  ought  to  respond  at 
once,  if  the  associated  ideas  are  aroused  to  the 
field  of  active  memory  by  relationship  physically. 

Conceding  that  for  some  reason  there  is  a  phys- 
ical blocking  of  the  nerve  track,  and  the  cell  or 


120  MEMORY 

cell  center  in  which  the  lost  idea  is  closeted  can- 
not be  aroused,  yet  the  mind  knows  that  it  is 
blocked,  knows  that  it  has  the  idea,  has  an  in- 
distinct conception  of  what  it  is,  realizes  the  ne- 
cessity of  recalling  it,  and  willfully  goes  about  the 
work  of  finding  it.  This  would  appear  to  be  a 
"sum  total,"  which  as  a  product  realizes  that  it 
is  not  the  product  which  it  ought  to  be,  and  that 
if  it  could  only  add  another  force  as  a  unit  it 
would  be  a  different  "sum  total." 

Possibly  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  this  can 
be  given,  but  it  remains,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned, 
one  of  the  mysteries  of  memory,  one  of  the  things 
which  Science  does  not  know,  but  at  which  it  may 
make  more  or  less  rational  guesses. 

There  is  another  rather  curious  habit  which 
memory  seems  to  have,  and  one  which  again  leaves 
a  mystery  unsolved  if,  as  Professor  Haeckel  says, 
the  soul  is  the  "sum  total"  of  the  chemical  activi- 
ties of  the  cells  of  the  cerebrum,  and  that  an 
individual  cannot  be  divided  and  retain  its  indi- 
viduality. 

I  have  found  frequently,  as  I  presume  every- 
body else  has,  that  when  a  name  or  a  number,  or 
even  a  quotation,  has  escaped  my  memory,  I  can 
recall  it  by  directing  the  attention  mechanically 
or  automatically  to  something  else  temporarily, 
as,  for  instance,  by  adding  a  column  of  figures  or 
engaging  in  light  conversation.  When  I  do  this, 
usually  the  lost  name  comes  up  from  the  depths 
like  a  submerged  cork  which  has  been  suddenly 
loosened  from  anchorage  below.  Now,  in  the 
common  experience  the  "sum  total"  is  either  en- 


MEMORY  121 

gaged  in  the  exercise  or  the  conversation  referred 
to,  or  the  "sum  total"  is  not  one,  but  is  divided, 
and  one  of  them  is  engaged  as  suggested,  while 
the  other  is  searching  the  nerve  tracks  and  cere- 
bral cells  for  the  lost  name.  Either  the  individ- 
ual is  not  a  "sum  total,"  but  the  master  of  vari- 
ous units  and  combinations  which  simultaneously 
do  the  bidding  of  the  will,  or  there  is  no  indi- 
vidual, he  being  divided  into  two  separate  "cere- 
bral activities,"  even  though  one  of  them  is  un- 
conscious or  subconscious.  Lest  it  be  supposed 
that  I  do  not  fairly  quote  the  definition  of  a  soul 
and  individual  as  given  by  Professor  Haeckel,  I 
will  here  say  that  I  understand  fully  that  his  defi- 
nition of  a  soul  is  that  it  is  "a  collective  title  for 
the  sum  total  of  the  cerebral  functions."  But  as 
a  sum  total  is  a  definite  factor  and  the  adjective 
"collective"  appears  to  be  superfluous,  I  feel  jus- 
tified in  considering  his  definition  to  mean  that 
there  is  no  true  unity  of  mind  function,  but  merely 
a  changing,  vacillating  multiplicity  of  function- 
ing cells  which  seem  in  some  unaccountable,  tran- 
scendental way  to  make  up  a  "sum  total"  akin 
to  the  N  function  in  mathematics. 

As  one  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  endeavor 
to  present  some  features  of  the  action  of  memory 
which  remain  unsolved  mysteries,  and  which  seem 
to  demand  something  more  as  a  cause  than  the 
cerebral  cells  which  appear  to  be  the  organs  of 
its  functioning,  I  will  again  refer  to  the  memory 
of  the  germ  cell.  To  account  for  the  organized 
human  body  which  arises  from  its  activities  with- 
out admitting  the  truth  of  the  ancient  doctrine 


122  MEMORY 

of  preformation,  biologists,  including  Professor 
Haeckel,  ascribe  to  the  fertilized  ovum  cell  certain 
wonderful  unconscious  memories ;  memories  which 
result  in  presentations  of  evolving  forms  from 
the  cell  through  the  line  of  species  from  which 
man  has  finally  emerged  to  the  full  stature  of 
humanity. 

This,  of  course,  necessitates  a  memory  some- 
where and  somehow  in  the  one  cell,  of  the  vari- 
ous changes  through  which  it  must  thereafter 
evolve.  Consider  what  this  demands  of  us  in  the 
way  of  mental  gymnastics.  First,  the  physical 
memory  must  have  its  physical  counterpart,  and 
every  existent  potential  memory  must  be  stored 
as  a  form  of  motion  of  matter  in  that  one  cell  if 
we  adhere  to  the  theory  that  memory  is  always 
attended  with  cerebral  or  cell  or  material  activ- 
ity. We  have  seen  that  we  can  conceive  of  a  de- 
pository for  all  the  elements  of  memory  up  to  a 
certain  point  if  we  provide  cells  or  cell  centers 
enough  to  contain  them  in  some  forms  of  motion 
or  chemical  activities,  and  that  we  have  even  some 
comprehension  of  how  these  become  consciously 
active  and  form  a  basis  for  intelligence. 

In  the  case  of  the  germ  cell,  however,  it  divides, 
first  into  two  cells,  presumably  each  like  the  other ; 
certainly  we  know  of  no  chemical  process  by  which 
the  memory  of  these  two  has  become  in  any  way 
changed,  unless  something  has  been  added  to 
them,  hence  they  are  so  far  the  same ;  they  then 
divide  into  four,  again  alike,  and  so  on  until  we 
reach  a  certain  point  in  the  process  of  division 
where  a  series  of  lower  animal  embryonic  forms 


MEMORY  123 

appear  one  after  another,  evolving  out  of  each 
other  in  a  determinate  order.  If  we  are  to  con- 
cede that  a  memory  must  always  be  associated 
with,  as  its  necessary  correlative,  a  physical  or- 
ganism, then  that  physical  organism  must  be  equal 
in  complexity  and  coordination  to  the  complexity 
and  coordination  of  the  memory.  It  is  useless  in 
such  a  position  to  talk  of  potential  memory,  for 
even  the  atoms  which  are  hypothetically  gifted 
with  "will  and  feeling"  can  evolve  no  memory 
which  will  be  capacious  and  complex  without,  by 
association  with  other  atoms,  building  a  complex 
brain  substance  capable  of  functioning  such  a 
memory,  in  which  case  the  memory  is  not  con- 
ceded by  HaeckePs  theory  to  be  the  result  of  the 
potential  memory  of  a  single  atom,  but  the  "sum 
total  of  the  cerebral  activities." 

Long  before  the  embryo  of  the  coming  animal 
appears,  the  cells  which  have  by  division  been 
born  of  the  original  one  cell  begin  to  divide  the 
work  among  themselves;  in  other  words,  to  dif- 
ferentiate as  to  function.  Is  this  the  memory  of 
these  cells?  No,  for  they  have  never  performed 
the  process  nor  witnessed  the  process  of  the  per- 
formance before;  they  are  new  cells.  Is  it  the 
memory  of  the  original  cell?  No,  for  it  has  dis- 
appeared in  the  many.  It  is  the  memory  at  best, 
under  that  theory,  of  the  morphological  unity.  We 
can  conceive  of  separate  cells  receiving  impres- 
sions and  setting  up  forms  of  specific  motion  and 
in  a  unity  producing  a  synthetic  result,  but  here 
we  are  confronted  with  the  opposite  proposition — 
of  one  cell  producing  many  with  separate  func- 


124  MEMOKY 

tions  which,  by  a  mutual  activity,  construct  a  syn- 
thetic product.  If  memory  is,  physically  consid- 
ered, a  form  of  motion,  is  it  within  the  bounds  of 
human  knowledge,  or  even  within  the  limits  of 
human  understanding,  to  comprehend  how  there 
can  be  in  the  one  original  cell  a  unification  of  a 
multiplicity  of  memories  which  may  be  transmit- 
ted to  many  cells  as  differentiated,  varying  mem- 
ories ? 

Memory  is  here  a  word  to  which  Science  flees 
for  refuge;  it  is  one  of  the  explanations  of  the 
activities  of  the  cell  given  in  order  that  effects 
may  be  matched  with  sufficient  causes.  I  believe, 
notwithstanding  its  wide  acceptance  as  a  theory, 
that  it  is  utterly  beyond  anybody's  capacity  to 
demonstrate  its  correctness.  It  serves  its  purpose 
and  yet  remains  only  a  hypothesis. 

That  such  a  form  of  motion  in  the  germ  cell  is 
not  quantitative  but  is  qualitative,  if  it  exists  at 
all  as  the  correlative  of  the  "unconscious  mem- 
ory," is  made  fairly  clear,  as  I  have  shown  in  the 
previous  part  of  this  book,  by  the  experiments  of 
Pfluger  with  clamped  ovum  cells  of  the  frog, 
which  experiments  together  with  those  which  I 
have  mentioned  as  made  by  Professor  Loeb  with 
the  eggs  of  the  sea  urchin,  seem  to  indicate  that 
the  substance  of  the  egg  is  undifferentiated  as  to 
its  power  of  producing  the  embryo.  Every  part 
has,  then,  the  same  "unconscious  memory"  and 
its  form  of  motion,  not  a  synthetic  one  of  the  mass 
but  evidently  molecular.  Such  a  conclusion  ren- 
ders the  mystery  of  the  memory  of  the  cell  more 
dense,  because  it  requires  that  these  wonderful 


MEMOEY  125 

memories  shall  be  looked  for  in  infinitely  smaller 
bodies  than  the  cell  itself.  Scientists  have  recog- 
nized the  profound  mystery  attending  the  activ- 
ities of  the  cell  and  the  difficulty  of  providing  the 
machinery  essential  to  do  such  marvelous  work. 
That  is  the  reason  why  Weismann  proposed  the 
theory  of  his  ids,  idants,  and  biopheres,  and  why 
there  is  such  earnestness  in  the  field  of  cytology 
just  at  this  time.  Science  has  given  its  various 
theories  based  upon  the  data  which  it  has  in  its 
possession,  and  that  is  right;  but  it  is  far  from 
being  conclusive,  and  it  always  has  an  unknown 
region  beyond  its  last  footstep. 

Eecalling  the  theory  of  the  possibility  of  even 
an  etheric  body  suggested  in  the  chapter  on  "Some 
Things  Which  Science  Does  Not  Know,"  a  theory, 
of  course,  presented  as  merely  a  tentative  one,  we 
shall  see  that  while  memory  is  essential  to  con- 
sciousness of  objects,  yet  consciousness  after  all 
constitutes  but  a  very  small  part  of  our  lives.  Be- 
tween the  outer  environment  and  the  inner  one 
which  we  have  conserved,  and  which  constitutes 
the  deep  from  which  the  forms  of  memory  are 
brought  up,  is  the  very  small  circumscribed  posi- 
tion which  we  occupy  in  our  waking  consciousness. 
I  say  waking  to  distinguish  it  from  the  conscious- 
ness with  which  we  are  familiar  in  dreams. 

Of  the  vast  number  of  impressions  which  we 
have  received  and  which  are  conserved  within  us, 
we  are  from  moment  to  moment  conscious  of  only 
a  remarkably  small  number.  We  can  remember, 
but  habitually  we  do  not,  and  when  we  do  it  is 
only  a  comparatively  insignificant  number  at  a 


126  MEMOBY 

time.  Of  all  these  experiences  which  we  have 
had,  of  all  the  faces  seen,  of  the  great  and  over- 
whelming number  of  events  which  have  crowded 
upon  us  during  life,  of  all  the  conversations, 
books  which  we  have  read,  of  that  great  unnum- 
bered multitude,  how  many  are  at  the  present 
moment  present  to  consciousness? 

This  moment's  consciousness  is  comparatively 
an  insignificant  thing  to  contemplate,  and  yet  it 
is  in  the  now  that  we  live,  and  consciousness  is 
seemingly  its  value,  but  is  it!  As  I  read  the 
pages  of  a  book,  my  eye  sweeps  rapidly  along  the 
lines  taking  note  of  every  word,  of  necessity  of 
every  letter,  and  if  I  make  the  seeing  of  every 
letter  an  act  of  consciousness,  it  is  a  painful  op- 
eration. It  is  the  thought  embodied  on  that  page 
that  I  am  after,  not  the  road  to  it,  hence  those 
former  halting  efforts  at  spelling,  which  in  boy- 
hood I  made,  have  resulted  in  an  approximately 
automatic  servitude  on  the  part  of  my  eyes,  cen- 
ters of  letter  memory,  word  memory,  sentence 
memory,  and  indeed  of  nearly  the  whole  cerebrum. 
I  am  conscious  only  of  the  thought  in  its  succes- 
sive changes  in  presentation.  The  real  self — the 
center  of  consciousness — the  soul  is  that  very 
unifying  force  which  once  in  consciousness  laid 
the  foundations  of  all  those  new  unconscious  au- 
tomatic processes  of  memory  and  which  is  the 
One  using  the  many  in  acquisition  of  the  new. 

Again,  an  analysis  of  the  experience  of  the 
mind  in  extemporaneous  speaking  reveals  a  pro- 
cess of  the  creation  of  new  compilations  of  thought 
in  a  definite  direction,  in  which  memory  without 


MEMOEY  127 

consciousness  opens  its  many  doors  and  pours 
forth  its  treasures,  figures,  words  and  ideas  which 
are  simultaneously  organized  into  new  structures, 
and  symmetrically  builded  into  a  continuous  chain 
of  reasoning  and  possibly  a  pyrotechnic  display 
of  the  imagination.  Here  apparently  conscious- 
ness dwindles  to  an  imperceptible  point,  but  in 
fact  it  is  itself  a  never-changing  unit  perceiver 
of  an  incessantly  varying  organization  of  burning 
feeling. 

In  both  cases,  we  have  the  comparative  auto- 
matic action  of  memory  serving  the  dominant  will, 
the  something  which  unifies  and  which  while  the 
unifications  vary  immensely  in  their  intricate 
combinations  from  second  to  second,  yet  feels  and 
knows  itself  to  be  the  same  unity  unchanged  in 
self -consciousness  and  perfectly  well  aware  that 
it  was  by  its  determination  that  those  wonderful 
kaleidoscopic  changes  occurred. 

The  so-called  subconsciousness  therefore  of  our 
environment  and  the  memory  of  all  our  experi- 
ences seem  to  me  to  be  b]it  in  themselves  environ- 
ments, activities  which  but  serve  to  conserve  their 
product  in  turn  for  a  larger  and  more  compre- 
hensive consciousness  and  memory. 

It  would  be  a  mere  matter  of  opinion  on  my  part 
to  say  that  I  believed  the  individual  to  be  some- 
thing somewhat  larger  and  more  inclusive  than 
the  memory  and  consciousness  which  are  evi- 
dently not  the  ultimate  conserved  memory  or  the 
true  and  full  consciousness. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  we  imagine  a  separate 
body  for  the  soul,  or  indeed  a  separate  body  at 


128  MEMORY 

all,  if  we  find  ourselves  able  to  conceive  of  the 
continuity  of  etheric  substance  into  ponderable 
matter.  Body  then  is  perceived  to  be  cells,  many 
and  small,  cells  are  viewed  as  structures  of  mol- 
ecules, molecules  as  atomic  combinations,  atoms 
as  forms  of  motion,  vortices  in  ether,  and  at  no 
place  is  left  a  break  in  the  continuity  in  any  form 
of  ponderable  matter  back  to  the  substance  it- 
self. If  such  be  the  fact ,  and  there  are  many 
reasons  to  think  so,  and  many  scientists  who  be- 
lieve so,  then  we  shall  not  look  for  the  individual 
in  the  mere  functioning  of  his  contact  with  pon- 
derable matter,  but  trace  his  life  back  completely 
to  an  organic  force  in  ether. 

If  the  individual  then  extends,  as  he  would  if 
ether  is  continuous,  into  the  ether,  there  is  no 
reason  made  apparent  by  Science  why  the  chemi- 
cal activities  of  the  evolving  body  do  not  start 
there,  nor  why  the  chemical  activities  of  the 
organs  of  memory  and  consciousness  may  not 
report  there,  nor  why  there  may  not  be  the  true 
conservation  of  memory  and  the  real  conscious- 
ness. Complexity  and  organization  may  well  be 
a  condition  antecedent  as  well  as  a  result,  as  each 
would  be  but  an  activity  conditioned  by  its  en- 
vironment. 

The  natural  and  pertinent  questions  here  are 
whether  memory  can  be  conceived  as  continuing 
upon  the  loss  of  the  ponderable  body,  also  why 
we  do  not  have  memory  of  any  past  beyond  the 
body. 

Attempting  to  give  a  conceivably  truthful  re- 
ply to  the  last  question,  first  in  order;    I  suggest 


MEMORY  129 

that  even  the  science  of  biology  concedes  that  in 
a  very  large  sense  we  do  have  memory  of  past 
existence  for  as  we  have  seen  it  has  been  com- 
pelled to  conserve  those  memories  in  the  germ 
cell  in  order  to  account  for  heredity  and  provide  a 
substitute  for  preformation.  A  little  considera- 
tion of  the  law  of  specialization  and  generaliza- 
tion will  lead  us  to  conclude  that  it  is  possible 
that  in  the  fertilized  ovum  cell  the  individual  finds 
that  very  point  of  commencing  evolution  essential 
to  its  presentation  as  ponderable  matter  or  "con- 
densing ether."  It  is  possible  that  heredity  is  of 
the  cell  alone,  and  the  memories  additional  which 
present  their  products  in  the  forming  embryo, 
those  of  the  individual.  There  are  mysterious 
changes  enough  to  be  perceived  in  the  cell  as  it 
begins  its  work  of  division  and  synthesis  to  de- 
mand just  such  an  organic  activity  to  be  present. 
Does  this  suggest  too  forcibly  a  deus  ex 
machina,  an  entering  spirit?  Not  one  bit  more 
so  than  does  the  theory  of  biology.  When  the 
germ  cell  begins  to  become  many  and  divide  and 
redivide,  from  whence  comes  the  material  of  which 
the  products  are  composed?  From  outside  of 
course,  nobody  denies  that  external  environment 
is  absolutely  essential  to  enable  a  germ  cell  to 
become  an  animal;  its  substance  is  added  to  by 
growth,  and  growth  demands  molecules  and  atoms, 
and  molecules  and  atoms  are  the  presentations  of 
"condensed  ether,"  and  we  have  conceived  the 
individual  to  be  existence  in  the  ether  as  a  unity 
of  force.  Now  it  is  immaterial  whether  we  call 
this  chemical  affinity  or  the  activity  of  an  able 


130  MEMOEY 

unity,  we  know  that  the  results  are  life,  changing 
life,  form,  changing  form,  and  such  a  conception 
comes  nearer  to  accounting  for  the  epitomized 
evolutionary  proceeding  from  cell  to  embryo  than 
does  the  theory  of  unconscious  memories  which 
come  into  activity  by  platoons  only  when  one  has 
ceased  to  be  the  one  and  has  become  the  many. 

This  is  a  vastly  different  proposition  than  that 
of  the  creation  of  a  special  soul  which  enters  the 
body.  It  is  not  dualistic,  it  is  rather  polyistic 
and  certainly  as  Monistic  as  HaeckePs  "Collec- 
tive title  for  the  sum  total  of  cerebral  activities." 
It  is  the  column  of  units  and  the  process  of  addi- 
tion, rather  than  the  "sum  total." 

Now  as  to  the  second  question  which  is,  as  to 
whether  memory  can  be  conceived  as  continuing 
upon  the  loss  of  the  ponderable  body.  It  has  been 
said  that  the  etheric  body  is  impossible  because 
it  is  not  consonant  with  the  "laws  of  substance." 
That  may  be  so,  but  when  were  the  "laws  of  sub- 
stance" discovered,  and  by  whom?  Substance  it- 
self, our  reason  demands,  but  it  is  only  hypothet- 
ical, its  laws  only  guessed  at.  I  say  guessed  at 
because  the  practice  of  Science,  and  a  very  proper 
and  necessary  one,  is  to  formulate  a  theory  based 
upon  data  and  then  push  into  the  unknown  and 
relate  everything  in  the  way  of  phenomena  to 
that  theory.  The  theory  may  be  wrong,  it  fre- 
quently is  so ;  there  may  be  many  different  theo- 
ries, there  often  are ;  and  hence  the  "laws  of  sub- 
stance" are  laws  only  to  those  who  accept  that 
particular  theory  to  which  they  apply  them.  So- 
called  "laws"  have  more  than  once  been  repealed 


MEMOEY  131 

by  enactment  of  the  college  of  physicists.  I  fancy 
HaeckePs  conception  of  gravitation  is  somewhat 
different  from  that  of  Newton,  and  possibly  in  a 
short  time  the  "laws  of  substance"  may  be  differ- 
ently formnltaed  and  convey  a  vastly  different 
idea  than  does  HaeckePs  as  presented  in  "The 
Eiddle  of  the  Universe." 

But,  considering  that  the  ponderable  matter  of 
the  composite  body  only  represents  a  specialized 
phase  of  the  life  of  the  individual,  and  that  we  do 
not  rightfully  mark  his  boundaries  when  we  walk 
around  him  in  the  flesh,  we  may  well  conceive  that 
the  very  continuity  of  etheric  substance  affords 
us  a  sufficient  basis  for  a  belief  that  the  actual 
memory  is  no  more  finally  located  in  its  organs, 
the  cerebral  cells,  than  the  final  activity  of  the 
whirlwind  is  to  be  looked  for  in  the  atoms  of  dust 
which  spin  in  it,  and  take  form  from  it,  or  is  to 
be  located  even  in  the  air  in  which  they  float. 

Naturally,  as  we  contemplate  the  body  of  a  man 
five  or  six  feet  in  height  and  with  a  rotundity 
proportionate,  we  incline  to  imagine  that  any 
structure  in  ether  or  any  substance  which  shall 
be  commensurate  with  the  substantial  memories 
of  the  individual  must  be  comparatively  large 
and  proportionately  capacious. 

But  when  we  recall  the  fact  that  even  the  won- 
derful memories  of  the  germ  cell  must  be  looked 
for  in  bodies  much  smaller  than  the  cell  itself, 
indeed  in  such  as  are  beyond  our  microscopic  view, 
we  should  not  make  size  a  stumbling  block  to  the 
conception  of  a  unit  of  force,  an  individual  center 
capable  of  the  conservation  of  memory.    We  can- 


132  MEMORY 

not  place  a  limit  to  the  series  of  vanishing  ele- 
ments in  the  cell  (Wilson,  in  the  International 
Monthly,  July  1910) ;  and  the  capacity  of  any  por- 
tion to  reproduce  in  presentation  these  memories, 
if  the  cell  be  artificially  divided,  is  evidence  that 
the  forms  of  motion  as  I  have  said  before,  are  not 
of  the  mass  but  of  much  smaller  bodies  not  yet 
identified  by  Science. 

Possibly  we  shall  yet  reach  the  atom  as  the  in- 
dividual laden  with  memories.  The  atom,  what- 
ever it  is,  is  a  profound  mystery,  it  has  been  sup- 
posed to  consist  of  a  hard,  round  body;  to  be  a 
differentiation  of  hydrogen;  a  vortex  ring  or  a 
vortex  of  some  other  character;  possibly  an  elec- 
tron, etc.  It  has  assumed  so  many  protean  shapes 
in  the  scientific  imagination  that  probably  it  is 
individual  and  variable  as  to  size,  capacity  and 
potential  characteristics. 

Therefore,  if  memories  many  are  to  be  found 
at  the  commencement  of  the  physical  man  in  bod- 
ies so  small  as  to  be  beyond  our  possible  vision, 
I  see  no  reason  for  conceiving  of  memories  as 
confined  and  limited  in  fact  to  the  cells  of  the 
cerebrum,  but  on  the  contrary  as  reaching  back 
and  back  to  similar  elements  of  which  these  cells 
like  the  germ  cell,  are  composed.  Neither  do  I 
see  any  known  reason  why  they  may  not,  as  I 
have  suggested,  finally  even  be  landed  in  one. 

Again  it  may  be,  and  it  is  conceivable  that, 
the  activity  in  the  etheric  substance  may  in  turn 
rhythmically  subside  to  unconscious  memory  in 
the  lapse  of  time,  and  there  may  be  a  form  of 
energy  in  the  ether  comparable  to  that  wonderful 


MEMORY  133 

burdened  germ  cell,  in  which  shall  be  preserved 
the  potentiality  of  that  larger  memory,  the  es- 
sence of  individuality,  that  which  after  all  needs 
not  to  carry  the  petty  details  of  time's  experience 
any  more  than  we  now  find  it  essential  to  do  so  in 
order  to  preserve  onr  individuality. 

Knowledge  may  be  a  word  which  covers  them 
more  than  consciousness  and  memory.  And  this 
rhythmic  movement  may  proceed  from  eternity 
to  eternity  and  waking  and  sleeping,  conscious- 
ness and  unconsciousness,  memory  and  forgetful- 
ness  follow  in  order  just  as  they  do  now  with  us  in 
the  flesh.  Who  knows?  Do  I?  No,  neither  do 
those  who  measure  the  individual  by  his  organs. 


Chapter  VIII 


MONISM 

In  reading  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Universe,"  we  find 
reference  made  frequently  to  "pure  monism,"  and 
naturally  the  inference  drawn  from  the  use  of 
those  words  is  that  Monism  as  a  thesis  is  suscep- 
tible to  adulteration,  and  that  in  some  manner 
not  easily  discovered  in  Prof.  HaeckePs  work  he 
has  presented  it  in  its  unadulterated,  pristine 
purity.  Whether  this  is  so  or  not  depends  entirely 
upon  what  we  understand  as  Monism.  It  is  not 
at  all  an  unusual  occurence  for  an  advocate  of  a 
particular  theory  to  insist  that  his  presentation 
of  it  is  the  only  one  which  should  be  recognized, 
indeed  such  an  arrogation  constitutes  the  strength 
of  the  individuality  of  the  especial  thesis  for  which 
it  is  claimed.  Each  sect  of  Christendom  broadly 
asserts  its  creed  to  be  the  formulated  expression 
of  pure  Christianity,  if  it  did  not  it  would  have 
no  reason  for  existence  as  a  separate  body. 

Undoubtedly  the  Monism  presented  by  Prof. 
Haeckel  is  to  him  "pure  monism,"  but  others 
who  lay  claim  rightly  to  the  title  of  "monists" 
may  with  equal  propriety  assert  their  system  to 
be  "pure."  They  may  consider  that  Haeckel,  be- 
cause of  the  "organization  of  the  individual,"  the 
"momentary  condition  of  his  environment"  and 

134 


MONISM  135 

the  determinations  of  "heredity,"  has  burdened 
unalloyed  Monism  with  a  host  of  suppositions, 
assumptions,  and  unnecessary  conclusions.  It  is 
simply  a  question  of  opinion  again  and  by  no 
means  one  capable  of  absolute  solution  as  to  what 
is  "pure  monism." 

Personally,  I  have  for  a  long  time  considered 
myself  to  be  a  Monist,  not  a  "pure  monist,"  if  by 
that  we  are  to  understand  one  who  because  he  is 
a  Monist  must  of  necessity  accept  as  truth,  as 
scientific,  as  demonstrated,  and  as  Monism  what- 
ever other  Monists,  however  distinguished,  choose 
to  gather  under  their  wing. 

I  think  we  have  a  fair  idea  of  what  Monism  is 
by  contrasting  it  with  the  two  Isms  which  it  com- 
bats, viz :  materialism  and  spiritualism.  By  mate- 
rialism we  understand  a  hypothesis  which  claims 
that  material  changes  cause  mental  changes,  and 
by  spiritualism  just  the  contrary,  that  mental 
changes  are  the  causes  of  material  changes. 
Monism  does  not  recognize  either  as  the  cause 
of  the  other,  but  claims  that  physical  and  psy- 
chical phenomena,  although  seemingly  occupying 
the  relationship  of  cause  and  effect,  are  in  reality 
different  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  activity. 
So  far  we  have  a  clear  definition  of  what  Monism 
is,  and  if  there  is  any  such  thing  as  "pure 
monism,"  that  is  it.  Here  on  this  statement  all 
Monists  stand,  or  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon 
them  to  show  that  they  are  entitled  to  call  them- 
selves Monists.  The  moment,  however,  that  they 
step  one  foot  off  this  single  corner-stone  and  be- 
gin to  theorize  and  speculate  they  become,  if  any- 


136  MONISM 

thing,  less  "pure"  as  Monists.  Monism  is  not  a 
quart  pot  in  which  to  measure  the  universe,  it  is 
a  theory,  and  a  strong  one  indeed,  under  the  aegis 
of  which  one  may  build  many  speculative  uni- 
verses. There  is  nothing  so  all-commanding,  all- 
demanding,  so  overwhelmingly  rejective  about  it, 
that  a  man,  having  come  to  the  conclusion  that 
what  he  has  mistaken  for  dual  is  in  fact  single, 
should  perforce  of  his  adherence  to  that  thesis 
never  be  able  to  find  any  truth  which  does  not 
wear  the  label  of  Monism.  It  is  not  nearly  so  im- 
portant that  we  be  loyal  to  the  Monistic  theory 
as  that  we  find  truth. 

In  this  connection  I  cannot  refrain  from  again 
calling  attention  to  the  emphatic  statement  of 
Prof.  Haeckel  that  he  is  at  one  with  George  John 
Eomanes  except  in  unimportant  particulars,  be- 
cause it  will  enable  me  to  make  clear  the  fact  that 
Monists,  and  among  them  Haeckel  and  Eomanes, 
differ  widely  upon  very  important  particulars. 
At  the  risk  of  being  criticised  for  repetition,  I 
will  recall  to  your  minds  the  assertion  of  Schop- 
enhauer quoted  approvingly  by  Haeckel  that  the 
Monistic  philosophy  to  which  he  adheres  as  "pure 
monism"  has  given  the  "Lord  God  his  congeJ' 
He  undoubtedly  has  the  right  to  form  such  an 
opinion,  and  my  purpose  is  not  to  enter  into  a 
dispute  religious  as  to  the  existence  of  an  Infinite 
Being,  but  merely  to  show  that  as  with  Spinoza, 
he  materially  differed  on  this  question,  so  with  his 
co-Monist,  Eomanes,  he  has  nothing  in  common  on 
this  point. 

It  is  certainly  a  vitally  important  difference 


MONISM  137 

as  I  shall  try  to  demonstrate.  Nobody  will  deny 
that  there  is  a  broad  distinction  between  a 
"thinking  substance"  which,  as  such  as  a  whole 
is  mindless,  but  endowed  with  innate  properties 
of  movement,  etc.,  which  evolve  in  the  atoms 
will  and  sensitiveness,  and  ultimately  mind 
and  soul  in  the  complexities  of  the  cerebral  cells, 
— and,  a  "thinking  substance"  which  thinks  as 
much. 

One  is  HaeckePs,  the  other  Spinoza's  and 
George  John  Eomanes'.  I  have  quoted  at  large 
from  Spinoza  on  the  point  in  a  preceding  chapter, 
but  I  wish  here  to  remark  upon  the  wide  gulf  be- 
tween Haeckel  and  Eomanes. 

In  "Mind,  Motion  and  Monism,"  Romanes  in  re- 
ferring to  the  views  of  Prof.  Clifford,  which  I  may 
suggest  are  similar  on  this  subject  to  those  of 
Haeckel,  says :  "Assuming  the  theory  of  Monism, 
I  desire  to  ascertain  the  result  to  which  it  will 
lead  when  applied  to  the  question  whether  we 
ought  to  regard  the  external  world  as  of  a  char- 
acter mental  or  non-mental.  As  observed  in  my 
Rede  lecture,  this  question  has  already  been  con- 
sidered by  the  late  Prof.  Clifford,  who  decided 
on  the  Monistic  theory  the  probability  pointed  to- 
wards the  external  world  being  of  a  character  non- 
mental  ;  that,  although  the  whole  universe  is  com- 
posed of  'mind  stuff'  the  universe  as  a  whole  is 
mindless.  This  decision  I  then  briefly  criticised, 
it  is  now  my  object  to  contemplate  the  matter 
somewhat  more  in  detail."  His  concluding  words 
upon  the  matter  are  these:  "As  a  matter  of 
methodical    reasoning,    it    appears    to    me    that 


138  MONISM 

Monism  alone  can  only  lead  to  Agnosticism."  (In 
a  note,  he  says:  "It  may  be  explained  that  by 
Agnosticism  I  understand  a  theory  of  things 
which  abstains  from  either  affirming  or  denying 
the  existence  of  God.")  "That  is  to  say,  it  leaves 
a  clear  field  of  choice  as  between  Theism  and 
Atheism;  and  therefore  to  a  carefully  reasoning 
Monist,  there  are  three  alternatives  open.  He 
may  remain  a  Monist  and  nothing  more ;  in  which 
case  he  is  an  Agnostic.  He  may  entertain  what 
appears  to  him  independent  evidence  in  favor  of 
Theism,  and  thus  he  may  become  a  Theist ;  or  he 
may  entertain  what  appears  to  him  independent 
evidence  in  favor  of  Atheism,  and  thus  he  be- 
comes an  Atheist." 

A  similar  view  seems  to  be  taken  by  Spencer  in 
his  last  edition  of  "First  Principles,"  and  pos- 
sibly it  may  be  suggested  of  that  gigantic  philo- 
sophic intellect,  as  it  has  concerning  Virchow  and 
others,  that  his  views  have  been  modified  by  ap- 
proaching age.  Of  course,  any  close  student  of 
Spencer  will  at  once  resent  any  such  suggestion, 
being  well  aware  that  the  great  generalizer  never 
took  any  other  position,  but  has  merely,  out  of  an 
abundance  of  caution,  declared  his  views  in  rather 
plainer  terms,  and  this  is  what  he  says :  "But  an 
account  of  the  transformation  of  things  ...  is 
simply  an  orderly  presentation  of  facts;  and  the 
interpretation  of  the  facts  is  nothing  more  than 
a  statement  of  the  ultimate  uniformities  as  they 
present  the  laws  to  which  they  conform.  Is  the 
reader  an  Atheist!  The  exposition  of  these  facts 
will  neither  yield  support  to  his  belief  nor  destroy 


ERGiTY 

MONISM  139 

it.  Is  he  a  Pantheist!  The  phenomena  and  the 
inferences  as  now  to  be  set  forth  will  not  force 
on  him  any  incongruous  implication.  Does  he 
think  that  God  is  immanent  throughout  all  things, 
from  concentrating  nebulae  to  the  thoughts  of 
poets  ?  Then  the  theory  to  be  put  before  him  con- 
tains no  disproof  of  that  view.  Does  he  believe 
in  a  Deity  who  has  given  unchanging  laws  to  the 
universe  1  Then  he  will  find  nothing  at  variance 
with  his  belief  in  an  exposition  of  those  laws  and 
an  account  of  the  results." 

Mr.  Spencer  dissents  from  Haeckel  and  the 
school  of  Monists  to  which  he  belongs  in  that  he 
claims  that  evolution  does  not  require  any  aban- 
donment of  Theism. 

In  precisely  the  same  arbitrary  manner  as 
Haeckel  disposes  of  the  soul  of  man  by  the  decla- 
ration that  it  is  "a  collective  title  for  the  sum 
total"  of  the  activities  of  the  cerebral  cells,  he, 
Haeckel,  gets  rid  of  the  idea  of  God,  with  the 
exception  that  he  fails  to  be  true  to  his  own  logic. 
In  other  words,  he  admits  that  the  "51/m  totaV^ 
in  man  yields  something  aJcin  to  soul,  hut  fails  to 
find  the  same  to  he  true  as  to  the  sum  total  of 
universal  activities. 

Whatever  we  define  the  soul  to  be,  it  neverthe- 
less remains  true  that  it  feels,  thinks,  acts,  and 
is  conscious,  and  this  is  evident  even  though  we 
should  admit  that  it  is  a  "collective  title,"  etc. 
Yet  Haeckel  scornfully  denies  the  possibility  that 
there  may  be  a  Being  whose  name  is  "a  collective 
title  for  the  sum  total"  of  the  activities  of  the 
universe,  whose  "modes  of  thought  may  be  differ- 


140  MONISM 

entiations  attending  the  eternal  modifications  of 
substance."  It  is  just  here  that  Spinoza  in  his 
Pantheism  differs  widely  from  Haeckel.  Haeckel 
finds  a  substantial  agreement  between  Atheism 
and  Pantheism,  although  it  is  fair  to  state  that 
he  limits  his  definition  of  God  to  a  personal  extra- 
mundane  entity.  His  use,  however,  of  these 
words  which  follow  leaves  no  doubt  as  to  his 
attitude  on  the  question:  "This  'Godless  world 
system'  substantially  agrees  with  the  Monism  or 
Pantheism  of  the  Modern  scientist ;  it  is  only  an- 
other expression  for  it,  emphasizing  its  negative 
aspect,  the  non-existence  of  any  supernatural 
Deity. ^^  No  doubt,  if  his  destructive  attack  had 
been  confined  to  an  "extra-mundane,  supernatural 
deity,"  it  would  have  found  ample  support  in  the 
light  of  true  Monism,  but  it  is  clear  that  from 
his  whole  discussion  of  "  God  and  the  World,"  the 
"Moral  Order,"  etc.,  that  his  Monistic  idea  is,  be- 
yond question.  Atheistic  and  a  denial  of  any  mind 
or  being  "In  whom  we  live  and  move  and  have 
our  being."  I  repeat,  Haeckel's  thinking  infinite 
substance  does  not  think,  as  such. 

The  Pantheism  of  Spinoza,  which  Haeckel  im- 
agines finds  a  scientific  reflection  in  the  "Eiddle 
of  the  Universe,"  was  quite  a  different  conception, 
or  else  Spinoza  was  guilty  of  disguised  and  covert 
arguments,  and  this  he  expressly  denies  in  Letter 
XLIX  to  Isaac  Orobio,  as  follows: 

"Thus,  you  see,  my  friend,  how  far  this  man 
has  strayed  from  the  truth ;  nevertheless,  I  grant 
that  he  has  inflicted  the  greatest  injury  not  on  me, 
but  on  himself,   inasmuch  as   he  has  not  been 


MONISM  141 

ashamed  to  declare  that,   'under  disguised  and 
covert  arguments,  I  teach  Atheism,'' " 

Even  Spinoza  did  not  see  absurdity  in  consid- 
ering the  Universe  as  one  individual  physically, 
for  in  Part  II  of  the  "Ethics,"  he  says :  "We  thus 
see  how  a  composite  individual  may  be  affected 
in  many  different  ways,  and  preserve  its  nature 
notwithstanding.  Thus,  we  have  conceived  an 
individual  as  composed  of  bodies  only  distin- 
guished one  from  the  other  in  respect  to  motion 
and  rest,  speed  and  slowness,  that  is,  of  bodies  of 
the  most  simple  character.  If,  however,  we  now 
conceive  another  individual  composed  of  several 
individuals  of  diverse  natures,  we  shall  find  that 
the  number  of  ways  in  which  it  can  be  affected, 
without  losing  its  nature,  will  be  greatly  multi- 
plied. Each  of  its  parts  would  consist  of  several 
bodies,  and,  therefore  (by  Lemma  VI),  each  part 
would  admit,  without  change  of  its  nature,  of 
quicker  or  slower  motion,  and  would  consequently 
be  able  to  transmit  its  motions  more  quickly  or 
more  slowly  to  the  remaining  parts.  If  we  fur- 
ther conceive  a  third  kind  of  individuals  com- 
posed of  individuals  of  this  second  kind,  we  shall 
find  that  they  may  be  affected  in  a  still  greater 
number  of  ways  without  changing  their  actuality. 
We  may  proceed  thus  to  infinity,  and  conceive 
the  whole  of  nature  as  one  individual,  whose 
parts,  that  is,  all  bodies,  vary  in  infinite  ways, 
without  any  change  in  the  individual  as  a  whole." 
We  shall  find  room  for  the  rational  application  of 
the  law  of  relationship,  and  the  theory  of  the  liv- 
ing environment,  inasmuch  as  his  definition  of  an 


142  MONISM 

individual  is  found  in  these  woi^ds :  "That  which 
constitutes  the  actuality  of  an  individual  consists 
in  a  union  of  bodies;  but  this  union,  although 
there  is  a  continual  change  of  bodies,  will  be 
maintained;  the  individual,  therefore,  will  retain 
its  nature  as  before,  both  in  respect  of  substance 
and  in  respect  of  modeJ^ 

Neither  did  Eomanes,  in  "Mind,  Motion  and 
Monism,"  consider  it  beneath  his  Monistic  dig- 
nity to  contemplate  the  possibility  of  such  a  con- 
ception being  true,  for  we  find  him  indulging  in 
such  language  as  this:  "For  aught  that  we  can 
know  to  the  contrary,  not  merely  the  highly  spe- 
cialized structure  of  the  human  brain,  but  even 
that  of  nervous  matter  in  general  may  only  be 
one  of  the  thousand  possible  ways  in  which  the 
material  and  dynamical  conditions  required  for 
the  apparition  of  self-consciousness  can  be  se- 
cured. To  imagine  that  the  human  brain  of  neces- 
sity exhausts  these  possibilities  is  in  the  last  de- 
gree absurd.  ...  It  may  well  be  that  elsewhere 
(or  apart  from  the  conditions  imposed  by  nervous 
tissue)  subjectivity  is  possible,  irrespective  both 
of  circumscription  and  of  complexity.  .  .  .  Now, 
if  we  fix  our  attention  merely  on  this  matter  of 
complexity,  and  refuse  to  be  led  astray  by  obvi- 
ously false  analogies  of  a  more  special  kind,  I 
think  there  can  be  no  question  that  the  macro- 
cosm does  furnish  amply  sufficient  opportunity,  as 
it  were,  for  the  presence  of  subjectivity,  even  if  it 
be  assumed  that  subjectivity  can  only  be  yielded 
by  an  order  of  complexity  analogous  to  that  of  a 
nervous  system.     For,  considering  the  material 


MONISM  143 

and  dynamical  system  of  the  universe  as  a  whole, 
it  is  obvious  that  the  complexity  presented  is 
greater  than  that  of  any  of  its  parts.  .  .  . 

"If  we  imagine  the  visible  sidereal  system  com- 
pressed within  the  limits  of  the  human  skull,  so 
that  all  its  movements  which  we  now  recognize 
as  molar  should  become  molecular,  the  complexity 
of  such  movement  would  probably  be  as  great  as 
that  which  takes  place  in  a  human  brain.  Yet  to 
this  must  be  added  all  the  molecular  movements 
which  are  now  going  on  in  the  sidereal  system, 
visible  and  invisible."  He  might  well  have  added 
the  statement  that  such  a  compressed  sidereal 
system  would  of  necessity  also  include  all  of  these 
very  human  brains,  with  all  their  complexities. 

Nobody  admitted  more  frankly  than  Professor 
Eomanes  the  impossibility  of  forming  a  compre- 
hensive conception  of  a  universal  mind,  not,  how- 
ever, because  it  did  not  and  could  not  exist,  but 
because  of  its  very  transcendency.  He  refused  to 
admit  the  force  of  Professor  Clifford's  argument, 
negativing  the  existence  of  mind  in  any  other 
form  than  that  which  we  find  in  brain,  and  found 
no  sufficient  reason  for  ruling  a  Universal  Being 
out  of  the  Monistic  system.  He  was  an  Agnostic ; 
Spinoza,  a  Pantheist ;  Haeckel  is  an  Atheist. 

Thus,  we  find  that  Monism  has  really  but  one 
common  theory  upon  which  all  Monists  agree, 
and  that  is  that  mental  and  physical  phenomena 
are  but  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  thing,  neither 
being  the  cause  of  the  other.  It  by  no  means  fol- 
lows that,  because  we,  being  possessed  of  brains, 
have   associated   with   them   the   phenomena   of 


144  MONISM 

thought,  there  is  no  other  association  of  thought 
and  organized  substance.  All  that  Monism  can 
demand  as  essential  to  consistency  with  its  thesis 
is  that  we  shall  not  designate  either  thought  or 
matter  as  cause  wherever  the  phenomena  appear 
simultaneously  and  associated.  If  we  are  loyal 
to  this  fundamental  rule  of  Monism,  then  the. 
whole  question  of  mental  existence  after  the  death 
of  the  composite  body  will  depend  upon  the  pos- 
sibility, or  otherwise,  of  any  structural  properties 
in  matter  or  substance  more  attenuated  than  that 
of  the  cells  of  the  cerebrum,  and  considering  our 
profound  ignorance  at  present  on  that  subject, 
we  are  at  liberty  to  exercise  either  our  religious 
or  scientific  faith  without  being  justly  charged 
with  an  abandonment  of  the  Monistic  theory.  It 
may  well  be  that,  instead  of  consciousness  and 
thought  fading  into  mere  dessicated  sentience 
with  th^e  shading  of  ponderable  matter  into  in- 
visible substance,  we  shall  rather  find  that,  with 
this  process  on  the  part  of  matter,  mind  becomes 
more  and  more  emphasized  and  gifted  with  a 
much  wider  range  of  knowledge. 

Eational  scientists  may  take  either  view  of  that 
matter  and  await  further  evidences,  if  any  be 
forthcoming,  and  it  is  precisely  at  this  point  that 
Haeckel,  standing  upon  the  fundamental  rule  of 
Monism  with  Spinoza  and  Eomanes,  finds  reason 
to  face  West  while  they  face  East.  Which  way 
you  and  I  shall  look,  will  depend  largely  upon  our 
experience,  our  data,  our  independence,  and  our 
desires. 


Chapter  IX 


THE  WILL 

From  whatever  standpoint  we  begin  the  analy- 
sis of  ourselves,  we  find  one  thing  which  appears 
to  stand  out  as  the  present  cause  of  all  our  activi- 
ties, namely,  the  will. 

We  seem  to  be  fully  aware  that  it  is  by  our  voli- 
tion we  live,  for  conversely,  somehow,  we  are  un- 
able to  escape  the  conclusion  that  it  would  but 
require  an  effort  on  the  part  of  will  to  cease  from 
activity  and  stop  living.  We  feel  moving  behind 
the  shifting  scenes  of  our  daily  lives  all  the  time 
this  shadow,  desire  or  will. 

Nothing  appears  able  to  restrain  or  control  it 
save  such  interferences  as  come  from  the  limita- 
tions of  our  physical  environment,  and  even  those, 
while  they  frequently  build  impossible  barriers 
between  will  and  physical  activity,  seem  to  seduce 
the  desire  into  a  wilderness  of  longings  which 
transcend  the  possibilities  of  our  bodily  achieve- 
ment. 

It  is  the  one  thing  which  within  ourselves  ac- 
knowledges no  king,  no  ruler  and  no  limitations 
in  its  exercise  as  itself.  It  has  an  absolutely  un- 
qualified freedom  as  its  in]ierent  quality.  What- 
ever the  limitations  and  conditions  may  be  which 
on  the  part  of  the  external  world  serve  to  prevent 

145 


146  THE   WILL 

it  from  untrammelled  activity  objectively,  they  do 
not  and  cannot  in  the  least  prevent  it  from  creat- 
ing its  own  environment  of  subjectivity,  from  de- 
siring that  which  it  will,  and  from  even  out  of 
these  desires  building  its  own  subjective  universe. 
The  will  and  the  imagination  are  the  shoulders  of 
the  Atlas  who  holds  the  true  life  poised  as  the 
individual. 

I  have  called  attention  in  another  place  to  the 
emphatic  statement  of  Eomanes  in  "Mind,  Motion 
and  Monism"  that  in  his  opinion,  one  for  which  he 
gives  logical  reasons,  "The  will  itself  is  here  the 
ultimate  agent,  and  therefore  an  agent,  which 
must  be  identified  with  the  principle  of  causality." 

Turning  now  to  Haeckel,  we  find  that  in  the 
first  place  he  imbues  the  atoms  with  will  and  sen- 
sitiveness ;  will  and  sensitiveness,  however,  which 
is  very  slight,  merely  a  suggestion  of  them,  if  I 
understand  his  position.  From  these  atoms  by 
the  process  of  evolution  comes  the  individual  as  a 
product,  his  will  of  necessity  then  a  composite 
will,  its  action  synthetic;  if  such  a  thing  be  pos- 
sible, a  sum  of  wills,  which  as  a  total  produces  the 
individual  will.  Such  a  will  is,  of  course,  not  free, 
freedom  is  impossible,  it  must  of  necessity  be  ab- 
solutely the  servant  of  its  masters,  the  atomic 
wills. 

Viewing  the  human  body  from  a  psychological 
standpoint,  I  confess  myself  unable  to  find  any 
possibility  of  the  establishment  of  any  individual 
will  in  such  a  manner. 

The  physical  system  is  one  composed  of  innum- 
erable cells,  the  brain  itself,  the  seat  of  physical 


THE   WILL  147 

activities,  is  a  vast  multitude  of  them.  They  in 
turn  are  made  up  of  an  uncountable  number  of 
molecules  and  atoms.  The  atoms  as  such  are  as 
definite  and  individual  in  structure  in  the  central 
system  as  they  ever  were  when  out  of  it.  They 
have  been  drawn  into  the  dance  of  atoms  and  un- 
doubtedly must  have  retained  their  wills,  so  that 
we  have  a  composite  of  an  enormous  number  of 
independent  wills  in  the  human  body. 

We  are  certainly  conscious  that  a  dominant  in- 
dividual will  is  the  coordinating  power  behind  the 
wills  of  particular  ganglionic  cells,  and  the  com- 
mander of  the  multitude  of  wills  in  the  living  en- 
vironment. We  know  it  because  we  are  able  to 
move  the  output  of  these  wills  in  a  given  direction, 
say  of  the  attainment  of  some  ideal.  Ideals  as  such 
are  always  beyond  our  experience  and  we  could 
have  none  if  it  were  not  for  desire,  one  desire,  one 
which  will  even  sacrifice  the  contending  wills  for 
it.  Indeed  any  conception  of  a  condition  of  har- 
mony sufficient  to  hold  together  the  vast  concourse 
of  units  of  will  in  the  human  body,  is  impossi- 
ble, without  the  assumption  of  an  individual  will, 
again  the  unity,  the  unifier,  the  unit  of  force. 
The  very  assertions  of  Haeckel  that  will  is  a 
"universal  property  of  living  psychoplasm"  and 
that  the  atoms  are  gifted  with  will  and  feeling, 
demand  that  before  we  can  reconcile  the  knowl- 
edge which  we  have  of  the  physical  and  mental 
man,  with  them,  that  there  should  be  one  force, 
one  will  which  holds  them  in  union  as  one  appar- 
ent body  with  one  activity  of  units.  It  is  this 
which  is  the  will  of  which  we  are  conscious. 


148  THE   WILL 

I  cannot  refrain  from  referring  to  the  fact  that 
Professor  Eomanes  is  again  at  this  point  dia- 
metrically opposed  to  Professor  Haeckel  in  that 
he  emphatically  declares  the  will  to  be  free.  Free 
as  such,  and  only  limited  in  its  ability  to  act.  In- 
dividual wills,  he  tells  us,  are  not  conditioned  by 
the  Universal  or  God  will,  but  that  the  Universal 
Will  acquiesces  in  their  volitions,  also  that  indi- 
vidual wills  may  influence  other  individual  wills 
by  reason  of  the  fact  that  they  are  separate  and 
apart  from  each  other.  He  asserts  unequivocally 
the  absolute  freedom  of  will.  Now,  this  subject 
of  the  freedom  of  will  is  not  an  "unimportant 
matter,"  for  Haeckel  himself  states  that  "the  im- 
portance of  the  question  is  also  seen  in  the  fact 
that  Kant  put  it  in  the  same  category  vith  the 
questions  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  be- 
lief in  God." 

Indeed  it  seems  apparent  that  the  philosophi- 
cal and  ethical  conclusions  reached  by  these  two 
great  Zoologists  scarcely  touch  at  that  point. 

It  seems  to  me  that  Haeckel  confuses  the  desires 
with  the  activities  of  the  will.  While  I  may  de- 
sire to  fly,  my  physical  limitations  prevent  me.  I 
may  will  to  spread  my  wings  and  nothing  can  pre- 
vent me  from  so  willing,  but  I  am  not  able  to  fly. 
I  can  certainly  will  to  hail  the  man  in  the  moon, 
but  I  shall  never  make  my  voice  reach  him.  The 
will  qua  will,  says  Eomanes,  is  free.  It  is  just 
here  that  Haeckel,  it  appears  to  me,  makes  the 
mistake  of  considering  the  hindrances  to  action, 
to  be  hindrances  to  the  will. 

There  is  a  strange  and  to  me  striking  incon- 


THE   WILL  149 

sistency  in  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Universe"  in  that 
Professor  Haeckel  assures  ns  that  "Each  act  of 
the  will  is  fatally  determined  by  the  organization 
of  the  individual  and  is  dependent  upon  the 
momentary  condition  of  his  environment  as 
every  other  psychic  activity.  The  character  of  the 
inclination  was  determined  long  ago  by  heredity 
from  parents  and  ancestors.  The  determination 
to  each  particular  act  is  an  instance  of  adaptation 
to  the  circumstances  of  the  moment  wherein  the 
strongest  motive  prevails,  according  to  the  laws 
which  govern  the  statics  of  motion." 

Now  I  cannot  understand  why  Professor 
Haeckel  should  take  the  pains  to  write  a  great 
many  pages  in  which  he  strives  to  promote  the 
Ethics  and  Eeligion  of  Monism.  What  is  the  use 
of  telling  us  that  the  Golden  Eule,  as  given  by 
Aristotle:  "We  must  act  towards  others  as  we 
wish  others  to  act  towards  us,"  is  in  complete 
harmony  with  Monistic  Ethics!  Having,  in  the 
language  which  I  quoted,  negatived  the  freedom 
of  will,  we  cannot  help  ourselves  as  to  how  we 
shall  act  toward  others,  nor  can  we  control  our 
desire  as  to  how  others  should  act  toward  us. 

The  Golden  Eule  must  take  care  of  itself,  for 
we  shall  act  just  as  our  "inclinations"  are  deter- 
mined by  heredity,  and  we  shall  wish  just  as  the 
"strongest  motive"  directs. 

There  can  be  no  religion  in  such  a  view,  for 
whether  we  feel  "astonishment"  when  we  gaze 
at  the  heavens  or  not,  whether  we  shall  feel  "awe" 
when  we  trace  the  "marvellous  workings  of  ener- 
gy in  the  motion  of  matter,"  or  not,  will  depend 


150  THE   WILL 

absolutely  upon  whether  we  are,  in  our  particu- 
lar individual  machines,  producing  these  commod- 
ities of  astonishment  and  awe.  Furthermore,  the 
very  religion  which  he  assails,  the  superstitions, 
the  cruelties  and  wars  which  he  decries,  the  rev- 
elations which  he  ridicules,  are  all  as  much  en- 
titled to  their  place  among  the  determined  actions 
and  inclinations  of  human  beings  as  anything 
which  he  can  mention. 

It  may  even  follow  that  although  the  inherent 
inclinations  of  Professor  Haeckel  may  have  made 
it  his  fate  to  write  and  urge  this  so-called  Monis- 
tic Keligion  and  Ethics,  it  will  be  the  fate  of 
others  to  reject  them.  It  may  well  be  that  all  the 
various  religions  and  ethical  views  of  the  world 
and  the  antagonizing  philosophies  and  sciences 
are  necessary  and  inevitable,  and  life  and  effort 
therefore  reduced  to  absurdity  because  fate  plays 
such  pranks  with  its  very  self  that  persuasiveness 
and  effort  are  its  most  ridiculous  expressions. 

To  what  line  of  heredity,  to  what  moment  of 
circumstances  shall  we  look  for  the  truth!  In 
the  light  of  such  a  philosphy,  what  is  truth? 


Chapter  X 


THE  ETEENITY  OF  INDIVIDUALITY 

In  a  former  chapter  I  have  adopted  the  word 
"relationship"  as  being  the  most  felicitous  ex- 
pression of  the  meaning  of  individuality,  and  I 
have  again  spoken  of  the  individual  as  a  unit 
of  force,  a  unity  and  a  form  of  motion.  This  is 
the  result  of  a  habit  of  always  considering  every- 
thing as  having  polarity  and  more  than  one 
aspect.  The  Monistic  idea  is  that  what  ordinarily 
appears  to  be  two  separate  things,  the  opera- 
tion of  mind  and  the  functioning  of  brain  sub- 
stance, is  really  but  one  thing  with  parallel  activ- 
ities in  both  aspects. 

If  we  disabuse  our  minds  of  the  idea  that  all 
things  had  a  beginning  at  the  same  time,  and 
rather  conceive  of  Eternity  as  an  everlasting 
Now,  we  shall  perhaps  perceive  that  it  is  possible 
that  subjectivity  and  objectivity  are  ever  in  ex- 
istence and  that  to  limit  their  parallel  phenomena 
is  unnecessary  and  responsive  to  no  imperative 
demand  of  Science. 

I  have  stated  that  all  I  know  of  mind  or  con- 
sciousness is  gathered  from  within  myself.  I 
cannot  possibly  have  or  analyze  the  consciousness 
of  another ;  objectivities  we  may  have  in  common, 

151 


152  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

but  as  I  retire  toward  myself,  I  of  course  of 
necessity  draw  the  curtains  between  myself  and 
others.  Hence,  when  I  may  happen  to  apply  the 
words  "relationship,"  "unit  of  force,"  "a  unity," 
"form  of  motion,"  to  something  other  than  my- 
self, I  must  ask  to  be  excused  from  asserting 
whether  they  are  conscious  or  not.  It  would  be 
presumptuous  to  say  that  they  are  not,  and  yet  I 
should  be  unable  to  prove  that  they  are.  From  the 
position  of  the  living  environment  which  I  have 
postulated  my  own  belief  is  that  we  should  hesi- 
tate at  fixing  boundaries  to  sentience  and 
consciousness. 

That  physically  it  is  comparatively  easy  to  con- 
struct a  working  synthesis  we  have  already  seen, 
and  even  concerning  that  unsolved  problem  of 
memory  I  think  that  the  physical  operation  of  it 
may  be  tentatively  accounted  for.  Not  that  I  am 
able  to  say  that  it  is  so,  but  that  for  aught  I  know 
it  is  scientifically  possible  for  it  to  be  something 
like  what  I  shall  try  to  describe.  The  scheme, 
however,  as  we  shall  see,  will  fail  to  account  for 
the  sense  of  pastness  felt  in  the  present,  which  is 
an  unsurmountable  barrier  to  any  satisfactory 
materialistic  solution  of  the  mystery  of  memory. 

It  has  been  estimated  that  in  the  cortex  of  the 
cerebrum  alone  there  are  over  1,600,000,000  cells. 
These  are  presumably  less  and  less  specialized  as 
we  approach  the  periphery  and  more  and  more 
limited  and  specialized  as  we  sink  deeper  into  the 
mass.  As  there  is  an  environment  about  and  out- 
side of  us  which  incessantly  bombards  us  through 
our  senses  with  unnumbered  impulses,  so  there 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  153 

may  be  said  to  be  a  constructed  environment 
within  US  to  be  filled  out  with  the  product  of  these 
sensations.  Not  all  these  which  assail  us  are  the 
subjects  of  conscious  attention,  though  a  vast 
number  make  their  impression  notwithstanding. 
There  are  sixty  seconds  in  a  minute,  thirty-six 
hundred  in  an  hour,  and  approximately  fourteen 
hours  in  the  day  during  which  we  may  be  said  to 
receive  an  average  of  such  sensations  as  are  re- 
ceived and  retained  within  the  field  of  memory. 
There  are  three  hundred  and  sixty-five  days  in  a 
year,  and  a  man  may  be  fairly  considered  to  carry 
the  capacity  for  receiving  the  average  of  sensa- 
tions for  about  sixty  years.  If  every  second  of 
such  time  a  new  and  distinct  sensation  were  to  be 
experienced  it  is  easy  to  perceive  that  there  is  an 
ample  number  of  cells  to  allow  to  each  a  record 
of  the  experience,  for  we  should  then  receive  but 
about  1,103,760,000  such  distinct  sensations.  If 
the  distinction  between  the  results  is  a  distinctive 
form  of  motion  among  the  molecules  of  the  cell 
thereby  causing  a  change  which  is  fixed  and  there- 
after characteristic,  then  we  shall  have  an  envi- 
ronment within  from  which  to  draw  at  will  in  a 
manner  similar  to  that  in  which  we  first  received 
them  at  will,  or  as  is  ordinarily  the  case,  against 
our  will. 

Such  a  cell  so  changed  and  modified  as  to  its 
form  of  motion  would  when  stimulated  to  a  dis- 
charge of  energy  send  forth  along  the  nerve  track 
just  that  form  of  energy  which  it  was  modified  by, 
and  no  other.  It  needs  only  the  comparatively 
undifferentiated,    unequilibrated   cells   which  lie 


154  THE  ETEBNITY  OF  INDIVIDUALITY 

near  the  periphery  of  the  cortex,  to  be  what  they 
apparently  are,  the  receivers,  analyzers,  sifters, 
synthesizers  and  impermanent  reflexes  of  such 
sensation  from  within  or  without,  to  partially  ac- 
count for  the  phenomena  of  memory  from  the 
physical  view  of  it;  and  I  do  not  see  why  it  is 
not  fully  as  rational  as  the  theory  of  phospho- 
rescent gleams  by  Luys  and  far  more  within  the 
bounds  of  scientific  probability. 

All  this  however  goes,  even  if  it  be  reasonable, 
but  a  little  way  toward  explaining  memory.  It 
utterly  fails  as  do  all  such  schematic  explanations, 
to  account  for  the  sense  of  pastness.  It  provides 
and  can  provide  no  place  for  consciousness  or  per- 
ception, and  leaves  the  questions  of  value  and 
quality  of  ideas  unanswered.  And  it  is  this  sense 
of  pastness  that  lends  the  element  of  conscious 
continuity  to  the  individual.  Whatever  the  phys- 
ical character  of  the  memory,  these  thoughts  and 
collections  of  the  past  come  forth  from  their  clois- 
ters hoary  with  age,  and  with  a  mustiness  and 
pathos  which  belong  only  to  that  which  is  past. 
What  physical  explanation  can  be  given  for  the 
presence  of  this  quality  of  pastness,  indeed  what 
physical  explanation  may  be  given  for  any  quality 
of  thought  or  recollection,  from  the  materialistic 
position? 

This  storehouse  of  experienced  sensations  is 
the  universe  reflected  within  as  we  have  seen  it, 
felt,  heard,  understood  and  lived  it,  and  from  it 
and  within  it  we  construct  other  lives  for  ourselves 
and  fill  them  out  with  combinations  of  reflected 
sensations. 


THE   ETEKNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  155 

I  have  prefaced  what  I  wish  to  say  upon  the 
subject  which  heads  this  chapter  with  this  specu- 
lation, merely  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  asser- 
tion that  there  is  ample  reason  to  consider  the 
physical  counterpart  of  all  thoughts  and  memories 
to  be  the  set  figures  produced  in  specific  forms  of 
motion,  or  rather  the  capacity  of  such  forms  of 
motion  to  produce  set  figures.  I  think  there  can 
be  no  quarrel  over  the  statement  upon  the  part  of 
the  biologists,  for  without  some  such  assumption 
biology  will  be  at  a  loss  to  account  in  any  manner 
for  heredity.  While  it  must  be  apparent  that  from 
the  theory  of  the  living  environment  which  I  have 
tried  to  present,  heredity  is  only  to  be  considered 
as  finding  its  place  in  the  composite  of  that  en- 
vironment and  not  in  the  individual ;  yet,  unless 
we  are  to  stand  squarely  upon  the  preformation 
theory,  we  must  look  for  the  bearers  of  heredity 
among  the  elements  of  the  germ  cell  and  find  its 
potentiality  in  the  modification  of  forms  of  mole- 
cular motion.  Such  a  form  of  motion  is  however 
a  synthesis,  is  itself  a  living  environment,  a  unity, 
and  all  attempts  to  find  within  its  expression  a 
unit  of  life  have  failed  in  demonstrating  anything 
except  as  I  have  said  before,  that  any  portion  of 
it  has  life  of  more  or  less  duration  according  as  it 
has  or  has  not  the  union  of  protoplasm  and  nu- 
cleus. To  the  vast  possibilities  within  its  com- 
plexity, nobody,  but  one  who  is  determined  to  ar- 
bitrarily treat  it  as  the  unit  of  life,  will  close  his 
eyes. 

To  make  my  meaning  clearer  I  should  write  up- 
on the  living  universe:    '^ Individuals  within  in- 


156  THE   ETEENITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

dividuals,  ever  the  one  in  relation  to  the  many, 
from  the  Infinite  one  to  the  cell  which  we  study, 
and  beyond," 

That  the  multiplex  individualities  within  any- 
one may  be  separated  and  become  in  turn  the 
dominant  force  of  a  unity  is  evidenced  in  a  great 
variety  of  forms  among  the  invertebrates,  and 
this  is  almost  universally  true  where  the  units 
of  the  congeries  are  but  slightly  specialized.  That 
composite  forms  appear  simultaneously  with  the 
evidences  of  individuality  is  not  proof  that  the 
individual  is  the  result  of  the  organization  and 
unification.  The  unification  will  not  be  there  ex- 
cept the  individual  is  likewise. 

The  mere  fact  that  the  higher  powers  of  the 
microscope  can  get  no  separated  individuality  be- 
yond the  minute  cell  does  not  any  longer  cause  my 
mind  anxiety,  for  the  reason  that  I  have  been  able 
to  perceive  enough  under  such  lenses  as  I  can 
command  to  teach  me  the  lesson  that  size  is 
nothing,  it  is  a  word  of  comparison,  it  is  but  the 
measure  again  of  our  capacity  of  seeing.  The 
natural  incapacity  of  the  eye  to  perceive  largeness 
in  smallness  is  a  condition  akin  to  that  existing, 
when  looking  at  an  object  at  a  distance.  Distance 
is  a  barrier  to  sight,  and  our  inability  to  overcome 
it  except  artificially,  is  an  incapacity.  It  is  be- 
cause of  this  attitude  of  my  mind  that  with  the 
stakes  which  actual  Science  has  driven  I  allow 
myself  to  establish  a  base  of  rational  operations 
in  surveying  the  really  unknown  territory  be- 
yond. 

As  I  have  said  before,  this  is  my  mental  atti- 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  157 

tude,  it  satisfies  me  for  the  present  because  I  must 
live  in  that  mind  and  not  in  another's. 

I  have  indulged  in  this  little  excursion  merely 
to  enforce  the  position  I  assumed  that  there  is  no 
satisfactory  reason  for  treating  the  unicell  as  a 
unit  of  life,  whatever  it  may  be  in  relation  to  the 
combinations  which  it  forms  with  others  in  the 
composite  body.  Therefore,  any  form  of  mo- 
tion set  up  within  it  would  be  again  the  evi- 
dence of  the  one  and  the  many,  the  units  and  the 
unity. 

As  I  sift  over  the  returns  from  the  field  of 
modern  physical  science,  it  appears  to  me  most 
likely  that  the  old  theory  of  hard  atoms  will  be 
utterly  abandoned  and  matter  will  be,  in  its  last 
analysis,  the  operation  of  forms  of  energy  in  ether 
or  substance ;  and,  as  the  originating  force  cannot 
be  known  to  physics,  we  must  conceive  of  these  as 
eternal.  In  the  vastness  of  the  thought  one  bows 
his  head  and  says :  "It  is  as  it  is  from  eternity  to 
eternity";  and,  in  the  field  of  psychology,  I  am 
unable  to  discover  units  of  consciousness  or  the 
alleged  reason  to  assume  them;  without  at  least 
two  and  a  third  there  is  no  consciousness,  and,  as 
the  complexity  of  the  universal  substance  has  been 
conceived  to  always  exist,  this  condition  must  at- 
tend all  units  of  force  with  the  resulting  relation- 
ship ; — so  we  must  say  again :  "It  is  as  it  is  from 
eternity  to  eternity,  there  has  ever  been  the  one 
and  the  many,  dependent  upon  each  other  for  con- 
scious being." 

To  a  Science  which  holds  fast  to  the  teaching, 
"All  life  out  of  life,"  it  ought  not  to  be  a  difficult 


158  THE   ETEENITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

thing  to  accept  the  consistant  idea  that  the  forms 
of  force  and  the  substance  in  which  such  energy 
forms  appear  to  be,  are  eternal.  The  use  of  the 
word  "potential,"  is  as  I  have  before  suggested, 
no  escape  from  the  mystery,  for  there  is  nothing 
in  potentiality  which  does  not  as  a  form  of  energy 
in  a  medium  subsist. 

Any  conception  which  we  may  have  of  an  ulti- 
mate eternally  existing  substance,  such  as  ether, 
in  view  of  the  axioms  of  Science  concerning  force 
and  life,  cannot  be  of  a  motionless,  absolutely  calm 
and  equated  homogeneity,  but  must  be  of  such  a 
substance  pulsating  with  forms  of  motion,  units 
of  force,  eternally.  This  must  be,  or  there  is  noth- 
ing potential  in  what  fills,  as  variety,  the  universe. 
The  scientist,  however  renowned,  who  is  icon- 
oclastic enough  to  cut  from  under  humanity  its 
hope  and  faith  in  immortality,  must  sharpen  his 
axe  on  the  grindstone  of  Science  and  on  that  alone. 
His  conclusion  that  "it  is  not,"  is  not  the  equiva- 
lent of  "cannot  be,"  therefore  as  I  have  reiterated, 
it  remains  only  necessary  to  stand  beneath  the 
shadow  of  scientific  possibilities  and  suggest  any 
one  of  the  possible  avenues  open  to  a  rational  be- 
lief in  the  eternity  of  existence. 

Let  us  suppose  the  individual  to  be  one  of  those 
units  of  force  in  ether,  and  therefore  eternally  an 
energy  form  in  ether.  It  is  not  inconceivable,  it 
certainly  is  not  disproven,  that  the  consciousness 
of  the  Infinite  One,  as  we  have  before  suggested, 
is  dependent  upon  these  units  of  force  and  form 
in  the  substance,  and  they  in  their  turn  upon  it 
for  theirs.     We  need  not  travel  outside  of  our 


THE  ETERNITY  OF  INDIVIDUALITY  159 

own  brains  and  minds  for  a  completely  analogous 
condition. 

Without  expressing  any  opinion  as  to  the  merit 
of  his  work,  I  may  with  propriety  at  this  moment 
quote  with  approval  the  conclusions  of  a  gentle- 
man of  recognized  position  in  the  world  scientific, 
Prof.  Flourney.  In  his  recent  book,  "From  India 
to  the  Planet  Mars,"  he  says :  "How  is  it  possible 
to  believe  that  the  foci  of  chemical  phenomena,  as 
complex  as  the  nervous  centers,  can  be  in  activity 
without  giving  forth  diverse  undulations,  X,  Y,  or 
Z  rays,  traversing  the  cranium  as  the  sun  trav- 
erses a  pane  of  glass,  and  acting  at  a  distance  on 
their  homologues  in  other  craniums!  It  is  a 
simple  matter  of  intensity  and  I  confess  I  do  not 
understand  those  who  reproach  telepathy  with 
being  strange,  mystical,  occult,  supernormal,  etc." 

Now  I  can  have  no  reasons  for  combatting  such 
a  conclusion  as  this,  for  I  have  had  some  exceed- 
ingly interesting  experiences  in  telepathy  myself, 
as  a  result  of  a  determination  to  take  nothing  for 
granted  in  a  field  of  phenomena  which  offered  such 
large  chances  for  delusion,  fraud,  and  supersti- 
tion. But  what  is  the  medium  which  these  pre- 
sumably diverse  undulations  are  supposed  to 
traverse?  Is  it  the  atmosphere!  Hardly  that, 
for  they  seem  not  to  be  affected  by  the  storms 
and  tempests,  nor  halted  in  their  courses  by  heat 
or  cold.  We  can  conceive  of  but  one  medium  which 
will  serve  for  the  transmission  of  such  forms  of 
motion,  and  that  is  probably  the  same  which  con- 
veys the  electric  undulations  in  wireless  teleg- 
raphy, the  ether  or  substance.    As  a  remark  in 


160  THE   ETEBNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

passing,  I  may  say  that  this  suggests  a  conceivable 
cerebral  activity  to  a  World  Mind;  for,  after  all, 
the  cells  of  the  human  cerebrum  are  not  altogether 
actually  connected  by  their  nerve  processes,  there 
is,  on  the  contrary,  an  exceedingly  minute  space 
between  the  plexus  terminals  to  be  accounted  for 
over  which  the  varying  impulses  must  travel ;  and 
as  space  is  as  nothing  to  the  undulations  of  the 
ether,  one  who  is  gifted  with  a  fairly  well 
equipped  imagination  could  construct  without 
committing  scientific  suicide,  a  world  brain,  of 
the  consciousness  of  which  we  could  know  no  more 
than  do  the  cells  and  cell  centers  of  our  central 
system  of  our  individual  consciousness.  Locate 
as  we  will  the  special  centers  of  the  brain  and 
specialize  as  we  may  the  habitat  of  the  specific 
sensations  and  ideas,  it  yet  remains  a  fact,  that 
what  is  the  property  of  these  specialized  centers 
is  likewise  the  property  of  the  individual.  As 
localized  they  have  no  value  except  to  specially 
center,  as  generalized  they  become  profoundly 
of  value  to  the  individual.  They  are  the  property 
of  both,  and  the  relationship  between  them  is  one 
of  degree  and  mutual  of  course.  If,  then,  these 
"chemical  phenomena"  cannot  be  considered  as 
occurring  without  giving  forth  such  undulations, 
which  undulations  have  the  capacity,  in  a  medium 
like  that  in  which  they  originated,  of  reproducing 
as  an  effect,  their  cause ;  in  as  much  as  the  human 
brain  is  incessantly  producing  such  "chemical 
phenomena,"  it  must  logically  be  presumed  to  be 
always  surrounded  by  a  sphere  of  outgoing  undu- 
lations of  ether,  prominent  among  which  should 


THE  ETERNITY  OF  INDIVIDUALITY  161 

be  that  produced  by  the  idea  of  self ;  for  there  is 
nothing  which  lends  so  much  force  to  the  personal 
activities  as  that ;  it  fills  all  thought  with  its  color 
and  self -consciousness. 

Aside  from  the  value  which  all  this  must  have 
to  the  one  sea  of  mind  in  which  the  individual  is 
forever  a  unit  of  energy,  why  should  it  be  at  all 
inconceivable  that  at  death,  this  unit  of  force,  this 
form  of  energy,  this  individual  should  find  itself 
still  at  home  as  the  vortex  center  of  the  encircling 
undulations?  They,  the  created;  it,  the  creator. 
Why  should  it  not  adapt  itself  immediately  to  its 
environment  and  yet  live  ?  Indeed  it  is  already  in 
its  environment,  undulations  of  ether ;  the  environ- 
ment which  it  has  itself  drawn  from  the  surround- 
ing world.  These  surrounding  undulations  are  its 
own,  the  units  which  sent  them  forth,  obedient  to 
the  law  of  unity,  have  not  been  robbed,  they 
parted  with  nothing;  and  as  the  composite  com- 
munity falls  gradually  to  pieces  as  such,  each  unit 
of  force,  each  form  of  energy,  changes  its  outward 
environment  carrying  with  it  its  internal  world. 

These  undulations  of  the  substance  presumably 
are  the  equivalents  of  the  energy  forms  which 
sent  them  forth.  They  occupy  a  similar  relation 
to  them  as  do  the  undulations  on  the  telephone 
wire  en  route  from  transmitter  to  receiver  to  the 
energy  form  producing  them. 

It  is  a  common  saying  that  we  have  no  experi- 
mental knowledge  of  consciousness  unassociated 
with  matter,  the  purpose  being  to  emphasize  the 
assertion  that  there  is  no  consciousness  unassoci- 
ated with  matter ;  but  it  is  equally  true  that  we 


162  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

have  no  experimental  knowledge  of  energy  except 
as  associated  with  matter,  or  as  we  perceive  its 
phenomena  in  matter ;  but  one  would  hardly  assert 
therefore  that  energy  did  not  exist  except  in  con- 
nection with  matter,  unless  indeed  we  make  no 
distinction  between  matter  and  ether.  There  are 
a  number  of  undulations  in  the  ether  which  are 
caused  by,  or  evidence  of,  an  energy  unassociated 
with  ponderable  matter ;  light  for  instance. 

What  experimental  knowledge  have  we  of  en- 
ergy except  as  we  have  witnessed  its  action  in  the 
phenomena  of  matter?  Its  existence  is  discover- 
able in  matter,  and  because  we  also  experiment- 
ally ascertain  that  it  produces  certain  effects  in 
different  media,  and  that  as  its  movements  are 
transferred  from  one  form  of  matter  to  another 
they  assume  different  forms,  we  formulate  the 
statement  of  the  principle  of  transformation  of 
energy;  and  because,  as  is  the  case  with  light, 
which  we  can  only  perceive  when  reflected  from 
some  material  substance,  it  may  be  brought  into 
appearance  by  the  interposition  and  use  of  mat- 
ter, we  assume  of  necessity  its  existence  as  energy 
unassociated  with  ponderable  matter. 

Again,  because  it  is  impossible  for  the  human 
mind  to  conceive  of  energy  disassociated  with 
some  medium  of  transmission,  we  assume  the  ex- 
istence of  the  ether,  or  some  substance  akin  to  it, 
call  it  what  we  will. 

One  reason  why  the  scientific,  physiological 
psychologists  have  had  no  experimental  knowl- 
edge of  the  same  character,  of  consciousness  un- 
associated with  ponderable  matter  but  associated 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  163 

with  ether  or  substance,  is  because  the  field  of 
inquiry  necessary  to  be  investigated  has  been  un- 
til quite  recently  given  over  to  minds  untrained 
in  the  weighing  of  evidence,  and  therefore  what- 
ever of  phenomena  there  have  been  were  labelled 
"occult,"  "transcendental,"  "supernatural,"  etc., 
and  the  evidence  of  experiences  from  such  direc- 
tions has  been  unacceptable  and  ruled  out  of 
court. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  there  can  be  no  such  thing 
as  experimental  knowledge  of  either  energy  or 
consciousness  unassociated  with  matter.  The 
very  rules  we  apply  are  rules  of  physics,  and  the 
experiments  themselves  are  always  made  in 
matter. 

The  knowledge  we  have  of  energy  unassociated 
with  matter  is  inferential,  and  a  fair  application 
of  the  same  methods  to  the  study  of  consciousness 
will  result  in  the  same  inferential  knowledge  of 
it  as  unassociated  with  matter,  meaning  here, 
ponderable  matter  as  distinguished  from  its  sub- 
stance. 

I  need  not  repeat  perhaps  what  has  been  so 
often  reiterated  in  this  work  concerning  the  en- 
tire scheme,  that  I  do  not  mean  to  be  understood 
as  taking  the  position  that  this  discussion  is  in- 
tended to  prove  that  consciousness  ever  exists  un- 
associated with  ponderable  matter,  but  that  we 
should  not  accept  as  absolute  the  statement  of 
scientists  that  it  cannot.  All  we  know  of  con- 
sciousness is  of  our  own  and  that  which  is  re- 
ported to  us  by  others.  Any  report  of  conscious- 
ness is  of  consciousness  associated  with  matter, 


164  THE   ETEENITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

for  when  a  man  tells  me  he  is  conscious,  I  know 
that  it  is  only  as  associated  with  him,  and  that  is 
likewise  true  of  any  consciousness  which  I  may 
infer  is  associated  with  animal  or  physical  life  of 
any  kind 

What  I  do  insist  upon  is  that  we  know  experi- 
mentally nothing  pro  or  con  about  the  existence 
of  consciousness  in  the  substance  ether.  The 
suggestion  that  it  is  a  legitimate  hypothesis  to 
infer  its  existence  there  associated  with  ether 
may  cause  a  smile  to  spread  over  the  face  of  the 
truly  orthodox  scientist,  but  really  that  is  be- 
cause of  his  fixed  habit  of  thought.  Heterodoxy 
is  as  unpopular  and  as  unprofitable  among  the 
members  of  that  cult  as  among  some  divines. 

There  are  a  few  men  of  scientific  attainments 
who  have  dared  to  advance  the  suggestion  that 
we  have  no  right  to  limit  the  possibility  of  mind 
to  that  in  connection  with  which  only  we  perceive 
it;  notably  Professor  Komanes  and  Professors 
Cope  and  Dolbear,  unless  I  have  misinterpreted 
their  writings.  Eomanes,  as  I  have  elsewhere 
stated,  does  so  in  clear,  distinct,  unmistakable 
terms;  Cope  by  his  statements  that,  "effort  is  a 
conscious  state,"  that  "the  preliminary  of  any 
animal  movement  is  effort,"  that  "life  preceded 
organization,"  that  "consciousness  was  confident 
with  the  dawn  of  life,"  and  that  "energy  may  be 
conscious" ;  and  Dolbear  when  he  suggests  (and  it 
is  fair  to  state  that  it  is  but  a  suggestion)  certain 
properties  of  his  hypothetical  rings  in  the  ether, 
of  which  he  says:  "Now,  it  is  either  that  theory 
or  nothing"  that  may  "differ  from  each  other  not 


THE   ETEKNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  165 

only  in  size  but  in  their  rate  of  motion;  the  ring 
may  be  a  thin  one,  may  rotate  relatively  fast  or 
slow,  may  contain  a  greater  or  less  amount  of 
ether." 

Surely  if  structure,  variety,  heterogenity,  po- 
tentiality of  association  and  synthesis  be  essen- 
tial to  consciousness,  we  have  in  such  forms  of 
motion  and  their  evident  capabilities  all  that  is 
necessary  as  elements  of  functioning  mind  and 
consciousness.  True  these  forms  of  motion,  to 
the  inferential  existence  of  which  physical  science 
is  decidedly  leaning,  are  assumed  to  be  the  ulti- 
mate units  of  force  upon  which  all  matter  rests 
as  a  foundation ;  but  they  are  not  matter,  as  mat- 
ter is  considered  by  physical  science. 

One  fact  is  certain,  and  that  is,  that  wherever 
we  find  the  most  consciousness  in  the  human 
body,  it  is  associated  with  the  least  equilibrated 
and  most  unstable  combination  of  atoms,  and  that 
it  is  submerged  and  unappreciable  as  these  atoms 
are  found  in  combination  in  centers  of  matter 
more  stable,  more  equilibrated  and  material.  Is 
it  supernaturalism  to  suggest  that  one  may  fol- 
low logically  the  consciousness  into  the  region  of 
their  least  stability  of  compact  and  ponderable 
association?  It  is  perhaps  pertinent  here  to  say 
that  the  atoms  of  which  I  write  are  the  energy 
forms  in  ether  to  which  I  have  referred  as  the 
probable  future  substitutes  for  the  hard  atoms. 
The  concourse  of  such  atoms  bringing  into  ex- 
istence by  selective  synthesis  worlds  and  systems 
and  maintaining  them  in  their  specific  synthetic 
motions    and    forms   for    untold    ages,    may    be 


166  THE   ETERNITY   OF    INDIVIDUALITY 

paralleled  perhaps  by  the  concourse  of  such 
energy  forms  as  I  have  conceived  sensations,  ex- 
periences, thoughts,  etc.,  to  have  set  up  around 
and  about  and  as  the  appearance  of  the  unit  of 
force,  the  individual,  in  the  ether.  If  so,  the  ex- 
pression of  the  individual  is  as  real  in  the  ether 
as  in  the  matter,  for  matter  would  then  be  the 
mediator  between  the  world  and  the  individual. 
To  admit  even  that  the  consciousness  of  the  in- 
dividual is  produced  by  the  chemical  activities  of 
the  cells  of  the  central  system  would  not  force  us 
of  necessity  to  the  conclusion  that  consciousness 
ends  with  the  cessation  of  labor  upon  the  part  of 
the  cells,  for  it  is  not  the  molar  motion  of  the  cell 
(that  is,  its  motion  as  a  body)  which  assists  in 
the  accretion  of  material  for  consciousness,  but 
its  molecular  motion,  the  changes  of  form  of  mo- 
tion, not  form  of  cell.  We  know  practically  noth- 
ing about  the  changes  in  energy  forms  which  take 
place  within  the  cell,  and  with  the  fact  staring 
us  in  the  face,  that  there  must  be  most  marvel- 
lous variety  in  the  forms  of  motion  in  the  germ 
cell  in  order  to  build  up  that  wonderful  com- 
pound, the  distinguishable,  personal  body  of  man 
with  such  physical  characteristics  as  mark  him 
as  something  different  from  every  other  man,  we 
should  hesitate  at  attempting  to  measure  the 
mental  activities,  the  facts  of  consciousness,  with 
our  calorimeters. 

This  germ  cell  is  the  fusion  of  two,  one  the 
sperm,  and  the  other  the  ovum,  both  microscopic- 
ally small.  And  yet  in  these  the  only  sensible  ex- 
planation of  their  vast  potentialities  is,  that  re- 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  167 

markably  complex  forms  of  motion  have  been  set 
up,  in  some  manner  unknown  to  Science,  in  their 
molecules,  somewhat  akin  to  those  which  must  be 
looked  for  in  the  cells  of  the  cerebrum  as  the 
physical  seat  of  memory,  and  indeed  these  forms 
of  motion  in  the  germ  cells  must  be  considered  as 
memory  forms,  else  the  whole  scheme  of  biology 
is  based  on  an  unsubstantial  foundation.  A  very 
important  question,  however,  which  remains  a 
profound  mystery,  is :  What  causes  these  forms  of 
motion  in  the  molecules  of  the  cells! 

Passing  for  awhile  from  the  suggestion  of  an 
etheric  composite,  if  I  may  call  it  such,  I  wish 
to  consider  the  law  of  unity  and  units  as  applied 
to  this  germ  cell.  I  am  perfectly  conscious  that 
I  am  about  to  enter  a  field  of  discussion  which 
has  been  the  despair  as  well  as  the  inspiration  of 
many  very  able  men,  but  I  again  repeat  that  I 
must  think  for  myself  if  I  am  to  derive  any  bene- 
fit from  their  investigations  and  my  own  humbler 
efforts  in  the  same  direction,  and  while  I  may  not 
hope  to  accomplish  that  which  others  far  better 
equipped  for  the  purpose  have  failed  to  do,  yet 
I  may  be  able  to  show  cause  for  hesitation  in 
framing  final  conclusions  inimical  to  our  peace 
of  mind. 

If  we  substitute  for  the  confusing  terms  rather 
simpler  English  and  try  to  state  the  facts,  we  may 
have  some  idea  of  the  great  puzzle  of  biology,  and 
how  far  we  are  bound  by  any  actual  knowledge  to 
retreat  from  the  sunshine  of  our  hopes  into  the 
marshes  of  pessimistic  and  despairing  material- 
ism, or  a  soulless  Monism. 


168  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

It  will  be  conceded  that  men  are  not  all  alike, 
that  they  differ  one  from  another  both  in  physical 
appearance  and  mental  qualities  and  tendencies. 
It  will  probably  also  be  admitted  that  from  the 
same  parents,  children  with  widely  different 
physical  and  mental  qualities  are  brought  into  the 
world. 

Why  is  it  so?  If  you  could  give  answer  you 
would  solve  the  problem  which  has  caused  many 
shelves  of  my  library  to  be  filled  with  books, 
books  which  present  explanations  as  widely  di- 
vergent one  from  another  as  the  persons  whose 
varying  qualities  they  endeavor  to  explain. 

Why  is  it  that  in  one  family  there  will  be  found 
the  presence  of  a  marvelous  genius  for  music  in 
one  child,  its  total  absence  in  another,  and  in  lieu 
of  it  a  faculty  for  mathematics?  Why  is  it  that 
in  ourselves  there  come  dripping  from  the  depths 
of  the  unknown  sea  within  the  flotsam  and  jetsam 
of  experiences  which  we  never  had;  suggestions, 
ideas,  developed  capacities,  for  which  we  never 
practiced;  accomplished  results  for  which  we 
apparently  never  furnished  the  causes?  What  is 
the  reason  that  some  come  to  the  task  of  life 
already  armed  with  the  weapons  of  genius? 

"Heredity,"  answers  the  ready  scientist.  But 
what  is  heredity,  and  how  does  it  come,  in  what 
sort  of  a  parcel  is  it  done  up  in  that  invisible 
speck  of  substance  from  which  we  came  as  to  our 
bodies?  And  more  puzzling  yet,  how  does  it 
happen  that  from  the  same  microscopic  speck  so 
many  various  divergent  inheritances  come  ?  This 
body  of  mine,  that  of  my  brothers  and  sisters,  all 


THE   ETEENITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  169 

come  from  the  same  germ  cell.  We  do  not  escape 
that  very  plain  fact  by  asserting  that  inasmuch 
as  we  were  born  at  different  times,  we  therefore 
had  a  different  cell  origin,  for  it  is  evident  that 
each  parent  was  the  result  of  the  fusion  of  two 
cells  into  one  and  its  multiplication  into  the  many 
and  that  even  by  the  fusion  of  two  in  one,  we 
never  escape  the  one.  Are  the  potentialities  of 
many  individuals  resident  in  some  form  within 
the  one  cell?  If  so,  then  even  without  adopting 
the  somewhat  ancient  idea  of  preformation  in  the 
cell,  that  is,  that  the  form  of  man  lies  hid  in  actu- 
ality in  it,  we  are  confronted  with  the  proposition 
that  within  that  invisible  speck  of  matter  are  the 
various  forms  of  motion  which  may  determine 
the  product  as  one  of  many  differing  possibilities. 
Not  that  there  is  any  differentiation  in  the  various 
portions  of  the  germ  cell  which  might  determine 
the  product  as  one  of  a  different  species,  for  in 
the  light  of  the  experiments,  referred  to  in  an- 
other chapter,  made  with  the  eggs  of  a  frog,  this 
is  not  so ;  but  as  to  what  the  qualities,  character- 
istics and  personal  attributes  shall  be,  within  the 
limits  of  the  preformed  animal,  there  certainly  is 
differentiation  sufficient  to  produce  marvelous 
variety  as  the  product  of  the  progeny  of  the  same 
original  cell. 

My  citizenship  in  the  world  entitled  me  to  ap- 
proach without  undue  awe  a  brief  discussion  of 
the  statements  and  conclusions  of  even  so  eminent 
a  scientist  as  Professor  Haeckel,  especially  as  he 
has  found  it  convenient  to  treat  with  scant  cour- 
tesy the  opinions  and  beliefs  of  those  who  think 


170  THE   ETEENITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

differently  from  himself.  Taking  him  at  his  own 
estimate  of  the  value  of  man's  intellect  as  ex- 
pressed in  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Universe,"  we  must 
consider  his  mental  process  as  but  the  operation 
of  a  machine,  and  his  conclusions  but  the  result 
of  the  metabolism  of  proteids,  and  that  in  a  ma- 
chine which  is,  as  he  expresses  it,  approaching 
the  "gradual  decay  of  the  physical  powers."  Now, 
I  do  not  really  believe  this,  because  I  cannot  place 
the  estimate  which  he  does  upon  the  mental  prod- 
ucts of  mankind,  yet  I  fear  that  the  law  governing 
auto-suggestion  does,  in  the  case  of  one  who  per- 
sistently for  years  looks  upon  himself  as  the  phe- 
nomenon of  chemical  processes,  ultimately  result 
in  just  such  conclusions. 

In  his  discussion  on  the  subject  of  Psychic 
Gradations  he  informs  us  that  "unconscious  mem- 
ory is  a  universal  and  very  important  function 
of  all  plastidules,"  and  that  these,  "as  individual 
molecules  of  the  active  protoplasm,  are  repro- 
ductive, and  so  gifted  with  memory,  that  is  the 
chief  difference  between  the  organic  and  the  in- 
organic worlds."  With  all  but  the  last  clause  of 
this  declaration  of  course  I  can  have  no  dispute, 
because  it  is  in  accord  with  the  theory  of  the  liv- 
ing environment  which  I  have  suggested,  but 
taken  in  connection  with  other  propositions  in 
HaeckePs  work  it  leads  into  a  blind  alley  rather 
than  up  to  his  ultimate  conclusion.  For  instance, 
in  replying  to  Weismann's  theory  that  the  pro- 
tists  are  immortal,  he  asserts  (p.  190,  "The  Rid- 
dle of  the  Universe")  that  in  the  process  of  mul- 
tiplication of  the  protists  by  division,  the  unicel- 


THE  ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  171 

lular  organism  (cell)  breaks  up  into  a  number  of 
equal  parts,  each  of  which  leads  its  own  life,  and 
that  the  very  process  has  destroyed  the  individu- 
ality of  the  cell,  and  its  physiological  and  mor- 
phological unity  is  gone. 

It  is  appropriate  to  call  attention  to  Professor 
Haeckel's  accepted  definition  of  an  individual.  On 
page  190,  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Universe,"  he  says 
an  individual  is  "A  unity  which  cannot  be  divided 
without  destroying  its  nature." 

Again,  on  page  63  of  the  same  work,  the  asser- 
tion is  made  that  "with  the  formation  of  this 
cytula"  (the  united  ovum  and  spermatozoon,  which 
is  therefore  one  cell),  "hence,  in  the  process  of 
conception  itself,  the  existence  of  the  personality, 
the  independent  individual,  commences." 

But  this  independent  "individual,"  which  then 
"commences"  its  existence,  is  a  single  cell,  and  be- 
gins to  reproduce  at  once  by  fission,  and  soon 
becomes  not  only  two,  but  many  more  cells.  Has 
its  individuality  been  "destroyed,"  as  to  its  nat- 
ure, and  what  has  become  of  the  individuality  of 
the  molecules  of  the  active  protoplasm?  It  must 
be  remembered  that  the  study  of  this  process  of 
segmentation  is  not  carried  on  with  the  human 
cell,  but  with  that  of  the  thread  worm  found  in 
the  excretions  of  the  equine  race,  or  in  the  equally 
available  and  transparent  ova  of  the  sea  urchin, 
and  that  in  those  up  to  above  the  eight-cell  con- 
dition, the  cells  may  by  rocking  gently  be  sep- 
arated, and  each  department  produce  a  normal 
animal  except  possibly  as  to  size.  Were  there 
two  individuals  or  more  in  the  stem  cell  from 


172  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

which  these  came?  Has  the  individual  been  "di- 
vided" without  destroying  its  nature?  Which  of 
the  two  in  such  a  case  is  the  "independent  indi- 
vidual," or  are  both? 

Before  giving  expression  to  the  attitude  of 
mind  which  I  am  constrained  to  assume  toward 
Professor  HaeckePs  presentation  of  the  "sound 
scientific  arguments"  against  immortality,  I  de- 
sire to  show  to  those  who  may  have  been  some- 
what depressed  by  the  plausibility  of  his  general 
arguments,  the  force  of  which  depends  largely 
upon  his  illy  concealed  contempt  of  the  intelli- 
gence of  such  as  disagree  with  him,  that  he  is 
himself  compelled  to  rely  upon  the  mysterious, 
the  unproven,  and  the  unknown  in  the  last  anal- 
ysis of  his  reasoning.  On  page  220,  "The  Eiddle 
of  the  Universe,"  he  lays  down  the  following 
theses  as  his  "own  opinion":  "I.  The  two  funda- 
mental forms  of  substance,  ponderable  matter  and 
ether,  are  not  dead  and  only  moved  by  extrinsic 
force,  but  they  are  endowed  with  sensation  and 
will  (though,  naturally,  of  a  lower  grade) ;  they 
experience  an  inclination  for  condensation^^  (ital- 
ics mine),  "dislike  of  strain;  they  strive  after  the 
one  and  struggle  after  the  other.  II.  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  empty  space ;  that  part  of  space  that 
is  not  filled  with  ponderable  atoms  is  filled  with 
ether.  III.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  an  action 
at  a  distance  through  perfectly  empty  space;  all 
action  of  bodies  upon  each  other  is  either  deter- 
mined by  immediate  contact"  (immediate  contact 
is  puzzling  if  ether  is  not  continuous  in  the 
bodies),    "or    is    effected    by    the    mediation   of 


THE    ETEBNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  173 

ether."  On  page  228  we  find  the  following:  "The 
etheric  consistency  may  probably  .  .  .  pass  into 
a  gaseous  state,"  and  "Ether  is  boundless  and 
immeasurable." 

These  theses  I  have  no  disposition  to  dispute 
as  a  whole,  but  I  am  compelled  to  imagine  what 
takes  place  when  ether  condenses  into  a  gaseous 
condition,  for  the  results  of  condensation  neces- 
sitates the  thesis  that  "Ether  is  boundless  and 
immeasurable."  Is  it  any  less  of  a  strain  upon 
our  common  sense  and  reason  to  conceive  of 
"boundless  and  immeasurable  ether"  than  bound- 
less and  immeasurable  mind  and  consciousness? 
The  scientist  who  demands  that  we  have  the 
known,  evidenced  by  experimental  knowledge,  as 
a  basis  of  our  belief  in  the  eternity  of  individu- 
ality, must,  if  he  deliver  his  argument  from  the 
mere  physical  pole,  adhere  to  the  same  rule.  We 
have  and  can  have  no  experimental  knowledge  of 
the  boundlessness  of  ether.  It  is  purely  hypothet- 
ical, a  necessary  hypothesis  I  admit,  but  the  hu- 
man mind  staggers  with  awe  in  contemplation  of 
the  thought,  just  as  it  does  in  attempting  to  en- 
tertain the  conception  of  an  Infinite  Mind  which 
thinks.  Yet  to  this  great  and  learned  Professor, 
the  one  is  rational  science,  the  other  puerile  su- 
perstition. 

I  insist  that  if  one  shall  on  the  contrary  com- 
mence his  solution  of  the  "Eiddle  of  the  Uni- 
verse" from  the  psychic  pole,  and  inverting  the 
thesis  of  Professor  Haeckel,  insist  that  matter  is 
but  the  phenomenon  of  mind,  the  same  character 
of  argument  advanced  by  Haeckel  may  be  made 


174  THE   ETERNITY   OP   INDIVIDUALITY 

from  that  starting  point  and  with  equal  force  and 
effectiveness.  It  all  depends  upon  which  pole  of 
the  Monistic  theory  we  plant  our  feet  as  a  point 
of  departure.  Why  are  we  compelled  to  com- 
mence with  the  material  side?  Because  we  have 
material  brains,  ganglion  cells  and  nerves  ?  Why, 
we  have  also  thoughts,  ideas,  affections,  aspira- 
tions, memory,  and  love;  why  not  start  with 
them?  But  it  is  said  that  these  only  put  in  an 
appearance  with  and  disappear  with  the  brain 
and  cells.  Yes,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  the 
brain  and  cells  only  put  in  an  appearance  with 
these  and  disappear  with  them. 

The  apparent  fact  is  that  while  the  scientist  is 
to  be  allowed  to  load  down  a  speck  of  matter  with 
the  most  marvelous,  intricate  memories,  includ- 
ing not  only  those  of  preexisting  vertebrates,  ver- 
miformed,  fish-gilled  and  canine  ancestors,  but 
the  mental  and  physical  qualities  of  our  immediate 
parents  and  grandparents,  and  that  remarkable 
epitome,  the  memory  of  the  race ;  the  psychologist 
is  not  to  be  permitted  to  see  in  all  this  the  pos- 
sible living  environment  of  an  individuality  work- 
ing its  way  up  to  an  adaption  to  the  world  en- 
vironment, using  these  as  the  only  organs 
possible,  evolved  through  countless  ages.  He,  the 
biologist,  is  to  be  allowed  to  unchallenged  demand 
an  acceptance  of  his  limitless  ether  for  which  he 
can  offer  no  experimental  proof,  while  the  other 
is  to  be  ruled  out  of  the  arena  of  common  sense, 
if  he  find  on  the  other  side  of  Monism  a  limitless 
and  unbounded  consciousness,  in  which  "he  lives 
and  moves  and  has  his  being." 


THE   ETERNITY   OF  INDIVIDUALITY  175 

While  the  word  "Monism"  ought  not  to  alarm 
us  in  the  slightest  degree,  because  there  is  no  real 
necessity  why  we  should  be  Monists  or  that  Mon- 
ism should  rule  the  universe,  yet  it  seems  to  me 
that  there  is  an  unnecessary  abhorrence  expressed 
by  Monistic  philosophers  for  anything  which  ap- 
pears to  them  to  be  dualistic.  For  instance,  I 
have  no  doubt  but  that  the  suggestion  that  the 
individual  is  a  unit  of  force  and  the  unity  of  activ- 
ity in  the  developing  germ  cell  will  be  scorned  as 
dualistic.  But  is  it  any  more  so  than  HaeckePs 
Monism?  I  do  not  insist  that  it  is  the  truth,  al- 
though I  believe  it  to  be,  but  that  it  is  true  even 
to  the  Monism  presented  in  "The  Eiddle  of  the 
Universe."  The  memories  of  the  cytula  come 
from  both  parents,  says  Haeckel :  "the  ovum  con- 
tributes a  portion  of  the  maternal  features,  while 
the  nucleus  of  the  spermatozoon  brings  a  part  of 
the  father's  characteristics." 

*We  know  that  in  it"  (the  process  of  impreg- 
nation) "the  nucleus  of  the  spermatozoon  con- 
tributes the  qualities  of  the  male  parent,  and  the 
nucleus  of  the  ovum  gives  the  qualities  of  the 
mother  to  the  newly  born  stem  cell."  "Heredity 
is  the  memory  of  the  plastidule." 

Now  these  inherited  qualities  are  transmitted, 
presumably,  by  the  setting  up  of  forms  of  motion 
of  some  kind  in  the  protoplasm,  and,  upon  the 
union  of  the  nuclei  of  both  parents,  two  outside 
individuals  have  directly  operated  upon  this 
protoplasm  by  imparting  forms  of  motion  caused 
by  their  own  activities — so  far  we  will  be  admit- 
tedly  safely   within   the   Monistic    demands    of 


176  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

Professor  Haeckel,  but  how  comes  it,  because  we 
suppose  a  third  party  to  have  a  hand  in  setting 
up  the  unifying  forms  of  motion  in  that  same 
stem  cell,  we  have  become  dualistic?  To  admit 
the  individual  as  the  organizer  of  the  unity  which 
evolves  out  of  the  cell  and  its  division  is  no  more 
dualistic  than  HaeckePs  heredity. 

There  is  a  wide  margin  in  "infinite  eternal" 
force  for  a  force  unknown  or  unrecognized  by 
Science ;  indeed,  the  very  infinity  of  force,  and  its 
reciprocal  action,  would  be,  perhaps  I  should  say 
could  be,  the  force  of  forces,  the  law  of  laws,  the 
unity  of  forces,  the  Individual,  the  One,  in  which 
all  forces  are  held,  and  whose  infinity,  constancy, 
and  eternity  depend  upon  these  units  and  their 
relationship!  Such  an  Individual  would  be  God, 
and  it  would  not  be  matter  but  force. 

What  is  force  ?  Who  knows  ?  We  see  its  pres- 
ence in  matter,  but  we  believe  it  to  be,  and 
Haeckel  asserts  that  it  is,  eternal  and  infinite,  so 
we  are  agreed  that  it  is  not  matter  nor  the  phe- 
nomenon of  matter. 

Force  we  know,  consciousness  we  know,  and 
thought  we  know,  but  consciousness  and  thought 
are  no  more  mysterious  and  inexplicable  in  final 
analysis  than  force.  We  believe  in  the  constancy 
of  force,  partly  because  we  can  trace  it  in  its 
transformations,  yet  sometimes  it  eludes  us  and 
we  cannot  keep  the  column  of  figures  on  the 
ledger  balanced.  For  instance,  I  think,  and  my 
thought  is  of  "immortality."  We  may  measure 
the  expenditure  of  energy  made  by  my  cells  in 
thinking  the  thought,  but  that  thought  may  be 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  177 

loaded  witli  magnificence,  grandeur,  devotion,  all 
of  which  qualities  elude  the  calorimeter  with 
which  the  measurement  was  made.  Indeed,  the 
thought  '^immortality"  in  the  denying  mind  of 
Professor  Haeckel  would  probably  mark  the  same 
degree  on  the  calorimeter.  The  quality  of  thought 
has  one  characteristic  in  common  with  the  indi- 
vidual ;  it  eludes  measurement  in  terms  of  matter. 

Any  discussion  of  Professor  HaeckePs  chapter 
on  "The  Immortality  of  the  Soul"  must,  of  course, 
recognize  the  character  of  Immortality  which  he 
is  talking  about.  If  he  had  had  in  mind  only  the 
immortality  of  the  individual  when  he  wrote  the 
chapter,  it  would  be  a  much  more  simple  matter 
to  defend  one's  contrary  convictions  than  it  is. 
The  chapter  discusses  theological  "immortality" 
rather  than  the  broad  question  of  the  eternity  of 
the  individual. 

It  is  not  the  attitude  of  a  scientific  mind  to  ad- 
vance "insoluble  difficulty"  in  answering  such 
questions  as  "in  what  stage  of  their  individual 
development  the  disembodied  souls  will  spend 
their  eternal  life,"  as  an  argument  against  the 
immortality  of  the  individual.  That  and  much 
more  in  the  many  pages  of  the  chapter  referred 
to  is  but  the  presentation  of  reasons  for  not  ac- 
cepting the  theological  immortality,  reasons  which 
have  been  offered  so  many  times  that  they  are 
ancient  history.  So  serious  a  task  as  he  set  him- 
self demanded  the  discussion  of  the  greater  ques- 
tion of  whether  there  is  an  individual,  an  ego,  a 
self,  a  subjectivity,  to  which  this  life  in  the  en- 
vironment of  matter  on  this  earth  is  but  a  phase, 


178  THE   ETEKNITY    OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

an  event  which  has  its  beginning  and  ending,  its 
rhythmic  rise  and  decline  like  everything  else  in 
the  world. 

Such  a  question  is  large  enough  for  so  great  a 
scientist,  and  he  owed  it  to  the  mass  of  strug- 
gling, writhing,  suffering,  starving,  dying,  but 
hoping,  humanity,  for  whom  he  assumed  to  be  the 
judge  of  their  superstition  or  otherwise,  to  have 
discussed  it  fully  before  offering  them  his  charnel 
house  of  despair. 

To  present,  even  in  a  masterly  manner,  the  dis- 
coveries of  how  the  physical  side  of  man  was 
evolved,  a  discourse  upon  the  embryology  of  the 
"soul"  and  the  Phylogeny  of  the  "soul"  after  hav- 
ing jSrst  defined  "soul"  as  follows  (page  89,  "The 
Eiddle  of  the  Universe") :  "What  we  call  soul  is, 
in  my  opinion,  a  natural  phenomenon,"  is,  I  con- 
sider, a  begging  of  the  question,  for  it  is  a  declara- 
tion that  what  he  is  writing  about  are  the  "psychic 
activities"  as  they  are  evidenced  in  the  cells  of 
the  brain.  As  I  have  suggested  elsewhere  in  this 
book,  there  is  no  added  argument  in  all  the  mod- 
ern additions  to  the  subdivisions  of  the  body  of 
a  man  against  immortality.  We  stand  in  that  re- 
spect just  where  our  fathers  did,  when  instead  of 
cells  they  recognized  brain.  The  dissection  of  the 
organs  into  their  minutiae  only  adds  to  the  mys- 
tery ;  it  does  not  lessen  it.  That  we  do  our  think- 
ing with  millions  of  cells,  instead  of  a  mass  of  un- 
differentiated gray  substance,  brain,  lends  no 
added  force  to  the  ancient  attacks  upon  immor- 
tality. 

The  meat  of  the  chapter  in  question,  and  it 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  179 

strikes  me  the  only  scientific  meat  to  be  found  in 
it  is  on  page  204,  and  I  shall  make  the  same  sug- 
gestion to  the  interested  student  of  that  page 
that  the  author  (Haeckel)  makes  in  the  same  work 
on  page  107 :  "I  recommend  those  of  my  readers 
who  are  interested  in  these  momentous  questions 
of  psychology  to  study  the  profound  work  of 
Eomanes."  It  is  true  that  the  work  of  Eomanes 
to  which  he  was  referring  was  "Mental  Evolu- 
tion in  the  Animal  World,"  but  Eomanes  wrote 
several  great  books,  among  them  "Essays," 
"Jelly  Fish,  Star  Fish,  and  Sea  Urchins,"  and 
"Mind,  Motion,  and  Monism,"  and  it  is  to  this 
last-named  work  that  I  refer.  Inasmuch  as  Pro- 
fessor Haeckel  says  he  is  completely  at  one  with 
Eomanes  and  Darwin  in  almost  all  their  views 
and  convictions,  and  that  whenever  they  and  he 
seem  to  differ  it  is  either  because  of  "imperfect 
expression"  on  his  part,  or  the  differences  are 
"unimportant,"  I  feel  at  liberty  to  quote  quite 
freely  from  Eomanes  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
expression  to  what  Professor  Haeckel  means,  sup- 
posing the  differences  to  be  unimportant.  Pro- 
fessor Eomanes  on  page  151  of  "Mind,  Motion, 
and  Monism"  says :  "The  statement  of  any  causal 
relation  is  merely  a  statement  of  the  fact  that 
both  the  matter  and  the  energy  concerned  in  the 
event  were  of  a  permanent  nature  and  unalter- 
able amount.  Therefore  if  the  ultimate  Eeality 
is  mental  causation  it  must  be  ontologically  iden- 
tical with  volition.  And  that  the  ultimate  Eeality 
is  either  mental,  or  something  greater,  seemed  to 
be  proved  by  the  consideration  that  if  it  be  sup- 


180  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

posed  anything  less,  there  must  be  an  end  of  the 
equivalency  as  between  cause  and  effect,  and  so 
of  the  conception  of  causality  itself;  for  clearly 
if  my  mind  has  been  caused  by  anything  less  than 
itself,  there  is  an  end  of  any  possible  equivalency 
between  the  activity  of  that  thing  as  a  cause  and 
the  occurrence  of  my  mind  as  an  effect." 

I  have  quoted  this  freely  because  the  great  Zo- 
ologist, whose  book,  unwarranted  I  believe  as  to 
its  claim  that  its  philosophy  is  demanded  by  Sci- 
ence, appears  to  convey  the  impression  that  the 
lamented  Eomanes  held  the  same  views.  That  I 
have  not  made  a  wrong  application  is  evidenced 
by  the  author's  (Romanes's)  foot  note  on  the  same 
page,  as  follows:  "Whatsoever  is  first  of  all 
things  must  necessarily  contain  it  and  actually 
have,  at  least,  all  the  perfections  that  can  ever 
after  exist,  nor  can  it  ever  give  to  another  any 
perfection  that  it  hath  not  actually  in  itself  or  at 
least  in  a  higher  degree"  (Locke).  To  this  argu- 
ment Mill  answers :  "How  vastly  nobler  and  more 
precious,  for  instance,  are  the  vegetables  and  ani- 
mals than  the  soil  and  manure  out  of  which,  and 
by  the  properties  of  which,  they  are  raised  up !" 
To  which  Romanes  replies :  "But  this  stricture  is 
not  worthy  of  Mill.  The  soil  and  manure  do  not 
constitute  the  whole  cause  of  the  plants  and  ani- 
mals. We  must  trace  these  and  many  other 
causes  (conditions)  back  and  back  until  we  come 
to  whatsoever  is  first  of  all  things;  it  is  merely 
childish  to  choose  some  few  conditions,  and  ar- 
bitrarily to  regard  them  as  alone  efficient  causes." 

I  must  also  state  that  Romanes  says  that  a 


THE   ETEENITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  181 

"human  mind  is  a  part  of  the  self-existing  sub- 
stance, although  not  on  this  account  self -existing 
as  to  its  individual  personality,"  but  to  grasp  to 
the  full  extent  the  unbiased  elasticity  of  Eo- 
manes's  argument  his  whole  work  upon  "Mind, 
Motion,  and  Monism"  should  be  read.  He  claims 
that  personality  appears  to  be  the  result  of  cir- 
cumscription, a  limitation,  but  an  integral  part 
of  the  whole,  and  there  is  a  generous  margin  left 
for  God  and  even  the  necessary  relational  exist- 
ence of  the  individual  in  these  words :  "There  is 
next  the  fact  that  throughout  the  universe  of  in- 
finite objectivity,  so  far  at  least  as  human  obser- 
vation can  extend,  there  is  unquestionable  evi- 
dence of  some  one  integrating  principle  whereby 
all  its  many  and  complex  parts  are  correlated 
with  one  another  in  such  wise  that  the  result  is 
universal  order.  And  if  we  take  any  part  of 
the  whole  system — such  as  that  of  organic  na- 
ture on  this  planet — to  examine  in  more  detail, 
we  find  that  it  appears  to  be  instinct  with  con- 
trivance. So  to  speak,  whenever  we  tap  organic 
nature,  it  seems  to  flow  with  purpose  .  .  .  the 
world  eject  thus  becomes  invested  with  a  psychi- 
cal value  as  greatly  transcending  in  magnitude 
that  of  the  human  mind,  as  the  material  frame  of 
the  universe  transcends  the  material  frame  of 
the  human  body."  ("  Mind,  Motion  and  Monism," 
p.  109.) 

Contrast  these  words  with  those  of  Schopen- 
hauer quoted  approvingly  by  Professor  Haeckel 
on  page  231,  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Universe  " :  "The 
truth  of  pantheism  lies  in  its  destruction  of  the 


182  THE   ETERNITY    OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

dualistic  antithesis  of  God  and  the  world,  in  its 
recognition  that  the  world  exists  in  virtue  of  its 
own  inherent  forces.  The  maxim  of  the  Pan- 
theist, ^God  and  the  world  are  one'  is  merely  a 
polite  way  of  giving  this  Lord  God  his  congeJ^ 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  express  an  opinion  as  to 
which  of  these  great  men  is  nearest  to  the  truth, 
but  I  am  of  the  decided  opinion  that  Haeckel 
and  Eomanes  are  not  "at  one"  on  this  subject. 

As  the  human  mind  is  an  integral  part  of  the 
whole,  then,  in  view  of  the  "unquestionable  evi- 
dence" of  the  one  integrating  principle,  a  unity 
psychism,  a  psychism  so  transcending  that  of  the 
human  mind,  while  I  may  not  be  able  to  subject 
my  relationship  in  it  to  such  an  analysis  as  will 
afford  scientific  proof  of  its  inextinguishable 
value,  I  yet  have  sufficient  room  in  the  china  shop 
of  Science  to  exercise  a  reasonable  degree  of  sci- 
entific faith  without  breaking  the  valuable  china. 

Before  calling  attention  to  some  thoughts 
which  to  my  mind  have  been  sufficient  to  allevi- 
ate the  otherwise  depressing  influence  of  the 
physiological,  histological,  experimental,  and 
pathological  arguments  of  Haeckel,  I  desire  to 
refer  briefly  to  the  ontogenetic,  that  is  the  devel- 
opment of  the  soul  in  the  individual.  Of  course, 
if  we  are  to  limit  the  soul  to  the  mere  chemical 
activities  of  the  cells  of  the  brain,  there  is  noth- 
ing to  be  said,  because  our  agreement  to  such  a 
meaning  of  the  word  would  end  in  similar  views 
as  to  its  development,  rhythm,  and  end.  I  take 
it,  however,  that  most  of  us  understand  by  the 
soul,  that  substantial  entity,  the  individual.    "We 


THE  ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  183 

see,"  says  Professor  Haeckel,  "the  child  soul 
gradually  unfold  its  various  powers,  the  youth 
present  them  in  full  bloom,  the  mature  man 
shows  their  ripe  fruit,  in  old  age  we  see  the  grad- 
ual decay  of  the  physical  powers,  corresponding 
to  the  senile  degeneration  of  the  brain."  It  is 
undoubtedly  true  that  the  neuroblasts  or  unde- 
veloped cells  of  the  infant  develop  and  reach 
maturity  and  in  old  age  the  same  cells  become 
frequently  pigmented,  shrunken  and  give  other 
signs  of  degeneration,  and  the  connections  be- 
tween them  are  withdrawn,  and  we  have  the  sad 
picture  of  the  "lean  and  slippered  pantaloon" 
condition  of  man.  But  because  the  composite 
structure  is  falling,  that  which  was  the  individual 
amid  the  objectivities  of  the  environing  material 
world  no  longer  holds  together,  does  it  follow  that 
that  for  which  the  mediation  existed  has  likewise 
fallen  into  decay  ?  The  very  fact  that  it  no  longer 
communicates  with  us  or  we  with  it,  is  the  reason 
why  we  cannot  say  it  does  not  yet  live;  it  has 
no  bridge  on  which  to  cross  to  us.  Not  that  I 
mean  to  imply  that  it  is  something  which  was 
apart  from  and  came  into  the  body,  deus  ex  ma- 
china,  but  the  individual  is  not  that;  bounded  by 
bodies,  existing  as  and  in  a  living  environment; 
it  is  not  that,  I  decline  to  accept  this  senseless, 
shuffling,  incompetent  mass  of  cells,  precious  as  it 
is  to  memory  and  association,  as  the  measure- 
ment of  the  individual  whose  love  shone  out  of 
his  eyes  a  few  days  ago;  the  unification  in  that 
environment  is  destroyed,  and  what  is  left  will 
automatically    continue    its    various    specialized 


184  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

functions  until  the  units  are  themselves  sep- 
arated. As  Verworn  says  in  "General  Physiol- 
ogy," the  composite  body  is  quite  a  long  time  in 
dying,  even  after  that  moment  when  life  is  ordi- 
narily pronounced  to  be  at  an  end.  If  the  Pan- 
theistic scientist  can  find  God  in  the  universe  of 
many,  and  ascribe  "purpose"  and  "contrivance," 
and  not  discover  His  death  in  the  wreck  of 
changes  going  on  in  the  phenomena  of  substance, 
I  see  no  reason  why  I  may  not  continue  to  find 
the  individual  surviving  in  the  same  manner.  I 
stand  on  the  emphatic  language,  and  the  thought 
conveyed  by  it,  of  Alfred  H.  Lloyd  in  "Dynamic 
Idealism":  "Individuals  neither  die  nor  come 
into  being." 

The  soul,  says  Professor  Haeckel,  is  a  collec- 
tive title  for  the  sum  total  of  the  psychic  activ- 
ities of  the  cells  of  the  cerebrum,  and  these  are 
chemical  from  his  standpoint.  Somewhere  I  have 
read,  I  think  in  "Mind,  Motion  and  Monism,"  by 
Eomanes,  that  motion  can  only  produce  motion, 
and  I  am  perhaps  stupidly  puzzled  in  attempting 
to  understand  how  thought,  affection,  love,  rea- 
son, consciousness,  etc.,  can  be  produced  by  the 
chemical  motions  of  the  molecules  in  the  cells  in 
any  part  of  the  central  nervous  system. 

The  sum  total  of  motions  is  either  equation,  no 
motion,  or  a  synthetic  motion,  but  it  certainly  is 
never  anything  but  a  resulting  motion.  If  these 
various  qualities  of  mind  are  motions,  then  I  in- 
sist again  that  such  a  Monistic  conception  fur- 
nishes us  with  no  possible  individual  or  soul,  if 
an  individual  be  what  Professor  Haeckel  con- 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  185 

cedes  it  to  be,  a  something  which  cannot  be  di- 
vided without  destroying  its  individuality.  That 
we  are  marginally  conscious  of  more  than  one 
sensation  at  a  time,  it  appears  to  me  we  readily 
perceive  in  our  own  experiences.  I  hear,  see, 
think,  feel,  love,  etc.,  all  at  the  same  time.  These 
do  not  follow  each  other  necessarily  as  successive 
sensations  or  emotions,  but  are  present  in  the 
moment.  Now  if  the  "sum  total"  is  one  motion, 
what  motion  is  it?  Notwithstanding  the  sugges- 
tion that  it  is  so  plain  that  it  is  final  and  destruc- 
tive to  the  idea  of  any  individual  soul  other — 
What  is  it?  The  "sum  total"  of  our  cerebral 
chemical  activities;  but  is  it  one,  or  many;  is  it 
a  motion,  or  motions?  If  a  motion  and  one,  it  is 
a  motion  produced  as  a  "sum  total"  and  therefore 
something  additional  to  the  unit  motions,  and 
that  is  not  the  Monism  of  Professor  Haeckel.  If 
motions,  then  we  have  yet  a  complexity,  and  in- 
tricacy which  in  turn  needs  to  be  analyzed  by  the 
same  process. 

And  again,  Haeckel  says  in  reply  to  Weis- 
mann's  claim  that  the  protozoa  are  immortal ;  the 
fission  of  the  unicell  is  by  that  very  process  de- 
structive of  individuality,  because  an  individual 
is  that  which  cannot  be  divided  without  destroy- 
ing its  individuality.  The  human  body,  the  brain, 
the  cerebrum  thereof,  are  all  composed  of  separate 
individual  cells,  which  as  Haeckel  himself  sug- 
gests in  the  argument  against  immortality  are 
associated  in  strongly  specialized  centers.  We 
must  therefore  reach  the  curious  conclusion  that 
there  is  no  individual  to  be  immortal;  in  other 


186  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

words,  his  logic  is  destructive  not  only  of  immor- 
tality but  individuality  itself. 

It  appears  evident  that  if  one  cell  divided  is  no 
longer  an  individual  because  so  divided,  then  an 
ovum  cell  which  has  been  so  divided  many  million 
times  and  specialized  in  sections,  is  no  longer  the 
individual,  which,  as  Haeckel  says  in  "The  Riddle 
of  the  Universe,"  then  and  there,  with  the  stem 
cell,  commenced.  It  must  have  commenced  and 
ended  there  speedily  so  that  individuality  is  a 
commencement  of  that  which  never  proceeds. 

It  is  no  longer  a  unit  but  a  unity,  there  are  free 
cells  innumerable  within  it,  white  corpuscles,  etc., 
which,  while  they  make  a  community,  do  not  con- 
stitute a  unit.  The  human  body  dies  hy  piece- 
meal and  it  is  long  after  consciousness,  that  ab- 
solute destruction  of  the  mass  follows.  (Ver- 
worn.) 

I  insist  that  there  is  no  scientific  evidence  that 
the  force,  which  so  holds  together  these  divers 
units,  these  specialized  chemical  activities,  as  that 
there  is  an  individual  within  our  consciousness, 
is  a  product  of  those  motions ;  but  rather  that  it 
is  the  principle  of  force,  or  unit  of  force,  by  and 
through  the  means  of  which  the  union  and  main- 
tenance of  it  is  rendered  possible ;  and  that,  what- 
ever it  is,  is  the  individual  or  there  is  none. 

Where  it  came  from,  why  it  came  at  all,  I  do 
not  know,  but  I  do  know  that  while  we  are  indulg- 
ing in  such  mighty  flights  of  the  scientific  imag- 
ination into  the  region  of  the  infinite  as  that  we 
can  assert  an  ether,  which  is  coeternal  with  an 
equally  infinite  Spirit  which  can  have  a  sum  total, 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  187 

an  ether  boundless,  undifferentiated,  and  infinite, 
but  which  nevertheless  can  condense  into  gases; 
while  we  are  ascribing  to  atoms  sensation  and 
will,  and  loading  down  the  invisible  spermatozoa 
and  ova  with  the  burden  of  the  race  memory  and 
all  the  other  memories  necessary  to  evolve  a 
man;  while  witnessing  such  astounding  products 
of  the  metabolism  of  proteids  as  modern  educa- 
tion has  given  us;  we  need  not  yet,  even  at  the 
bidding  of  the  world^s  greatest  Zoologist,  find  it 
impossible  or  even  difficult  to  include  a  probable 
unit  of  force,  eternal,  having  its  life,  motion,  and 
being  in  that  One,  which  transcends  even  our  sci- 
entific power  of  thought. 

Let  me  return  to  the  last  discussion,  and  see 
if  I  can  make  my  difficulty  in  accepting  the  con- 
clusion of  Professor  Haeckel  a  little  more  ex- 
plicit. 

As  I  have  said,  motion  produces  only  motion; 
and  the  chemical  activities  of  the  cerebral,  or  for 
that  matter  of  all  the  cells  of  the  central  system 
are  motions.  I  can  conceive  of  these  interacting 
motions  producing  one  synthetic  motion  and  I 
may  add  that  that  one  motion  may  be  a  varying 
synthesis,  that  is,  it  may  be  now  one  form  of 
motion  and  again  another  form  of  motion,  de- 
pending upon  the  change  constantly  going  on  in 
the  unit  motions;  but  if  that  conception  is  to  be 
applied  to  the  psychical  phenomena,  we  find  our- 
selves, or  at  least  I  find  myself  in  a  dilemma. 
The  moment's  consciousness,  the  moment's  condi- 
tion of  mind,  is  not  a  simple,  a  single  form  of 
motion,  conceding  it  to  be  a  motion.    It  is  quite 


188  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

the  contrary,  it  is  complex,  it  is  composite,  it  is 
at  once  a  structure  with  many  details,  and  unless 
we  find  that  there  is  something  which  is  the  apex, 
the  perceiver,  we  have  in  this  quasi  Monistic  ma- 
chine no  room  for  the  individual  at  all.  Of 
course,  if  it  be  asserted  that  I  am  not  an  indi- 
vidual and  that  there  is  no  such  thing,  then  the 
consolation  that  I  am  but  the  Infinite  experienc- 
ing, is  sufficient,  because  as  I  have  endeavored  to 
show  in  another  chapter,  nothing  can  be  lost  in 
the  great  One  and  I  presume  that  the  delusion  of 
myself  will  find  its  permanent  place. 

We  know  absolutely  nothing  about  the  energy 
coeternal  with  ether,  we  know  nothing  about 
whether  it  has  units  of  force  or  not;  we  have  no 
scientific  knowledge  on  the  subject.  We  may 
trace  the  laws  of  physics  scientifically  so  far  only 
as  our  experiences  go ;  from  there  on  we  reason, 
we  infer,  and  seek  to  harmonize  the  possible  with 
the  certain.  Nobody  is  justified  in  saying  that 
we  have  in  the  closing  years  of  the  nineteenth 
century  demonstrated  scientifically  that  individ- 
uality either  begins  or  ends  with  its  phenomenal 
appearance  in  the  realm  of  "condensed  ether." 

The  limitations  placed  upon  human  knowledge 
are  tremendous  in  their  inhibitory  results,  and 
as  an  instance  of  how  little  we  know,  and  what 
possibilities  lie  outside  of  our  scientific  knowl- 
edge, I  may  be  permitted  to  present  an  imaginary 
scheme  for  eternity  of  individuality  which  I 
frankly  admit  I  cannot  prove,  but  which  I  insist 
cannot  be  shown  to  be  fatally  inconsistent  with 
what  we  know.    Bear  in  mind  that  I  do  not  say 


THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY  189 

it  may  not  be  inconsistent  with  the  opinions  and 
conclusions  of  individual  scientists,  but  only  that 
it  is  as  firmly  founded  upon  our  absolute  knowl- 
edge as  any  opinions  on  their  part. 

Let  us  suppose  the  world  to  be  an  individual 
endowed  with  consciousness,  will,  and  thought. 
Is  this  a  violent  presumption!  Not  at  all.  Many 
of  the  great  philosophers  of  the  past  and  some  of 
the  present  time  have  expressed  the  opinion  that 
"the  world  lives,  the  world  thinks."  Nor  need  we 
be  swerved,  necessarily,  from  the  assumption,  be- 
cause we  walk  about  and  find  space,  activities 
and  objects,  and  are  able  to  modify  the  appear- 
ance of  the  world  by  our  operations,  for  within 
myself  I  can  conceive  of  a  phagocyte  (white  cor- 
puscle) roaming  in  quest  of  food  and  performing 
his  duties  as  possibly  a  hunter  in  the  veins  and 
tissues  of  my  body,  and  refusing  to  admit  that 
what  he  lives  in  is  a  being  endowed  like  himself 
with  will,  thought,  and  consciousness.  He  finds 
space,  space  as  wide  and  extended  in  comparison 
as  do  you  and  I  in  the  world.  Or  to  bring  the 
suggestion  more  closely  home,  let  us  consider  one 
of  the  cells  of  the  cerebrum,  one  of  those  the 
"sum  total"  of  whose  activities  make  up  the 
"soul."  Such  a  cell  is  exceedingly,  incompre- 
hensibly intricate  in  its  internal,  molecular  mo- 
tions, so  much  so  that  the  movements  of  a  Hoe 
printing  press  are  as  a  sum  in  addition  to  a  quad- 
ratic equation  in  comparison — or  one  of  the  cells 
and  its  associate  cells  constituting  a  congeries  of 
cells,  a  center,  say  the  center  of  speech  in  one  of 
the  lobes  of  the  brain;  there  is  space  between 


190  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

these  cells,  they  commuiiicate  by  some  vibration, 
undulation  or  other  form  of  motion  along  the  sub- 
stance of  the  nerves  and  across  space  between 
the  plexuses.  They  have  their  admitted  limita- 
tions and  specializations  just  as  we  have  in  the 
world.  If  I  could  analyze  the  consciousness  of 
one  of  them  (and  of  course  I  cannot),  I  might 
find  as  much  ignorance  of  the  methods  by  which 
it  communicates  with  others,  as  I  find  among  men 
as  to  the  ways  and  means  of  telepathy;  or  I 
might  go  farther  and  say  that  it  will  deny  that 
it  communicates  at  all  except  so  far  as  it  may 
trace  its  own  force  impulses  physically. 

As  we  find  stated  in  "Mind,  Motion  and  Mo- 
nism," by  Eomanes  (and  the  statement  is  borne 
out  by  other  writers  equally  as  scientific),  when 
by  injury  or  destruction  the  cells  constituting 
the  center  of  speech  on  one  side  of  the  brain  dis- 
appear, the  power  of  speech  is  lost.  Ideas  re- 
main, there  is  no  change  or  loss  in  them,  but  the 
power  to  express  them  in  words  and  sentences 
is  not  there.  But,  in  many  instances  (and  one  is 
sufficient  for  proof),  after  a  while  the  cells  con- 
stituting a  similar  center  on  the  other  side  of 
the  brain  begin  to  develop  the  function  of  speech 
and  eventually  the  individual  regains  the  use  of 
the  faculty.  Professor  Eomanes  considered  this 
remarkable,  so  do  I,  so  I  think  will  you.  Ideas 
usually,  I  believe,  take  their  place  in  the  stream 
of  consciousness  in  the  form  of  language — and 
here  we  have  an  individual  with  undisturbed 
ideas  which  labor  and  struggle  for  utterance  and 
finally   force   their   way   into    expression.      The 


THE   ETERNITY  OF  INDIVIDUALITY  191 

physical  expression  has  departed,  but  shall  we 
hesitate  to  say  that  the  consciousness  and  knowl- 
edge of  speech  was  builded  into  the  individual 
and  refinds  expression! 

What  has  become  of  the  cells,  of  their  indi- 
vidualities? I  do  not  know  and  it  does  not  con- 
cern me,  it  is  sufficient  that  that  other,  the  un- 
born, the  relationship,  for  which  the  center  and 
cells  played  their  part  is  not  gone;  it  is  there. 
With  the  units  and  unities  which  make  the  ex- 
pression of  the  Unity  possible,  I  have  nothing 
to  do. 

To  return  to  my  relationship  to  the  world,  I 
have  long  ago,  perhaps  without  reason,  disabused 
my  mind  of  the  idea  that  I  stand  alone ;  the  space 
in  which  I  move  and  which  surrounds  me  no 
longer  appalls  me  because  I  find  that  it  is  all 
relative. 

Conceive  my  body,  if  you  will,  as  a  cell  in  the 
multicellular  world ;  the  intricacy  and  complexity 
of  it  need  not  deter  you,  for  we  have  seen  that 
it  is  not  a  whit  more  so  than  a  cortical  cell.  I 
may  serve  physically  just  that  purpose,  I  per- 
form my  function.  If  the  body  disintegrates, 
who  shall  say  that  the  function,  the  relationship, 
that  for  which  I  stand,  is  not  built  into  the  world 
and  that  my  real  life  is  my  life  in  it! 

That  which  I  as  an  individual,  not  as  a  mass  of 
cells,  stand  for,  is  not  in  the  ponderous  expres- 
sion, not  in  the  cumbersome,  composite,  living 
environment,  but  in  the  relationship.  I  cannot  be 
lost ;  its  value  is  just  what  it  is  in  that  larger  in- 
dividuality, in  which  it  lives  and  dwells. 


192  THE   ETERNITY   OF   INDIVIDUALITY 

To  fully  comprehend  what  I  mean,  we  should 
not  specialize  but  generalize  the  subject.  The 
law  of  relationship  must  be  conceived  of  as  ex- 
tending completely  down  the  line  of  physical  as- 
sociation until  we  shall  have  reached  what  has 
been  supposed  to  have  been  discovered,  the  unit 
of  living  substance.  With  such  a  conception  the 
question  of  how  the  individual  first  appears,  in 
the  germ  cell  with  its  wonderfully  prepared  en- 
vironment, is  no  more  mysterious  to  me  than  how 
anything  else  in  the  world  appears  where  and 
when  it  does,  for  on  this  theory  we  are  so  inti- 
mately woven  together  in  the  life,  that  to  solve 
that  problem  would  indeed  be  to  give  a  solution 
of  "The  Eiddle  of  the  Universe." 

Given  the  assumed  ether  and  spirit  of  Profes- 
sor Haeckel,  and  the  conception  of  the  units  of 
force  to  which  I  have  referred  is  certainly  not  a 
violent  presumption,  for  I  have  the  right  to  con- 
tinue to  ascribe  eternal  differentiation  to  the 
"Spirit."  It  certainly  is  not  homogenous  and  in- 
finite with  the  inherent  capacity  to  break  up  or 
condense  like  the  ether,  if  so  we  must  look  back 
of  even  it  to  find  that  mysterious  capacity  or 
force  by  virtue  of  which  it  condenses  in  sections 
or  breaks  up  or  starts  its  various  manifestations. 
A  homogenous  ether,  a  homogenous  Spirit  per- 
vading it  even  as  its  other  pole  would,  it  appears 
to  me,  sleep  a  dreamless  undisturbed  sleep  and 
be  eternally  as  immovable  as  adamant.  Either 
the  One  and  the  many  were  and  are  in  being  eter- 
nally, or  there  is,  as  in  fact  there  seems  to  be,  a 
point   beyond  which   reason   cannot   reach.     If 


THE   ETERNITY   OP   INDIVIDUALITY  193 

ether  and  units  of  force  eternally,  then  there  is 
no  scientific  reason  why  we  should  not  ascribe  to 
these  units  of  force  individuality  and  differentia- 
tion multiplex  enough  to  account  for  all  the  mani- 
festation of  the  Universe.  To  ascribe  to  Spirit 
diversity,  differentiation,  and  individuality,  is  no 
more  dualism  than  to  postulate  eternal  and  in- 
finite ether  and  eternal  infinite  spirit. 

Why  the  fact  that  any  conception  of  immortal- 
ity must  scientifically  include  the  lower  animals 
should  in  any  manner  be  considered  an  argument 
against  it,  I  do  not  understand.  The  Universe 
does  include  animals,  for  we  see  them  every  day 
and  what  the  Universe  includes  I  suppose  be- 
longs to  it.  While  we  are  talking  about  "infinite" 
force  or  spirit  we  may  as  well  logically  include 
infinite  variety  of  individualities,  for  that  is  what 
makes  up  the  universe.  What  value  the  units 
of  force,  which  appear  as  animals  here  and  now, 
may  have  in  the  economy  of  the  universe,  I  do 
not  know,  but  they  seem  to  have  had  great  value 
so  far  in  preparing  by  evolution  the  opportunity 
for  the  physical  appearance  of  man. 

Why  any  question  of  their  value  should  even 
be  considered  by  Professor  Haeckel,  I  do  not  un- 
derstand, for  he  has  given  the  "Lord  God  his 
conge*^  and  there  is  no  need  for  values.  The  idea 
that  all  individuals  should  be  alike  is  an  unnec- 
essary one  in  my  view,  for  infinity  and  eternity 
are  very  large  and  include  everything. 


Chapter  XI 


CONCLUSION 

As  I  endeavored  to  make  clear  at  the  cora- 
mencement  of  this  book,  my  purpose  has  not  been 
to  present  a  scientific  demonstration  of  immor- 
tality which  would  be  capable  without  personal 
evidence,  for  I  fully  realize  the  folly  of  any  such 
an  attempt  with  our  present  knowledge,  but 
rather  to  set  forth,  as  forcibly  as  my  command 
of  language  and  limited  familiarity  with  the  gen- 
eral field  of  Science  would  permit,  the  reasons 
why  I  believe  the  attempt  to  demonstrate  the 
contrary  position  to  be  true  to  be  chargeable 
with  greater  folly.  The  great  mystery  of  life 
and  individuality  is  as  dense  to-day  under  the 
rays  of  the  rising  sun  of  Science  as  it  has  ever 
been;  the  Sphinx  sits  as  silent,  as  immovable,  as 
uncommunicative  on  the  sands  of  the  desert  as 
it  has  done  for  countless  generations,  and  man 
knows  experimentally  as  little  about  the  whence, 
the  why  and  the  whither,  as  he  did  in  the  ages 
when  under  Indian  skies  he  reached  the  summit 
of  philosophic  wisdom.  It  is  unfortunate  that  we 
are  so  constituted  as  that  whenever  an  array  of 
facts  presents  itself  to  us  in  an  unbroken  line  of 
continuity,  we  are  apt  to  take  it  as  a  rule  of 
measurement  for  everything  else,  forgetting  the 

194 


CONCLUSION  195 

amazing  complexity  of  nature  and  the  startling 
surprises  which  frequently  assail  us  in  the  form 
of  apparent  breaks  in  continuity.  The  hidden 
links  which  bind  together  the  phenomena  are 
many,  are  unknown,  are  only  to  be  theoretically 
considered  and  will  forever  recede  from  our 
analysis. 

The  rational  process  of  Science  is  to  proceed 
from  the  known  to  the  unknown  by  inference ;  the 
theoretical  process  is  to  come  back  from  the  in- 
ferred and  construct  upon  it  theses  concerning 
other  phenomena.  Thus,  for  reasons  which  I 
need  not  give  in  detail.  Science  infers  the  exist- 
ence of  atoms  and  an  infinite  ether  or  substance. 
Now  this  is  rational.  Atoms,  we  say,  must  be; 
they  may  be  hard,  round  bodies,  or  they  may  be 
vortices.  Ether  must  be,  it  may  have  any  of  the 
consistent  qualities  assigned  to  it,  but  when  we 
have  assumed  necessarily  the  ether  and  the 
atoms,  our  assumption  has  not  become  the  basis 
for  a  demonstration  of  any  sort.  If  we  return 
with  our  atoms  and  our  ether  and,  using  them  as 
a  foundation,  rear  thereon  structures  other  than 
those  from  whence  (phenomenal  existence)  we 
traveled  into  the  region  of  the  unknown  by  induc- 
tion, we  are  theorizing,  and  theorizing  only. 

Hence  I  insist  that  the  laws  of  substance,  of 
which  so  much  has  been  said,  and  upon  which  so 
much  has  been  builded,  are  themselves  yet  to  be 
proven  and  demonstrated. 

There  is  a  sort  of  so-called  logical  destruction 
of  that  which  is  of  tremendous  ethical  value  to 
the  world,  which  proceeds  somewhat  after  this 


196  CONCLUSION 

fashion:  "I  find  mind  associated  with  brain; 
brain  is  composed  of  elements  to  be  found  un- 
associated  with  each  other  everywhere  in  the 
universe;  there  ought  to  be  a  substance  called 
ether;  these  elements  are  reducible  to  simple 
forms  of  condensed  ether;  as  there  seems  to  me 
to  be  no  other  place  from  which  consciousness 
and  will  can  come,  these  forms  of  condensed  ether 
must  have  them ;  they  cannot  have  much  of  them 
because  I  conceive  of  these  forms  of  condensed 
ether  as  infinitesimally  small  points  and  not  com- 
plex; true,  I  have  never  seen  these  small  points 
or  simple  forms,  but  as  I  cannot  account  for  mat- 
ter in  any  other  way,  they  must  exist. 

"I  do  not  believe  that  there  is  anything  in  the 
universe  but  this  ether  and  these  infinitesimal 
points  of  condensation  as  a  last  analysis,  there- 
fore everything  came  from  their  association,  all 
bodies,  all  differentiation,  all  mind,  even  the  soul 
of  man;  therefore,  it  is  absurd  to  think  that 
there  is  any  immortality,  and  any  man  who  thinks 
so  is  either  in  his  dotage,  or  is  superstitious,  or 
lacks  in  the  power  of  exercising  sound  judgment, 
or  owes  it  to  his  early  religious  training,  or  has 
not  the  gift  of  pure  reason." 

Now  all  this  may  be  true,  but  it  is  by  no  means 
shown  to  be  so.  As  we  have  seen,  there  is  an 
absurdly  small  degree  of  actual  knowledge  of  the 
properties  of  ether  within  the  possession  of  any 
one,  the  atoms  are  as  elusive  as  ghosts  and  as 
foreign  to  positive  classification  as  the  canals  of 
Mars.  The  attitude  of  Prof.  Haeckel  toward  the 
ignorance  of  the  qualities  and  properties  of  ether 


CONCLUSION  197 

and  atoms,  on  the  part  of  the  rest  of  mankind 
who  yet  have  a  lingering  faith  in  the  possibilities 
which  may  fill  the  vastness  of  what  they  do  not 
know,  is  akin  to  that  of  St.  Paul  toward  the  men 
of  Athens  when  he  covered  their  ignorance  with 
his  wisdom  by  saying:  "Him  whom  you  ig- 
norantly  worship,  Him  declare  I  unto  yon." 

It  is  not,  that,  in  these  days  when  Science  is 
the  king  of  the  realm  of  thought,  such  a  learned 
man  as  Haeckel  should  not,  if  he  chose,  instruct 
the  world  with  his  opinion  upon  the  subject  which 
he  deemed  of  import  enough  to  write  about,  but 
that,  because  of  his  prominence,  he  should  not 
have  presented  it  in  such  a  manner  as  to  amount 
to  a  declaration  that  such  an  attitude  as  that 
which  he  takes  is  the  ultimatum  of  Science.  As 
we  have  seen,  it  is  not  so ;  it  is  far  from  it ;  it  is 
only  the  opinion  of  Professor  Haeckel,  based  upon 
his  great  attainments  in  the  field  of  zoology  and 
manifestly  highly  colored  and  seasoned  by  his  un- 
deniable bias  for  the  Monistic  philosophy  and 
religion. 

Such  attitude,  if  taken  prematurely  by  Science, 
is,  I  believe,  dangerous  to  good  government, 
dangerous  to  character,  dangerous  to  society, 
dangerous  to  morals  and  dangerous  to  health  and 
peace  of  mind.  Not  dangerous  because  it  pre- 
sents the  truth,  for  mankind  can  always  adapt 
itself  to  truth,  but  because  it  presents  a  guess  as 
though  it  were  a  truth,  and  a  guess  too  which  is 
not  calculated  to  result  in  uplifting,  encourag- 
ing or  improving  mankind,  but  quite  on  the  con- 
trary calculated  to  result  in  shrouding  the  weak 


198  CONCLUSION 

in  hopelessness,  and  in  crowning  pessimism  king 
in  place  of  optimism.  All  this  because  one  great 
man,  who  had  created  a  wide  avenue  of  hearing 
for  himself  by  his  remarkable  intelligence  in  cer- 
tain fields  of  learning,  uses  that  avenue  to  pre- 
sent his  opinion  upon  the  subject  most  precious 
to  man,  in  a  form  which  appears  to  bear  the 
stamp  of  approved  and  demonstrated  fact. 

Why  do  I  take  this  attitude  toward  the  book? 
Why  should  I  not  1  I  have  read  it ;  for  a  moment 
it  staggered  me,  it  grieved  me,  it  inexpressibly 
saddened  me,  but  not  for  long ;  its  monument  of 
the  known,  of  the  seen,  the  felt,  the  measured,  the 
weighted  and  guaged,  stood  so  insecurely  upon 
the  uncertain  quagmire  of  the  absolutely  linknown 
that  it  toppled  over  of  its  own  weight.  I  found 
it  soon  enough  to  be  a  projection  of  lines  into 
the  infinite  horizon,  lines  which  had  but  one  end, 
lines  which  reached  to  nowhere. 

It  is  a  profound  presentation  of  the  physical 
appearance  of  life,  life  in  ponderable  matter ;  but 
in  every  direction,  without  exception,  the  known 
shades  off  by  degrees  to  the  unknown,  the  im- 
measurable and  possibly  the  unknowable,  leaving 
the  sensible  man  to  rely  yet  upon  his  inner  con- 
sciousness and  frame  his  faith  upon  the  data  as 
he  shall  find  them  appealing  to  him  as  rational. 

Of  all  the  attempts  of  encouragement  of  man 
as  an  ethical  being,  made  by  the  materialistic  and 
some  of  the  so-called  Monistic  moralists,  that  is 
the  saddest  which  suggests  that  the  individual  is 
nothing,  the  race  everything.  That  it  is  the  duty 
of  each  to  so  live  that  the  race  will  advance  in 


CONCLUSION  199 

happiness,  prosperity,  culture,  morality,  etc.,  etc. 
This  sort  of  pabulum  may  feed  the  minds  of 
those  who  present  it  to  others,  but  aside  from  the 
actual  compensating  pleasure  with  which  one  re- 
wards himself  for  virtue,  there  is  no  reason  why 
life  under  such  a  theory  should  not  take  its  full 
swing  regardless  of  the  future  and  those  who  are 
to  fill  it.  Why  is  the  race  everything?  Why  is 
there  a  race  at  all?  What  particular  advantage 
is  it  to  me  that  a  race  of  any  beings  should  sur- 
vive my  absolute  disappearance?  These  ques- 
tions cannot  be  answered  to  the  satisfaction  of 
any  except  such  as  have  been  so  environed  as 
that  love,  plenty,  culture,  education,  music,  art, 
science  and  prosperity  have  come  and  come  to 
stay. 

To  such  the  maintenance  of  morality  is  a  neces- 
sity and  the  preservation  of  the  race,  inasmuch 
as  it  necessitates  the  careful  preservation  of  that 
which  fills  their  lives,  is  worthy  of  their  effort 
and  fully  rewards  them.  This  is  the  reasoning 
usually  of  the  cloister,  the  library,  the  university, 
but  rarely,  if  ever,  of  the  city,  the  field,  the 
crowded,  sweating,  foul,  noisy,  contentious,  com- 
petitive and  suffering  swarms  of  human  life. 

The  struggle  of  life  is  for  the  individual!  The 
individual  is  everything;  it  is  as  much  a  race  as 
that  vast  concourse  of  men  and  women  usually  so 
named.  It  is  no  less  and  no  more  an  absolutely 
essential  factor  in  the  life  of  the  Universal  One. 
Is  there  any  community  more  emphatic  than  I 
find  in  myself — any,  where  the  struggles  are  more 
frequent  or  more  violent — any,  where  the  call  for 


200  CONCLUSION 

equity,  ethics,  and  culture  are  louder  and  more 
imperative  ? 

To  do  my  demanded  duty  to  the  race,  and  the 
race  of  men,  is  to  perform  loyally  and  cheerfully 
the  function  which  as  a  comparative  unit  I  must 
perform  from  the  necessities  of  my  relationship 
to  it,  just  as  I  demand  of  those  which  stand  be- 
neath me  as  the  units  of  my  unity  to  perform 
theirs  to  me. 

Therefore  I  insist  that  the  preservation,  the 
persistence  of  the  individual  has  as  much  of  value 
in  the  economy  of  the  universe  as  that  of  the  so- 
called  race. 

Socialism  has  no  saving  grace,  except  it  be 
always  directed  in  purpose  to  the  development 
of  the  individual. 

Either  all  this  is  true,  or  the  whole  race  life 
is  purposeless  and  empty  and  should  aim  at 
ultimate  suicide  of  society  rather  than  the 
preservation  of  the  meaningless  holiday  parade 
of  advancing  civilization. 

The  acceptance  of  such  an  ultimate  conclusion 
as  Professor  Haeckel  announces,  as  the  product 
and  the  only  product  of  pure  reason,  as  a  fact,  as 
an  undeniable,  proven  result  of  the  century's  prog- 
ress in  Science,  would  start  a  new  era  with  the 
undoing  of  all  that  has  been  accomplished  in 
centuries   of  ethical  progress. 

Human  life  has  achieved  a  value  which  the 
ancients  rarely  admitted,  the  shedding  of  blood 
has  become  more  abhorrent,  the  preservation  of 
the  lives  of  the  suffering,  the  amelioration  of  pov- 
erty, the  kindly  care  for  the  insane,  the  education 


CONCLUSION  201 

of  the  deaf,  dumb  and  blind,  have  all  become 
matters  of  great  interest  and  more  or  less  suc- 
cessful achievement,  and  why?  Because  mankind 
has  come  to  recognize  that  there  is  something 
more  to  a  human  individual  than  the  "chemical 
activities"  of  the  cells  of  the  cerebrum.  There  has 
been  developed  an  active  sympathy  for  the  suffer- 
ing of  dumb  brutes,  and  laws  for  the  prevention 
of  cruelty  to  them  promulgated  and  enforced. 

To  abandon  this  conception  of  the  value  of  the 
individual,  as  something  more  than  his  mere 
economic  availability  to  society,  would  result  in 
an  abandonment  of  the  useless  additions  to  the 
burdens  of  government.  The  protection  of  human 
beings  from  the  dangers  of  contagion  from  dis- 
eases would,  under  such  a  system  of  belief,  justify 
the  wholesale  extinction  of  populated  centers,  the 
painless  destruction  of  life,  and  the  merciless  ap- 
plication of  stringent  laws  for  isolation.  Why 
should  the  lame,  blind,  paralyzed,  tuberculous 
and  witless  be  allowed  to  persist  in  living?  Why 
burden  ourselves  with  the  insane  and  criminal? 
Why  not  weed  the  earth  of  the  incompetent?  The 
natural  operation  of  the  law  of  the  survival  of 
the  fittest  is  far  too  slow,  it  can  be  materially 
assisted.  The  aged  and  senile  may  be  gently 
passed  out  of  life  and  the  world  move  along  much 
more  easily  and  untrammeled. 

This  is  the  logical  outcome  of  such  a  view  of 
life,  and  any  attempts  to  relieve  the  situation  by 
soft  language  about  the  adoration  of  the  beauti- 
ful and  sublime  in  nature  is  folly.  If  love  is  but 
the  chemical  affinity  which  Haeckel  asserts  it  to 


202  CONCLUSION 

be,  it  is  an  empty  delusion  and  the  beautiful  and 
sublime  resolve  themselves  into  nothing  but  a 
dance  of  atoms.  We  have  for  centuries  been 
building  up  as  the  essential  vitality  of  our  civ- 
ilization elusive,  lying,  evanescent,  fictitious 
shadows  and  labeling  them  "heart"  and  "soul." 

If  we  are  to  commence  the  work  of  uprooting 
the  spiritual,  the  "superstitious,"  the  soulful,  the 
individual,  and  selfhood,  we  must  make  a  clean 
sweep  and  carry  with  them  all  which  has  grown 
in  the  soil  of  those  gardens.  They  are  illusions, 
they  are  courtiers  attendant  upon  the  king  of 
delusions,  the  soul.  Evolution  was  side-tracked 
centuries  ago,  and  the  sooner  we  find  the  main 
track  the  sooner  we  may  take  that  desirable 
plunge  into  the  abyss  of  anarchy  and  confusion. 

I  have  heard  the  charms  of  such  a  (Monistic?) 
philosophy  delightfully  expressed  by  others  than 
Professor  Haeckel,  but  to  any  but  the  contented 
and  prosperous,  the  healthful  and  happy,  they 
have  the  odor  of  the  charnel  house  and  the  hope- 
lessness of  hell. 

I  am  quite  aware  that  these  are  strong  words, 
but  I  am  searching  for  strong  words,  words 
powerful  enough  to  express  my  personal  con- 
demnation, not  of  an  expression  of  the  truth,  but 
of  an  expression  of  a  theory  upon  such  a  vital 
matter,  in  a  manner  which  leaves  the  impression 
upon  the  human  mind,  that  the  theory  is  scientific 
fact.  Such  a  negative  theory,  if  it  be  a  fact,  can 
never  be  shown  to  Science  as  such,  for  Science 
never  yet  has  found  an  ocean  whose  last  wave  it 
has  measured,  never  a  form  of  substance  which 


CONCLUSION  203 

did  not  inclose  another,  it  never  yet  has  laid 
its  hand  upon  the  lever  of  the  universe,  and  it 
never  will. 

It  is  evident  that  with  all  his  remarkable  attain- 
ments in  scientific  learning  Professor  Haeckel  has 
not  mastered  the  first  principles  of  mental  science, 
or  he  never  would  have  permitted  himself  to  sug- 
gest that  the  abandonment  of  the  belief  in  im- 
mortality would  be  for  the  best  interests  of 
human  society,  or  that  the  world  has  anything  to 
gain  by  it.  Under  and  by  virtue  of  the  very  laws 
of  substance  to  which  he  appeals,  the  ideas  of  im- 
mortality and  duty,  however  false  they  may  be, 
are  builded  into  the  very  being  of  human  in- 
dividuals. 

Heredity  has  made  them  parts  of  the  brains 
which  they  have  inherited  from  their  ancestors 
according  to  Professor  Haeckel,  and  any  sudden 
change  from  such  a  belief  must  assuredly  be  of 
such  a  character  as  to  cause  confusion  and  dis- 
astrous results  to  the  process  of  mental  evolution. 

Philosophers  may  have  no  trouble  in  adapting 
themselves  to  such  a  change  of  views,  if  the  neces- 
sity arises,  but  the  mass  of  mankind  certainly  will 
find  it  opening  before  them  like  an  impassable 
gulf. 

Whatever  may  be  the  mysterious  secret  behind 
the  fact,  it  is  certainly  true  that  happiness,  health, 
longevity,  and  good  government  depend  largely 
upon  the  belief  and  hope  of  mankind.  What 
punishment  would  be  sufficient  for  that  physician 
who,  in  attendance  upon  his  patients,  bluntly  con- 
fided to  them  the  exact  condition  of  their  physical 


204  CONCLUSIOIT 

organs,  the  hopelessnesb  of  attempting  to  co- 
ordinate the  nervons  system  and  the  certainty  of 
an  ultimate  and  speedy  death  1  Ignorance  of  even 
the  real  condition,  hope  based  upon  lack  of  imder- 
standing  of  the  threatening  complications,  and 
the  confidence  resulting  from  it,  have  always  been 
considered  curative  agents  of  profound  value. 

It  is  not  often  that,  when  the  apparent  hope- 
lessness of  life  is  so  emphatic  as  that  one  may 
almost  number  the  hours  remaining,  the  attend- 
ing physician  is  justified  in  destroying  the  last 
chance  by  a  destruction  of  hope.  It  may  be 
safely  said  that  no  justification  exists  for  such  a 
removal  of  the  supporting  faith  when  dissolution 
is  a  mere  possibility.  To  whatever  degree  it  may 
be  based  upon  superstition,  desire,  love,  the  un- 
known or  the  unknowable,  it  is  apparent  to  any 
thoughtful  and  observant  man,  that  the  belief  in 
individual  life  surviving  the  wreck  of  the  physical 
body,  in  accountability  in  some  manner,  in  an 
existence  where  the  disappointments  and  griefs 
of  this  life  are  compensated,  and  where  justice 
dangles  the  other  side  of  the  balances,  is  builded 
into  the  very  body,  indeed  it  is  the  central  system, 
of  ethics,  and  as  certainly  it  is  the  one  last  staff 
upon  which  all  may  lean. 


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